Larry Blount v. State of Illinois

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of Respondent to dismiss, it appearing that due notice has been given, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This is a claim by an inmate of a State correctional facility for compensation for lost property. The basis of the Respondent’s motion is that the Claimant failed to allege sufficient facts to impute negligence or breach of duty by the State. We have traditionally not required incarcerated persons to strictly comply with all the intricacies of pleading in these types of cases but tend to examine the complaint to see if it conveys an understand[*791]

791 I

able account of the circumstances constituting what the claimant believes to be a cause of action. If it is so lacking as to not meet this lesser standard we dismiss the complaint with leave to plead over.

In the case at bar the complaint alleges the following facts. On January 30, 1980, at approximately 4:30 a.m., the Claimant was released from his cell by an officer , using a key, for the purpose of reporting to the kitchen for work detail. Upon leaving, his cell was double-locked by the officer. Upon returning from work detail, he and j the officer escorting him discovered that his cell had been taken off deadlock status and that certain items of personal property were missing. I

The Claimant further alleged that in order for some- I one to enter his cell it would be necessary for the door to be removed from double-lock status and that the only persons having access to keys are correctional officials. He stated that the loss occurred by reason of the Respondent’s negligence and that he had exhausted all administrative avenues of relief to no avail.

As required by the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 1 et seq.), Respondent specifically pointed out the alleged defect in the complaint. Respondent argues that the above facts do not constitute a cause of action against the State because there was no allegation that the State or its agents ever came into exclusive possession of the property and that, as a matter of law, the State is not liable absent a showing of exclusive possession. (Doubling o. State (1976), 32 Ill. Ct. C1. 1.) Respondent also filed a departmental report compiled by the warden at Pontiac Correctional Center where Claimant is incarcerated, apparently for the purpose of showing that, as a matter of fact, the missing personalty was not in the exclusive possession of the Respondent.

[*792] The departmental report does not indicate that Respondent did not come into exclusive possession of the property but corroborates the facts alleged by the Claimant. Additional facts were contained in the incident report which was part of the departmental report. The incident report, compiled and signed by a correctional officer and also signed by two reviewing employees and the chief administrative officer, reads in part as follows:

“On this date and time (January 30, 1980, 11:30 a.m.) I went to let . . . (the Claimant) . . . in his cell . . . . When I went to open the door both resident Blormt and myself noticed the cell was off deadlock. Resident Blount’s cell was on deadlock all morning as he was working and he has no cellmate. C.O.T. Jordan showered the kitchen workers before taking them to work. I was at lunch during this period and resident Blount’s cell was definitely on deadlock before I left because I make sure all enipty cells are on deadlock at all times, unless the residents in the cell instruct me not to put their cell on deadlock before they leave.”

A search of the cellhouse failed to turn up the property. The officer in charge has denied taking the cell off deadlock.

Doubling 2). State, supra, cited by Respondent, held only that the Claimant therein stated a cause of action by alleging sufficient facts which, if proven, constituted a bailment. In that case it was alleged that property was delivered.to an agent of the Respondent, that it was not returned to the Claimant, and the Respondent did not use reasonable care to insure its return. The Court, by Chief Justice Perlin, distinguished the situation in Doubling from that in Bargas 0. State (1976), 32 Ill. Ct. C1. 99, by stating that Bargas held that the State does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which they keep in their cells from pilferage by other inmates. In effect, the only type of cause of action Respondent would have us recognize in cases where inmates have lost property while incarcerated would be the bailment situation.

Doubling and Bargas are not so limiting. In Bargas, [*793] supra, at 100, the Court specifically noted that the Claimants in that case did not “contend that agents of the Respondent took their property, or acquiesced in its disappearance.” (Emphasis added.) It was a case where the Claimants sought to charge the State with the broad responsibility of preventing acts of pilferage by other inmates. The Court stated:

“We can find no basis for imposing snch a burden on the State. The State is not an insurer of an inmate’s property and cannot be responsible where other inmates engage in criminal acts directed at that property. Nor can the State in the exercise of reasonable care be expected to prevent isolated acts of pilferage in the environnient of a penal institution.” Burgus, supru, at 100.

Since those two cases were decided, we have consistently followed those holdings in our decisions. However, cumulative precedential effect of those decisions is not to be interpreted to mean that, unless a bailment relationship is alleged or established by the evidence, the loss of an inmate’s property is not compensable. In most of those loss-of-property cases where recovery has been denied, a bailment relationship was not established, or if established, the Respondent met its burden of showing freedom from negligence. In those cases where a bailment was not established, negligence of the Respondent was either not properly alleged OF not proven. Often the burden of proving negligence of the Respondent by the preponderance of the evidence was not met by the Claimant due to issues of fact, duty, and causation, especially where more than one inmate resided in the same cell.

Also, we have expressed reluctance to interfere with the internal procedures and management of the prisons. We do feel that judicial restraint on the part of the Court of Claims must be exercised in this area so as not to hamper effective prison management. We still concur with the statements expressed by the Court in Bargas, quoted above. However, we note with concern an in[*794]crease in the number of complaints filed setting forth facts similar to those alleged or evidenced in the case at bar.

In a properly pleaded and proven case the State can be held liable for the loss of an inmate’s property notwithstanding the existence or nonexistence of a bailment relationship. To hold otherwise would be to condone irresponsibility and/or complicity on the part of prison authorities. In the case at bar it was not alleged that another inmate stole the missing property.

With respect to this case we find that the Claimant has failed to state a cause of action. The complaint is lacking in that it fails to allege what the duty of the State ~721s.

It is hereby ordered that this case be, and hereby is, tlisniissed with leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.

( No . 81-CC-0859-Clairn denied.)

F RANK J. E VEN, Claimant, u. THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

Opinion filed Febrrrcrry 17, 1983.

E DWARD R. VRDOLYAK, LTD. (WILLIAM J. MCGANN,of counsel), for Claimant.

N EI L F. HARTICAN, Attorney General (SANDRA ANDINA, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

- ~ ’ snowplow-Stote

~ ~ : ~ ; l . l ~ ; ~ ~ N ~ ~ Ewith O ~ / ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ l i not negligent-chim denied. Cl~iinif or pcrsonal injuries iintl property damage which resulted when Clainiant’s ;iiitoniohilc collitlrd \vith sno\vplow wits dismissed, as testimony clearly c ~ s t ; i h l i 4 i c ~that

l Cl:~iniant’sf:iilnrc* to have his car nnder control was proximate [*795] c . i t w of c o l l ~ w ni n hit he . ~ l l o \ v c ~h li \ ,illtornobile to fidit,ul Into wrong I'inc, of trdflc .itit1 collrdc with mi)\\plow 111 t11,it 1.1nc POCH,J.

Claimant, Frank J. Even, has brought this action seeking damages for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a collision between his vehicle and a snowplow being operated by Michael J. Kaminen, an employee of the State of Illinois.

The incident occurred on January 21, 1980, at about 9:30 p.m. Claimant was traveling in a westerly direction on Route 120 and approaching its intersection with Route 134, while Michael J. Kaminen was traveling in an easterly direction. Route 120 is a public highway located in Avon Township in Lake County, Illinois. At the time of the incident, Route 120 was covered with ice.

Claimant testified that he had spent the evening visiting friends, and at the time of the accident was on his way home to McHenry, Illinois. When he started for home after 9:00, the roads were slippery. It had rained and was freezing. Due to the hazardous conditions of the road he was traveling between 30 and 35 miles per hour.

He was westbound on Route 120 when he first saw the snowplow eastbound about 100 to 150 feet in front of him. The State vehicle was a dump truck with a salt bed and snowplow attached in front, and as it proceeded toward him it was occupying the entire middle of the roadway.

On seeing the snowplow coming down the middle of the road, he immediately pulled off the road into the ditch of the westbound lane. He assumed that he was hit by the plow of the truck. The car was a total wreck.

Michael J. Kaminen, the driver of the truck, testified that he was driving a three-ton International truck with a [*796] snowplow attached. The plow is approximately three feet high, eight feet wide, runs at an angle and can be lifted and lowered. That evening he was directed to plow snow and spread salt where necessary on his assigned route. At the time of the accident, he was eastbound on Route 120 going towards Grayslake. The temperature had fallen and the road became slippery and icy. Route 120 is a two-lane highway with each lane about 100 feet wide. The left side of his plow was two feet from the center lane and the right side was at the edge of the pavement.

There were automobiles ahead of him and he and the other automobiles were traveling 15 to 20 miles per hour. The road was straight and level. When he first saw Claimant, Claimant’s car was the fourth car in a line of oncoming westbound traffic. Claimant’s car was starting to fishtail. The front end of Claimant’s car was fishtailing back and forth into the east-bound lane. Kaminen watched Claimant from the first time he saw him fishtail to the point of impact. Claimant was traveling sideways down the road. Claimant tried to right the vehicle in a westerly direction and the back end of the car swung into the eastbound lane. Claimant’s car from the driver’s door to the rear of the car came into contact with the left rear duals of the truck. Neither at the time of the impact nor at any time prior to the impact was any part of the plow or the truck in the westbound lane.

Kaminen stated that he did not apply his brakes prior to the accident because of the icy condition of the pavement, but he tried to angle his truck off to the right. From the first time he saw Claimant until the time of the impact, some part of Claimant’s car was in Kaminen’s lane.

David Seilinger, one of three occurrence witnesses testified that he was the driver of a pick-up truck travel[*797]

797 i ing 25 miles per hour eastbound on Route 120, when he

~ first became aware of Claimant. Claimant was passing I him at a speed of between 40 and 45 miles per hour. I When he came upon him again, Claimant was parked crosswise in the middle of the road and Seilinger had to go off the roadway about three or four feet to go around him. The whole road was a sheet of ice. Seilinger had I travelled about a quarter of a mile when he was passed by the snowplow travelling eastbound in its own lane, going slow and salting.

In the meantime, Seilinger was watching Claimant in his rear view mirror. Claimant had righted his car and was approaching at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour. As the snowplow passed Seilinger, Claimant’s car was about 20 to 30 yards to the rear of Seilinger. When the snowplow passed, Seilinger started to slow down because he thought a collision would take place. He watched the collision in his rear view mirror. The collision occurred in the snowplow’s lane with the snowplow in its own lane. Seilinger’s testimony was corroborated by Wade A. Neivdall and Herman F. Skokie, both of whom were in Seilinger’s truck.

The accounts of the three occurrence witnesses vary in certain respects, but taken as a whole substantiate convincingly the testimony of Kaminen, the truck driver, that he was travelling in his own lane and that Claimant fishtailed into the wrong lane and collided with the snowplow.

From the testimony in the record it is clear that Claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent was guilty of negligence. On the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence, if not the manifest weight of the evidence, is that Claimant’s failing to have his car under control and driving on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the accident.

[*798] Claim is denied.