Ernest Davis v. State of Illinois

This case is before this Court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Respondent. After a careful reading of the pleadings of the Claimant, we note that the complaint is an attempt to sue both the Macon County Sheriff’s Department and the State of Illinois.

This Court was created by the legislature for the purpose of hearing and determining claims made against the State of Illinois only. Claims against counties or departments of the counties are not within the jurisdiction of this Court. The Claimant is therefore in the wrong forum for a suit against the Macon County Sheriff’s Department.

As to the Claimant’s attempt to sue the State of Illinois we find, after a careful reading of the complaint, that the only conduct for which tortious action is alleged was perpetrated by either employees of the Macon County Jail or the prisoners of that jail. We find no allegations which attribute tortious conduct to the State of Illinois.

This Court, therefore, grants judgment in favor of the Respondent and against the Claimant.

(N O . 79-CC-0793-Claimant awarded $320.00.)

RICHARD G. BROWN, Claimant, 0 . THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

Opinion filed August 8, 1979.

STATE EMPLOYEES BACK SALARY CLAiMs-lump sum pay increases. Even though lump sum pay increase was based upon amount of crcditable servicc [*284] it fell within the exception to the prohibition where it was based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement.

SAME-authorittj of Director of Department of Personnel to agree to and abide by arbitration. Although nowhere is the director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities, the legislature, in making an appropriation for payment of amount determined by arbitration, rendered issue moot.

PER CURIAM.

This is a claim for $20.00 per pay period for 17 pay periods arising out of certain changes in the pay plan to bring the pay plan in line with certain collective bargaining agreements entered into between the State and employee representatives. The change in question granted employees $20.00 per pay period for all employees who were on the payroll as of June 30,1978, with the pay to be retroactive to July 1, 1977, for any' pay periods worked during that period of time. Mr. Brown commenced his employment with the Department of Labor on July 18, 1977, until March 20, 1978, at which date he commenced his employment with the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency where he was employed on the June 30, 1978, qualifying date. The Environmental Protection Agency paid Mr. Brown $140.00 for the seven pay periods for which he qualified while in their employ. The seven pay periods included the last pay period in March as well as two pay periods each in April, May and June. Having received the pay for the second pay period in March from the Environmental Protection Agency Mr. Brown is not entitled to that pay period from the Department of Labor. He is, therefore, entitled to only 16 pay periods as opposed to the 17 for which he made claim.

Except for the fact that Mr. Brown was employed by the State of Illinois on June 30, 1978, the issues raised in this case are identical to those in the case of John J . Beard v . State of Illinois, 78-CC-1585. In the Beard [*285] case this Court considered the statutory prohibitions against retroactive back pay and concluded that they did not apply to the current situation inasmuch as the legislature through their actions had mooted out the question by acquiescing in the actions of the director of personnel and ratifying the actions of the agencies and the director of personnel in paying these claims by expressing a legislative intent through the passage of legislation providing the funds for the payment of these claims.

It is, therefore, ordered that Mr. Brown be awarded the sum of $320.00 subject to the customary added benefits for retirement or F.I.C.A. and the customary and legal deductions and withholdings for retirement, F.I.C.A. and income tax.