SAMUEL E. FLANNIGAN v. STATE OF ILLINOIS.
Case summary
Claimant sought $1,655.00 in unpaid salary as a trustee of the Southern Illinois Normal University. The court denied the claim because it had been previously adjudicated and rejected by the Commission of Claims in 1873, making it res judicata.
AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.
Headnotes
- RES ADJUDICATA-what constitutes. Where a claim has been heard,
SAMUEL E. FLANNIGAN
v.
STATE OF ILLINOIS.
Opinion filed December 29, 1908.
RES ADJUDICATA-what constitutes. Where a claim has been heard, either before the Commission of Claims or its successor, the Court of Claims, and a decision rendered, such decision will be final, unless a rehearing is applied for and granted and the decision changed.
W. S. Cantrall, for Claimant.
W. H. Stead, Attorney General, for State.
This is a claim by Samuel E. Flannigan for $1,655.00 which he claims to be due him as salary as a trustee of the Southern Illinois Normal University. He alleges in his verified claim that in 1869 he was appointed a trustee of said board by John M. Palmer, then Governor of the State of Illinois; and that thereafter he was elected secretary of said board, and served both as trustee and secretary for a period of two years, beginning in March, 1869; and that he received as salary and expenses for said services the sum of $1,475.00, and that the amount claimed is yet due him from the State.
He also alleged in his said claim that in 1873 he filed a claim for said balance due him, with the Commission of Claims of this State.
To his demand the Attorney General has filed various pleas, among which is the plea of former adjudication.
It appears both from the verified claim and the evidence introduced in this case, that this claim was filed in the Auditor's office in 1873, and that a hearing was thereafter had thereon before the Commission of Claims, and that said claim was rejected. Having been so considered and determined upon its merits at that time, it is now barred from further hearing in this Court, and is therefore rejected.