H. L. SAUNDERS, Claimant, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent. Opznion filed October 1 0, 1939. CLAINANT
Case summary
Claimant sought refund of vehicle and driver's license fees after selling his car. The court denied the claim, holding no statutory authority for refunds and that the court lacked jurisdiction because no action would lie against the state if suable.
Cases cited: Phillips v. State, No. 3091 (1937); Crabtree v. State, 7 C. C. R. 207; Kramer v. State, 8 C. C. R. 31; Shumway v. State, 8 C. C. R. 43; Tatone v. State, No. 2475 (1937); Dealers Transport Co. v. State, 8 C. C. R. 510; Freeport Floral Co. v. State, 9 C. C. R. 149; Eaid v. State, No. 3157 (1938); Great Northern Oil Co. v. State, No. 3234 (1938)
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Headnotes
- MOTOR VEHICLE LICENSE mc-claziiz for refund where use of vehicle for which zssued dzscontznzced dtrrang period for whzch zssued- no prouzszon 111 law azrthorzxang-cannot be m a d e o n grounds of equzty and good conscienceaward for refund iivust Be dented. The identical question presented here was before this Court and decided in Pli~llzpsvs. Xtate, 1 0 Court of Claims Reports, 53 and the ruling therein is decisive i n the present case.
- MR. CHIEF JUSTICE H~LLERICH
Claimant filed his cqmplaint herein on June 29, 1939, and seeks to recover the sum of Eleven Dollars ($11.00) which he paid to the Secretary of State for a 1939 automobile license, and Fifty Cents (50c) which he paid to the same officer for driver’s license. The complaint alleges that claimant was unable to secure a driver’s license, and consequently was forced to, and did dispose of his automobile on April 30,1939, and thercfore asks for a refund of the unpaid portion of the fees so paid by him as aforesaid.
The Attorney General has entered a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the claimant is not entitled to an award under the facts set forth in the complaint.
The question here presented mas before this court in the case of Phillips State, No. 3091, decided at the Septem17s.
ber term, 1937. In that case the claimant sold his car, and did not opcratc it at any time after the receipt of the license plates. In considering his right to a return of the unearned portion of the license fee paid by him, we said: “There is no provision of the Motor Vehicle Act, or any other act, which authorizes a return of a license fee under the facts set forth in the complaint.
Had the Legislature intended that licensees should be entitled to a return of the license fees paid by them, in the event of a sale of the licensed car, they would undoubtedly have made provision to that effect.”
[*122] Also : “The jurisdiction of this court is limited to claims in respect of which the claimant would be entitled to redress against the State, either at law or in equity, if the State were suable. Crabtree vs. State, 7 C. C. R. 207; Kramer vs. State, 8 C. C. R. 31; Shumway vs. Stats, 8 C. C. R. 43; Tatone vs. State, No. 2475, decided at the January Term, 1937 of this court. “Under the facts set forth in the complaint, claimant could not maintain an action against the State if it were suable, and therefore we have no authority to allow an award.”
The same rule was applied by this court in the following cases, to wit: Dealers Traqasport Co. vs. Crtate, 8 C. C. R. 510; Freeport Floral Co. vs. State, 9 C. C. R. 149; Eaid vs. State, No. 3157, decided January term, 1938 ; Gyeat Northem C72aiiCo. vs. State, No. 3234, decided May term, 1938.
What has been said with reference to the vehicle license fee applies with equal force to the driver’s license fee.
For the reasons set forth in the cases cited, the motion of the Attorney General must be sustained.
Motion to dismiss allowed. Case dismissed.