RALPH E. TREPANIER, Claimant, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.
Case summary
Claimant sought workers' compensation for an injury allegedly sustained on July 23, 1949, but notice was not given until September 7, 1949. The court denied the claim because notice was not given within 30 days as required by the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the employer had no prior knowledge of the accident.
Statutes cited: Section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
Cases cited: Stuenkel v. State, 16 C.C.R. 34; Powers Storage Co. v. Ind. Corn., 340 Ill. 498; Pullman Co. v. Ind. Corn., 356 Ill. 43; Gray Knox Marble Co. v. Ind. Corn., 363 Ill. 210; Armour & Co. v. Ind. Corn., 367 Ill. 471; Brown Shoe Co. v. Ind. Corn., 374 Ill. 500
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Headnotes
- IVAN A. ELLIOTT, Attorney General; C. ARTHUR NEBEL,Assistant Attorney General, for. Respondent. WORKMEN’S COXPENSATIONAm-where uwnrd w i l l be denied under. Where no notice was given respondent until more than thirty ( 3 0 ) days after the accident, failure to comply with Section 20 of t h e Act and award will be denied and motion to dismiss sustained.
- NoTIm-necessity t o comply w i t h statute. Unless employer otherwise has knowledge of the injury, is jurisdictional under Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Claimant, on December 16, 1949, filed his complaint in this Court, seeking to recover urider the Workmen’s Compensation Act for injuries allegedly sustained in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss based on the ground that no notice was given to respondent until more than thirty days after the accident.
The verified compIaint alleges that the accident occurred on July 23, 1949, and notice was served on respondent on September 7 , 1949. The following allegations of the complaint explain the reason for claimant’s delay in notifying respondent: “I was asked to take care of Winnebago County at the time of the accident in addition to covering five ( 5 ) other counties in Northern Illinois. I worked alone and my superior was located at Springfield.
My injury did not appear serious at first and I hoped that the pain would ease up shortly. My vacation occurred the first two weeks in August, during which time I went away for a rest to relieve the pain.
When I got home, I found a letter stating that I would be re-placed and continued to remain at home while being treated by Dr. H. Floyd Cannon. It was not until I failed to respond satisfactorily to medical treatment that I finally realized how serious my injury was and requested Dr. H. Floyd Cannon to notify the proper authorities.
The above quoted allegations of the complaint, coupled with others, conclusively show that no superior of claimant had knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the accident until claimant’s own doctor notified the State Fire Marshal by a report dated September 7, 1949.
No medical, surgical or hospital treatments have been furnished claimant, and no compensation has been paid.
The giving to an employer of n6tice of the accident within thirty days, unless the employer otherwise has [*159] ‘knowledge thereof, is jurisdictional under Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Stuenkel v. State, 16 C.C.R. 34; Powers Storage Co. v. Ind. Corn., 340 Ill. 498; Pullman Co. v. Ind. Corn., 356 Ill. 43; Gray Knox Marble Co. v. Ind. Corn., 363 Ill. 210; Arrnour & Co. v. Ind. Corn., 367 Ill. 471; Brown Shoe Co. v. Ind. Corn., 374 Ill. 500.
The verified complaint herein, on its face, shows failure to comply with one of the jurisdictional prerequisites of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the motion of respondent to dismiss must be sustained.
Motion of respondent to dismiss granted and case dismissed.