Claimant, vs.-STATE JOHN LOCKETT, OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.
Case summary
Claimant, a highway laborer, slipped and fell at work, fracturing his hand. The court found the accident arose out of and in the course of employment under the Workmen's Compensation Act and awarded $761.16.
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Headnotes
- WORKMEN’S COMPEN S A TI ON ACT-laborer i n Division op Highways wzthin provasions of- when award m a y be made tinder for temporary total dzsabzlaty ‘and pewnanent partial loss of use of hand. Where laborer in Division of Highways, sustains accidental injuries, arising out of, and in the course of his employ&ent, while engaged in extra-hazardous employment, resulting in temporary total disability and permanent partial loss of use of hand, an award may be made for compensation therefor, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, upon compliance by said employee with the requirements thereof and proper proof of claim for same.
- CEIEF JUSTICE DAMRON
On June 20th, 1940, and for some time prior thereto claimant was employed by the respondent in the Division of Highways as a laborer working on repairs, maintenaiice and construction of highways in the State of Illinois. On the last mentioned date, while in the discharge of his duties, he slipped and fell and sustained a comminuted compound fracture of the middle metacarpal bone of the right hand. He was given first aid by a fellow employee, and sent to his home at 3849 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago. Claimant then called Dr. Samuel W. Chavis of 3439 South Michigan Avenue in Chicago, who cleaned the wound, and put on a palmer cast. Dr. Chavis treated the claimant’s hand from the date of the injury until the 6th day of August, 1940.
On August 8th, 1940, on orders of the respondent the claimant was placed under the care of Dr. H. B. Thomas, [*166] Professor of Orthopedics, at the University of Illinois Medical College, for examination, and further treatment. On October 22nd, Dr. Thomas discharged the claimant from treatment, and reported to the Division as follows: “Examination on August 8th, showed a swollen dorsum of right hand.
Could not make a fist, fingers flex about fifty (50%) per cent. X-rays showed a fracture of index and middle metacarpals with angulation of distal fragment of third (3rd) forward. Complete callus. This fracture was never set.
We got the patient seven weeks after the injury. The over-riding fragments make an ugly deformitory over the back of the hand. This will reduce some, but there willqalways be a deformity. Today patient can touch palms with tips of fingers, swelling gone and 3rd head is retracted about 1/4 inch as compared with 2nd and 4th. Discharged to go on full duty. Prognosisgood.”
Evidence was taken in this case in Chicago on April 4th, 1941, at which time Dr. Samuel W. Cbavis testified that in his opinion the degree of functional loss of use of claimant’s right hand was fifty (50%) per cent. At a further hearing of this cause on the 5th day of May, 1941 in Chicago, Dr. S. I. Winer testified as an expert, expressing an opinion that the condition as of January 18,1941, when he examined claim-. ant, was permanent, and that he had suffered a total loss of use of the hand for industrial purposes. Dr. Winer had not treated the claimant and apparently had not seen him prior to the last mentioned date.
This claimant was not cooperative with his physician.
On August 16, Dr. Thomas advised claima..nt that to improve his hand condition he should exercise wit& what was called the ball exercise. On August 29th, Dr. Thomas advised the claimant to try light work, and to take physiotherapy treatments two or three times a week. On October 4th, Dr.
Thomas reported : “John Lockett returned October 3rd. His hand was examined. All the fingers closed well except the right middle finger, but it has improved considerably since he first began treatment. Passively it can be closed. He is planning to return to work Monday (October 7) but will continue treatment.”
Claimant neither reported for light duty when advised to do so or full duty when discharged by his physician.
Upon consideration of the facts of the record we find as follows: That on the 20th day of June 1.940, claimant and respondent were operating under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; that on said date claimant sustained accidental injuries which arose out of and in the cGurse of his employment; that notice of the accident was given to [*167] said respondent, and claim for compensation on account thereof was made within the time required by the provisions of such act; that the earnings of the claimant or his predecessor, during the year preceding the accident was $800.00 per annum, figuring on a two hundred day year, and that his. average meekly wage was *$15.38, making his compensation rate $8.46, which includes the increase as provided in Paragraph (L) of Section (8) of the Act. That the claimant at the time of the injury was forty-five (45) years of age, married, and had no children under the age of sixteen (16) years ; that all necessary first aid, medical, and surgical services were provided by the respondent; that claimant was temporarily totally disabled from the date of his injury as afore- ‘ said, until October 7, 1940, to-wit for a period of fifteen and four sevenths weeks (15 4 / 7 ) ; that he also suffered the permanent loss of fifty (50%) per cent of the use of his right hand.
We further find that claimant is entitled-to have and receive from the respondent the sum of $8.46 per week for fifteen and four sevenths (15 4/7) weeks for temporary total disability, in accordance with the provision of Paragraph (b) Section (8) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the further sum of $8.46 per week for a period of eighty-five (85) weeks for the permanent loss of fifty (50%) per cent of the use of the right hand in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (e-12) of Section (8) of such Act.
We further find that the claimant has been paid the sum of $89.64 for non-productive time which must be considered as payment of compensation and deducted from the amount which he is entitled to have and receive as above set forth.
We further find that all the compensation due to claimant, as aforesaid has accrued at this time.
I
An award is therefore entered in favor of claimant John Lockett, for the sum of Seven Hundred Sixty-One Dollars . and Sixteen Cents ($761.16). I This award being subject to the provisions of an Act entitled, “An Act Making an Appropriation to Pay Compensation Claims of State Employees and Providing for the Method of Payment Thereof,” approved June 30, 1941, and being by the terms of such an Act, subject to the approval of the Governor, is hereby, if and when approval is given, made payable from the appropriation from the Road Fund in the manner provided for in such Act.
[*168] - (No. 3710-Claim denied.)
JOSEPH MANDEL, Claimant, us. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.
Opanion filed June 15, 1941.
. BEDNARSKI & HAAS, for claimant.
GEORGE F. BARRETT, Attorney General'; GLENN A. TREVOR, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
NEGLIGENCE - employee of State Charitable Institutzon- State not liable for. In the conduct of State Charitable Institutions, the State exercises a governmental function, and it is not liable to respond in damages for personal injuries, sustained by inmate thereof, as the result of the negligence of its officers, agents or servants employed therein, or in charge thereof.
RESPOITDEAT SUPERIOU-dOctrz?ae of not applzcable to State. The State is never liable for the negligence of its officers, agents or servants, while in the exercise of its governmental functions, in the absence of a Statute making it so liable and in this State there is no such Statute.
E Q UITY AND GOOD coxscIENcE-cZuzm based on neglzgence of employees 01 State- award cannot be made on grounds of. An award for damages for personal injuries cannot be made on the grounds of equity and good conscience, where claim for same is based .on the negligence of officers, agents or employees of the State, regardless of thk degree of such negligence, the absence of contributory negligence or the extent or seriousness of such injuries.
CHIEF JUSTICE DAMRONdelivered the opinion of the court: . This is an action brought in behalf of Joseph Mandel, by Bernard Garner, his next friend under a claim filed April 27, 1942 alleging damages in the sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,0QO.Q0)Dollars, for injuries received by the said Joseph Mandel.
The complaint states that the said Joseph Mandel was, and had been since August 23, 1940, an inmate of the Kankakee State Hospital for the Insane under a commitment of the County Court of Cook County, Illinois. That on July 2, 1941, while he was working in the bakery shop of said Iiankakee State Hospital, his right hand mas caught by one of the bakery machines fracturing the bones of said hand, and that he. sustained injuries to other parts of his body.. He further says said injuries were sustained by him through the negligence o_f the said Kankakee State Hospital through its officers or agents, and that he is now permanently crippled; that he has lost the use of his right hand, and that as the result of said injury he has lost the partial use of his wrist and sustained shock.
[*169] The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and for grounds therefor says: 1. Claimant’s complaint does not state a claim which the State of Illinois, as a sovereign commonwealth, should in equity and good conscience discharge and pay in that claimant’s -claim is predicated on the alleged liability of respondent while engaged in a governmental function, because of negligent and wrongful acts of its officers, agents or employees. 2. That an award cannot be made by the Court of Claims solely on the basis of equity and good conscience, when there is no legal basis for such an award. 3. That the complaint does not comply with rules 5(b) and 6(a) of the Court of Claims.
The court finds upon examination of the complaint that the position of the Attorney General is correct in that it does not comply with rules 5(b) and 6(a) of the Court of Claims Act, but since the complaint could be amended in these respects to conform with the rules, and since, as hereinafter pointed out, no award could be made on this claim on the merits, such omissions are immaterial and are merely incidental to the ultimate outcome. Further, the general charge of negligence is an assumption on the part of the claimant, not supported by specific averments against an officer or agent of the State.
The Kankakee State Hospital is one of the State charitable institutions, and in maintaining it the State is exercising a part of its governmental functions. In the conduct of its charitable and penal institutions, neither the State or‘ any of its agencies are liable for damages caused by the negligence of those in charge of or employed in such institutions. The institution is maintained solely for the benefit of the public, and there exists no legal liability upon the part of the State nor the institutions for the negligence of those officers or servants there employed.
Butler et al. vs. State, 8 C. C. R., 102.
In Shilkitis vs. State, 10, C. C . R., 96, the question of the liability of the State for damages to an injured inmate was thoroughly discussed by this court. On page 97 the court said : “Claims against the State by those who have been committed to its charitable or penal institutions have arisen before. One claim was based [*170] upon alleged ill health of the inmate, occasioned by the fact that the food in such institution was steam-cooked which he was not accustomed to and his stomach would not properly digest steam-cooked food. Another has complained of the unduly severe character of labor to which he was assigned.” “In these and all other cases of similar character this court, as at present constituted, has felt compelled to deny any award. These matters were considered in the cases of Jones vs. State, 8 C. C. R. 78 and Butler vs.
State, 8 C. C. R. 103. In the former case this statement appears, ‘Strictly public institutions created, owned and controlled by the State or its subdivisions such as State asylums, city hospitals, reformatories, etc., are not liable for the negligence of their agents.’ The doctrine of ‘Respondeat Superior’ does not apply.”
Before a claimant can have an award against the State, he must show that he comes within the provision of some law making the State liable to him for the amount claimed. If he cannot point to some law giving him a right to an award he cannot invoke the principle of equity to secure such an award.
We do not make the law and can only apply it as we find it, and if any change is to be made therein it must come through the Legislature and not through the courts.
Under the law we have no authority to allow an award and the motion of the AttoTney General must therefore be sustained. Motion to dismiss allowed. Case dismissed.