Sarah M. Crawford v. State of Illinois

Claimant, Sarah M. Crawford, brings this action to recover for personal injuries which she suffered on February 3, 1967.

Mrs. Crawford, a widow and sixty-three years of age, [*372] lives in East Peoria, Illinois, on 1112 Meadow Street, which

l is also State Route 150.

There are no sidewalks in this particular area and the claimant, who worked at a Fannie Mae Candy Shop in Peoria, was in the habit of catching a bus in front of her home in the morning to go to work.

She would use her driveway to get to the roadway and then walk to the bus stop which was a short distance away.

It is her contention that the State Highway Department, in removing the snow from the highway, piled up snow on her driveway and upon which rain had later fallen causing it to become very slippery and, in attempting to walk over this ridge of snow and ice, she slipped and fell, fracturing her right ankle.

She was confined to the hospital for some period of time and was off work for several weeks.

On January 26th and January 27th approximately ten inches of snow fell and from January 27th to January 29th there were strong winds which caused the snow to drift. On February 2nd and February 3rd there was five more inches of snow with some rain.

The record discloses that the State snow plow had pushed snow onto the driveway in question as it endeavored to keep Route 150 open for the traveling public on several different occasions.

The records show that on at least three occasions, a path was cut through the snow piled on the driveway so that Mrs. Crawford could get to the road and catch her bus. On at least one of these occasions, Mrs. Crawford cleared the driveway herself, in one instance, a neighbor cleared it for her, and her grandson and a neighbor boy made a path on one other occasion.

[*373] On the morning in question, she stated that she had not cleared it because she was going to work and when she endeavored to cross the ridge of snow, which was approximately knee deep and was somewhat icy due to the rain that had fallen previously, she slipped and fell causing the damage complained of.

Claimant maintains that it was the duty of the State to keep this driveway open so that she would have a means of getting to the road and catching her bus.

It is the State’s contention that it is not the responsibility of the State to remove the snow from individuals’ driveways and the only way possible to keep the State highway open is to plow the accumulated snow on the roadway onto the shoulders; otherwise, there is no other place for the snow to be placed.

Claimant also allows that in view of the fact that some of this snow had accumulated for several days at the place where the accident took place, even though there is evidence of repeated falling of snow and some rain, it is still the duty of the State to maintain each driveway in a condition that is safe to be used by pedestrians.

There is a great deal of law in this State on the liability of the municipalities, particularly in cities and villages, when accidents of this nature take place.

One of the leading cases where the State of Illinois was involved is the case found in 23 C.C.R. on page 172. In this particular case, the claimant fell and sustained injuries while on the shoulder of State Route 40. The actual fall evidently was caused by the claimant stepping into a depression or hole which was 2% to 3 feet in diameter and from 2 to 2% inches deep. The question was argued in this case as to what the liability of the State is in maintaining the shoulders of the road in such condition that they are safe for pedestrians and people using the State right-of-way and it [*374]

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was determined that the State is not an insuror of all persons injured on its rights-of-way.

Claimant contends that it was the duty of the State to maintain the open driveway, particularly in view of the fact that this accident happened some six days after the original snowstorm and it is suggested that the State had a duty, at intervals, to open paths or maintain breaks so that people could get to the street despite the fact that there were not any sidewalks or intersections involved in this particular accident.

Claimant takes the position that it apparently is the duty of the State, even in situations such as this where there are no sidewalks or intersections, to keep open the private driveways so the street can be reached.

To do this would place an impossible burden upon the State because the crews would be so busy opening up private driveways, they would have little or no time left for keeping the road itself open for the benefit of the traveling public.

Claimant knew the condition that existed and had cleared the area on at least three separate occasions for her own use but still failed to do so on the morning in question even though she knew she was going to take the bus and knew the condition of the driveway.

It would be difficult to find her free from contributory negligence in going in to a place that was as dangerous as she claims it was and there is nothing in the record to show why, on that morning in question, a small path could not have been cleared by her before attempting to get to the street.

We are denying this claim for the reason that to place the burden upon respondent, which claimant is now contending in this particular area, would be placing a burden upon it, which the law does not contemplate.

[*375] , ~

I 375 I

I

j The burden of maintaining an “open driveway” which

claimant seeks to place upon the State is not a responsibility

~

imposed by law. We do not believe that claimant has es

tablished the proof necessary to justify recovery.

For the reasons above stated, the claim is hereby

,

denied.

CHRIS STRATAKOS, Claimant, os. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.

Opinion filed April 12, 1972.

Attorney for Claimant.

SUDAK A N D GRUBMAN,

WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General: SAUL K. WEXLER,

Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

Doc R I T E - I I ~ S O ~ Uliability.

~~ \Vherc claiinant was bitten hy dog, kq,t in thv

grounds of a school by reslmiitlent, thcrr is absolritr liability on the rrsl)oiidciit. :HI

award will be cwtered.

BURKS, J.

Claimant was bitten by a dog owned or kept by the

respondent and brings this action for damages resulting

from the injury he sustained. The pertinent facts which arc

undisputed in this case are as follows:

At the time of the incident, clairnant, an employee of

the Edward Don Company, u7as delivering a package to

the office of the IhPage State Boys School located at

Naperville, Illinois. After making his delivery and while

leaving the said office, clairnant was bitten on the lower

calf of his right leg by a medium sized collie dog, which

was kept on the grounds of the school by the respondcnt.

Ronald J . Fos, acting principal of the IXiPagc. Statc

Boys School, testified that the dog was a Top Collicl that

had been at the school about tkr7o nionths after he had bccn

given to the school by a family that w;is leaving thc stilt(’.

[*376] Mr. Fos said the dog was generally kept on a chain to prevent him from running around and from leaving the school, but had never previously bitten or threatened to bite anyone.

Being in his office at the time of the incident, Mr. Fos examined the claimant’s wound and then called the Naperville Police who had the dog checked for rabies. Shortly thereafter, claimant went to the Edwards Hospital in Naperville where he received first aid. Subsequently, he was treated by his own physician, Ilr. Stanley Hudrys.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, n7e conclude that the dog attacked the claimant without provocation and that claimant was peaceably conducting hirriself in a place where he had a lawful right to be. LJnder these circumstances, the liability of the respondent for claimant’s injuries is absolute, by statutc, even thorigh respondent did not know of the vicious propensities of the dog. See Ch. 8, Sec. 12d, ZZZ. Reu.Stat., 1971.

The only remaining question to be deteriiiinetl is thc amount of injury sustained by the clainiant.

Clainiant’s iiiedical specials are as follo\vs:

Edwards €Iosi)ital . . . . .$ 6.60

Ilr. Stanley f3iidrys . . . . 185.00

Medicines . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.00

Clainiant testified that he saw Ilr. Htidrys ten or ~WCAW times over a period of one rnonth and that, as a resiilt of the treatments, he suffered an allergic reaction which caiiscd him rniich pain and difficulty. He further testified that he lost a1)proxirnntcly six days from work, or a inonetary loss of aboitt $300.00.

Medical reports of Ilr. Stanlcy Hiidrys and Ilr. Lpdin Serenynski, who treatcd c1aiin:int at the Edwards Hospital, w e r ~atlniittcd into cvidcwce by stipulation. Clairnant w a s e s a ~ n i n c don bchilf of thc rcsl)onclcnt h y Ilr. Zyginiint [*377] Buchsbaum, and his report was also introduced into evidence by stipulation. llr. Buchsbaurn states that claimant now has “A well healed wound, very faint, hardly visible small scar on his right calf” antl “Probability of no residuals in the future”. Ilr Lydia Serenynski’s report concurs with that of Ilr. Ruchsbaiim. Nevertheless, we cannot entirely discount the less favorable prognosis of Dr. Budrys who stated, “In view of the persistence of the cornplaints of pain upon activities of standing, walking and driving, there is a strong probability of deep tissue &miage to the leg, which, if present, will continue to plague hiin indefinitely.” Nothing that this opinion is based nierely on “complaints of pain” given by the claimant, we must conclude that the weight of the medical evidence does not slipport a finding of any injury of long duration.

It is our judgment that an award be riiade to the claiinant in the amount of $1,500.00.

( No . 5803-Claii1i;mt a\vsrdetl $lO,OOO.OO.) BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC., Claimant, us. STATE OF Illinois,

DIVISION OF WATERWAYS, Respondent.

Opinion filed Aiiril 22, 1972.

T. G. SCHUSTER,J. L. PILONAND P. M. LEE, antl BARRY N. G UTTERMAN, Attorneys for Claimant.

WILLIAM J . SCOTT, Attorney General; SAULli. WEXLER, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

C o ~ ~ ~ ~ c r s - ~ a pa ps~c~.rdo ) i r i n t i o t\\‘hen

t. t h c ~ ~ i ) i ) r ~ ) i ) r i ~froin

~ t i ( i\vhich

~~ :I

claim should have been paid has l a p s ~ l the , ( h i r t \vi11 w t e r it11 a\v:trd for the amount due claimant.

PERLIN, C.J. [*378]

(No. 6220-Clairnant aw;irtled $WS.67.)

RIVEREDGE

HOSPITAL, Claimant, us. STATEOF ILLINOIS, DEPARTMENT

OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Respondent.

Opinion fikd April 14, 1972.

RIVEREDCE HOSPITAL, Claimant, pro se.

WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General; S AUL R . WEXLER, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

CoNTtucrs-hpserl uppropricitioti. W’hen thc qiIiropriation froiir which ii claim should have been piid ha\ Inl)~ctl. the Court \Till enter an award for the amount due claimant.

PERLIN, C.J.

(No. 64.25-Cl;iiiiiant n u w t l d $44.0().) BERZ AMBULANCE SERVICE, Claimant, vs. STATE OF ILLINOIS,

DEPARTMENT OF M ENTAL HEALTH, Respondent.

Opinion fikd April 14. 1972.

BERZ AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., Claimant, pro se.

WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General; S AUL R. WEXLEH, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

CoNTwcrs-Zupsed appropriation. When thr alqiropriation froiii which a claim should have been paid has lapwd, thc Court will cnter an award for thr amount due claimant.

PERLIN, C.J.