VIRGIL G. BROOKS, Claimant, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent. Opinaon filed May 12, 19@. JOH N W. FRIBLEY, for claimant. GEORGE F. BARRETT, Attorney General; ROBERT V. OSTROM, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. CIVIL sERvIcE-enzployee under illegally discharged - subseqziently re- stored t o position-when awlard m a y be made f o r salary f o r period between tame of discharge and restoratzon. Where civil service employee was illegally discharged and is subsequently restored to his position by judgment of court of competent jurisdiction, he is entitled to the salary provided for said posi- tion, for period between time of such discharge and restoration, when not otherwise employed during said- time, where he is ready, able and willing to perform the duties of such position and tenders his services t o the State therefor, which tender is refused by it. FISHER, 5. ’ 442 Claimant alleges : That on April 11, 1941, and prior thereto, he was a civil service employee with the Department of Conservation. - That on April 11, 1941, he was wrongfully discharged from his position as an Inspector. That on December 22, 1941, the Circuit Court of Sanga- mon County, in a mandamus proceeding pending therein, wherein claimant was petitioner and the Department of Con- servation and the Illinois Civil Service Commission were defendants, entered an order commanding the Department of Conservation and the Illinois Civil Service Commission to reinstate claimant to his,position as Inspector, and that he was so reinstated on January 20, 1942. Claimant seeks a n award of $1,605.44 f o r salary unpaid from April 11, 1941, the date of his discharge, to January 20, 1942, the date of his reinstatement. The record consists of the statement of claim filed Feb- ruary 26, 1942, stipulation of facts, and waiver of statement, brief and argument by claimant and respondent by and through respective counsel. The facts as stipulated herein are, in part, as follows: “That on May 1, 1941, the Civil Service Commission of the State of Illi- nois advised Virgil G. Brooks that his discharge had been approved by the Commission, and was, as far as that Commission was concerned, final. “That on July 24, 1941, Virgil G. Brooks, Claimant, commenced a n action of mandamus, i n the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois, to compel his reinstatement as a n Inspector to the position of Inspector in the Depart- ment of Conservation, State of Illinois. “That on December 22, 1941, the’circuit Court of Sangamon CouGty, Illi- nois, issued a Mandamus Order directing the Department of Conservation of the State of Illinois, and the Illinois Civil Service Commission, to reinstate the said Virgil G. Brooks, Claimant, to his position and employment as a n Inspector in the Department of Conservation, aforesaid. “That claimaqt was not so reinstated by the Department of Conservation of the State of Illinois, until January 20, 1942, and that from April 11, 1941, to January 20, 1942, Claimant was ready and willing to perform the duties of his office, but that his services were refused. “That the Auditor of Public Accounts of the State of Illinois, has advised that on the 30th day of September, 1942, the appropriation to the Department of Conservation of the State of Illinois, made by the Sixty-first General As- sembly, lapsed, leaving a balance of $89,853.10.” “The right to the salary is attached to and follows the legal title to the office.” People v. Bradford, 276 111. 246. Claimant was a duly certified Civil Service employee of the State of Illinois. .He was wrongfully discharged and prevented from performing the duties of his position, and mas restored to his position by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois. He was diligent in the protection of his own rights, and at all times for which he seeks payment of salary, he was ready, willing and able t o perform the duties of his position, tendered the performance thereof, and such tender was refused. He is entitled to the salary of this position during the time he was wrongfully prevented from perform- ing the duties of the position, which was from April 11, 1941, to January 20, 1942, o r the sum of $1,605.44. An award is therefore entered in favor of claimant in the sum of $1,605.44. J., dissenting : ECIIERT, On December 22, 1941, claimant secured a writ of manda- mus in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois, order- ing his reinstatement as an inspector in the Department of Conservation of the State of Illinois. I n that suit he had the right to seek payment of the salary for which claim was filed in this court on February 26, 1942. The Court of Claims has consistently held that it will not review the orders of officers, boards and commissions made pursuant to powers granted them by the Legislature, or grant awards where claimants had a remedy by appeal to the courts of general jurisdiction which they failed to pursue. (Bassett v. State, 2 C. C. R. 372; Mayer v. State, 3 C. C. R. 34; Bolton and Smith v. State,-4 C. C. R. 104; Toedter et al, v. State, 5 C. C. R. 400.) I n creating the Court of Claims, it was the intention of the Legislature to give jurisdiction t o the court only in such cases as could not be heard o r determined by any other court o r by any other process of law, provided by the statutes of the State of Illinois. ( N . Y., Chicago d?St. Louis R. R. Co. v. State, 6 C. C. R. 481.) The Legislature, -in creating the Court of Claims, did not intend to open wide the doors t o all litigants to choose between the courts already established by the Constitution and this court; did not intend that this court should usurp the powers of, contradict, or compete with courts of general jurisdiction. (Moline Phw Company v. State, 5 C. C. R. 277.) The Court of Claims was created to hear claims and demands against the State f o r which no other forum had been provided. (Michigan Central R. R. Co., et al, v. State, 7 C: C. R. 133.) Where the claimant has a complete and adequate remedy at law in courts of gen- eral jurisdiction, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdic- -tion. (Molime Plow Company v. Xtate, supra; Mohawk Carpet Mills, Imc., a corporatiofi, v. State, 8 C. C. R. 37 ; An- dersofi v. State, 9 C. C. R. 310; Decker VEL Xtate, 10 C. C. R. 294; Central States Distributors, Inc., et al, v. State, 11C. C. R. 417; Madera Wineries & Distilleries v. State, 11 C. C. R. 632.) Claimant had full opportunity bo present his claim to the Circuit Court of Sangamon County in a proceeding pending therein, and not having done so, cannot present the same claim f o r determination here. I n view of the long line of decisions of this court, and in view of the basic underlying principles of those decisions, this court is without jurisdiction to make an award in this case. III (No. 3033-Claimant awarded $68.25.) CARLSON.BROTHERS, INC., Claimant, v. STATE O FILLINOIS, Respondent.
Case summary
Claimant, a civil service employee, was illegally discharged and later reinstated by court order. He sought back pay for the period between discharge and reinstatement, and the court awarded $1,605.44 for unpaid salary.
AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.
Headnotes
- CIVIL sERvIcE-enzployee under illegally discharged - subseqziently re-
VIRGIL G. BROOKS, Claimant, vs. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.
Opinaon filed May 12, 19@.
J OH N W. FRIBLEY, for claimant.
GEORGE F. BARRETT, Attorney General; ROBERT V. OSTROM, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
CIVIL sERvIcE-enzployee under illegally discharged - subseqziently restored to position-when awlard may be made for salary for period between tame of discharge and restoratzon. Where civil service employee was illegally discharged and is subsequently restored to his position by judgment of court of competent jurisdiction, he is entitled to the salary provided for said position, for period between time of such discharge and restoration, when not otherwise employed during said- time, where he is ready, able and willing to perform the duties of such position and tenders his services to the State therefor, which tender is refused by it.
FISHER, 5.
[*442] ’ 442 Claimant alleges : That on April 11, 1941, and prior thereto, he was a civil service employee with the Department of Conservation. - That on April 11, 1941, he was wrongfully discharged from his position as an Inspector.
That on December 22, 1941, the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, in a mandamus proceeding pending therein, wherein claimant was petitioner and the Department of Conservation and the Illinois Civil Service Commission were defendants, entered an order commanding the Department of Conservation and the Illinois Civil Service Commission to reinstate claimant to his,position as Inspector, and that he was so reinstated on January 20, 1942.
Claimant seeks an award of $1,605.44 for salary unpaid from April 11, 1941, the date of his discharge, to January 20, 1942, the date of his reinstatement.
The record consists of the statement of claim filed February 26, 1942, stipulation of facts, and waiver of statement, brief and argument by claimant and respondent by and through respective counsel.
The facts as stipulated herein are, in part, as follows: “That on May 1, 1941, the Civil Service Commission of the State of Illinois advised Virgil G. Brooks that his discharge had been approved by the Commission, and was, as far as that Commission was concerned, final. “That on July 24, 1941, Virgil G. Brooks, Claimant, commenced an action of mandamus, in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois, to compel his reinstatement as an Inspector to the position of Inspector in the Department of Conservation, State of Illinois. “That on December 22, 1941, the’circuit Court of Sangamon CouGty, Illinois, issued a Mandamus Order directing the Department of Conservation of the State of Illinois, and the Illinois Civil Service Commission, to reinstate the said Virgil G. Brooks, Claimant, to his position and employment as an Inspector in the Department of Conservation, aforesaid. “That claimaqt was not so reinstated by the Department of Conservation of the State of Illinois, until January 20, 1942, and that from April 11, 1941, to January 20, 1942, Claimant was ready and willing to perform the duties of his office, but that his services were refused. “That the Auditor of Public Accounts of the State of Illinois, has advised that on the 30th day of September, 1942, the appropriation to the Department of Conservation of the State of Illinois, made by the Sixty-first General Assembly, lapsed, leaving a balance of $89,853.10.” “The right to the salary is attached to and follows the legal title to the office.”
People vs. Bradford, 276 111. 246.
Claimant was a duly certified Civil Service employee of the State of Illinois. .He was wrongfully discharged and [*443] prevented from performing the duties of his position, and mas restored to his position by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois. He was diligent in the protection of his own rights, and at all times for which he seeks payment of salary, he was ready, willing and able to perform the duties of his position, tendered the performance thereof, and such tender was refused. He is entitled to the salary of this position during the time he was wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of the position, which was from April 11, 1941, to January 20, 1942, or the sum of $1,605.44.
An award is therefore entered in favor of claimant in the sum of $1,605.44.
J., dissenting : ECIIERT, On December 22, 1941, claimant secured a writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois, ordering his reinstatement as an inspector in the Department of Conservation of the State of Illinois. In that suit he had the right to seek payment of the salary for which claim was filed in this court on February 26, 1942.
The Court of Claims has consistently held that it will not review the orders of officers, boards and commissions made pursuant to powers granted them by the Legislature, or grant awards where claimants had a remedy by appeal to the courts of general jurisdiction which they failed to pursue. (Bassett vs. State, 2 C. C. R. 372; Mayer vs. State, 3 C. C. R. 34; Bolton and Smith vs. State,-4 C. C. R. 104; Toedter et al, vs. State, 5 C. C. R. 400.) In creating the Court of Claims, it was the intention of the Legislature to give jurisdiction to the court only in such cases as could not be heard or determined by any other court or by any other process of law, provided by the statutes of the State of Illinois. ( N . Y., Chicago d?St.
Louis R. R. Co. vs. State, 6 C. C. R. 481.) The Legislature, -in creating the Court of Claims, did not intend to open wide the doors to all litigants to choose between the courts already established by the Constitution and this court; did not intend that this court should usurp the powers of, contradict, or compete with courts of general jurisdiction. (Moline Phw Company vs. State, 5 C. C. R. 277.) The Court of Claims was created to hear claims and demands against the State for which no other forum had been provided. (Michigan Central R. R. Co., et al, vs. State, 7 C: C. R. 133.) Where the claimant [*444] has a complete and adequate remedy at law in courts of general jurisdiction, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdic-tion. (Molime Plow Company vs. Xtate, supra; Mohawk Carpet Mills, Imc., a corporatiofi, vs. State, 8 C. C. R. 37 ; Andersofi vs. State, 9 C. C. R. 310; Decker VEL Xtate, 10 C. C. R. 294; Central States Distributors, Inc., et al, vs. State, 11C. C. R. 417; Madera Wineries & Distilleries vs. State, 11 C. C. R. 632.)
Claimant had full opportunity bo present his claim to the Circuit Court of Sangamon County in a proceeding pending therein, and not having done so, cannot present the same claim for determination here. In view of the long line of decisions of this court, and in view of the basic underlying principles of those decisions, this court is without jurisdiction to make an award in this case.
I
I
I (No. 3033-Claimant awarded $68.25.)
CARLSON.BROTHERS, INC., Claimant, vs. STATE O F ILLINOIS, Respondent.
Opiltaon filed May 12, 1943.
KENWORTHY, SHALLBERG & HARPER, for claimant.
I GEORGE F. BARRETT, Attorney General; ROBERT V. OSTROM, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Suwmcs-when award may be made 'forvalue of. Where it appears that merchandise was ordered by a department of the State, having authority so to do, and same was received by the State, an award may be made for the agreed price thereof, where same is the usual, customary and reasonable value of said merchandise.
FISHER, J. Claimant seeks an award for merchandise sold and delivered to respondent on or about December 12, 1942.
The record consists of statement of claim, transcript of evidence, and waiver of statement, brief and argument by . claimant and respondent, by respective counsel.
It appears from the evidence, that on December 1, 1942, ' the Illinois Commerce Commission, through its Secretary, Julius Johnson, ordered of claimant seven (7) mottled Sheaffer Life-time pen and pencil sets at the cost of $9.25 per set to be delivered to the office of the Commerce Commission at Springfield, Illinois. That thereafter, on December [*445] . 445 -.
12, 1942, the said pen and pencil sets were so shipped by prepaid express and receipt of the same acknowledged. That a statement and bill for the agreed charge mas frequently mailed to the Commerce Commission, but was never paid.
Claimant seeks an award for $68.25, and interest thereon from December 12, 1942, to the date of payment.
The facts are not in dispute. It appears that this obligation was not paid for the reason that there was a change in the personnel of the Illinois Commerce Commission about or shortly after the time this merchandise was.received by the commission, and the new members of the commission were unable to locate the pens and pencils. -It is difficult to understand how such merchandise could disappear, but, in any event, the responsibility of claimant ended with the delivery of the merchan'dise to respondent. The goods were properly ordered, delivery was promptly made, the price was reasonable, and claimant is entitled to payment therefor.
We know of no authority whereby we. could allow the claim for interest.
An award is therefore 'entered in favor of claimant in the sum of Sixty-eight and 25/lOO Dollars ($68.25).