Drennan v. State of Illinois

ROSCoe L. DRENNAN

v.

STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Opinion filed March 17, 1915.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-claims barred if not filed within twoyear period. Where the cause of action accrued on August 3, 1912, and the claim was not filed with the Auditor until February 16, 1915, the Statute of Limitations is a bar to the claim.

C. B. Taylor, for Claimant.

P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, and Arthur R. Roy, Assistant Attorney General, for State.

Claimant, a resident of Champaign County, aged twenty-eight years, was a member of Company G, Fourth Infantry, Illinois National Guard, and from July 28 to August 3, 1912, was on duty at Camp Lincoln, Springfield. On August 9, 1912, he was taken ill and on August 12 became completely paralyzed and helpless. His ailment was diagnosed as infantile paralysis. He was confined to his bed until December 1, 1912, and since then has been able to move about only with the aid of crutches or other objects, and with great difficulty.

In the opinion of physicians who have examined him, he is permanently paralyzed and his case is incurable.

The physicians who testified do not agree as to the time elapsing between exposure to the germ of this disease and the time of incubation, one saying ten to fourteen days, another that the period of incubation is from eight to ten days from the time of exposure to the time fever sets in and ten to fourteen days to paralysis.

Claimant testified that he sustained no injury while in camp. He received from the State one dollar a day for thirty days, and the medical board allowed him one dollar per day for six months more. The doctors' and nurses' bills and general expenses have been paid by the State. [*397]

merely appointive officers, with certain statutory powers, are mere subdivisions of the government.

They are mere assistants to the State in the exercise of its functions; not created at their own instance and request, but for the purpose of aiding and assisting the sovereign power of the State in carrying on the functions of the government and they are not liable for the negligence or tortious acts of its servants. * * *” Further the Court said: “* * * it has been judicially decided that the Board of South Park Commissioners are not liable in their corporate capacity. How then can it be claimed that the State is liable for the acts of the Board of South Park Commissioners?”

In Johnson v. State, 1 C. of C. R., 208, a case wherein claimant was injured while in the employ of the Board of Park Commissioners of West Chicago, and on page 209 this Court said:

“The demurrer raises the question whether the State of Illinois is responsible to the claimant for the wrongful or negligent acts of its subordinate officers. This question has been so frequently decided and the authorities are so numerous that we deem it only necessary to cite them. * * * In these cases the Commission held the rule to be well settled that a State could not be held liable for the wrongful or negligent conduct of its officers. The principle is so well established by authority as to admit of no doubt.”

The above quoted cases are cited with approval in Fowler, Admr., v. State, heretofore decided in this Court.

Claimant in this case argues that Lincoln Park Commissioners, in operating a railroad, exceeded the duties imposed by law. If that were the case, then the right of action would appear to be against the commissioners and those running the railroad as individuals. The State is not liable for the acts of its agents acting outside the scope of their authority. [*393]

the two dates. It is provided in section 4 of an Act to limit the time for persons to bring claims against the State of Illinois, approved March 1, 1847, same appearing also in chapter 84, paragraph 31 of the Revised Statutes of 1913, that "hereafter all unliquidated claims against the State shall be proved up and filed as above, within two years from the time such claim may have arisen; and any claim not presented and proved up as above, and filed, shall be forever barred from payment by the State." The rule of this Court is as follows: "If it appears on the face of a declaration that the claim is barred by Statute of Limitations, the same may be dismissed."

In this state of the case, claimant is not entitled to recover in this Court. We do not want to bar claimant's right to present his claim to the legislature, having in mind the facts as presented in this record and the serious nature of the disease from which claimant suffer. Were it not for the fact that the claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations, we would undoubtedly award the claimant the sum of eight thousand ($8,000.00) dollars. Under the circumstances, however, the claim is rejected without prejudice to the right of claimant to present his claim to the legislature. [*394]

BUSZKIEWICZ v. STATE OF ILLINOIS.