Illinois Court of Claims Opinions
General Court of Claims
Download PDF

M.ae Owens v. State of Illinois

41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 109 Illinois Court of Claims Filed 1989-03-10 No. 85-CC-1083
Disposition: (No. 85-CC-1083-Clainiant awarded $34,363.68.) Award: $34,363.68 Agency: Department of Public Aid
Cite as: M.ae Owens v. State of Illinois, 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 109 (1989)
General Court of Claims 41 awarded 1980s M.ae Owens v. State of Illinois 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 109 1989-03-10 (No. 85-CC-1083-Clainiant awarded $34,363.68.) /opinions/v41-p0197-1/

M.AE OWENS, Claimant, v . THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, DESSIE Respondent.

Case summary

Claimant slipped and fell on a wet tile floor in a state office waiting room, fracturing her kneecap and requiring surgery. The court found the State negligent for failing to keep the floor clear of snow and water, and awarded $34,363.68 for medical expenses, disability, pain and suffering, and future treatment.

Claim type: Personal Injury Negligence

AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.

Headnotes

  1. NEIL F. HARTIGAN, Attorney General (JOHN R. BUCKL.EY, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
  2. NEGLIGENCE-StUte’S duty to persons on its premises. The State of Illinois has a duty to maintain premises under its control in a reasonably safe condition for persons who are legitimately on those premises.
  3. SAiu-snow and water on waiting room floor-stale's duty. Where the evidence showed that water and snow had accumulated on the tile floor of a.waiting room in a State office, the State had a duty to remedy the situation in order to make the room safe for the persons using the room, since the accnmulation created a sitnation under which it would be reasonably foreseeable that someone could slip and fall, and requiring the State to keep the floor clear or to provide mats and rugs in areas of high traffic would impose a slight burden.
  4. SAME- slip-und-fall- waiting room- snow and water on floor-State negligent-award granted. The State was negligent in failing to correct an accumulation of snow and water on the tile floor of the waiting room of a State office, and therefore an award was appropriate for the Claimant who slipped and fell in one of the puddles in the waiting room and injured her knee, cspecially where the State's employees had knowledge of the condition and could have easily taken action to remedy the situation.
  5. DAMAGES-slip-and-fall-knee injury-award ,granted f o r disability, medical expenses, future treatment and pain and suffering. Where the State was found liable for the knee injury sustained by the Claimant when she slipped in a puddle of water in the waiting roomrof'a State office, an award was granted for the Claimant's medical expenses, her pain and suffering, and futnre treatment, but no award was made for lost income due to the speculative nature of the evidence in that regard, and the award for the Claimant's disability was limited because her condition was not solely due t o the post-traumatic chondromalacia and the prognosis after treatment or surgery was not in evidence.

The Claimant, Dessie Mae Owens, age 51 at the time of the mishap, has brought this action for damages for personal injury with accompanying pain and suffering and medical expenses: On December 15, 1983, the Claimant, Dessie Mae Owens, drove her daughter-in-law, Lavalle Owens, a public aid client, to the office of 'the Department of Public Aid in Rockford. At the Rockford office, an enclosed entranceway opened into a large waiting room in which clients sat waiting to be summoned to meet their caseworkers. As the Owens entered the waiting room, there were chairs in front of them and to the right.

They sat approximately .15 feet to the right of the entrance door, three or four feet from the interior door to the offices in which clients were interviewed.

[*111] Caseworker supervisor, Patricia G. Story, entered the waiting room through the interior door near the Owens and summoned the Claimant’s daughter-in-law to follow her into the offices. When Ms. Story first saw the Claimant, the Claimant was seated. However, just as Ms. Story was going through the interior door with the Claimant’s daughter-in-law, they both turned, and saw the Claimant on the floor. The Claimant had fallen between where she was seated and the interior door. Ms.

Story went to the Claimant’s aid.

The incident occurred about 1:30 in the afternoon.

Snow had been falling all day, and persons entering the waiting room had brought snow with them on their shoes. This snow melted into puddles. Ms. Story stated that the Claimant was down on her knee in one of the puddles. The floor was made of tile and there was no rug in the waiting room that was usable by entering parties. Generally, janitors did not come on duty until late afternoon, but from time to time a clerk would be summoned to clean up spills. This clerk was not summoned on December 15,1983, prior to the incident.

The State’s duty to persons legitimately on its premises is to maintain reasonably safe conditions. The accumulation of water and snow on the tile floor in the large waiting room did create a situation in which it would be reasonably foreseeable that someone could slip and fall. To remedy the situation would not have been burdensome. The clerk could have been summoned to keep the floor clear or mats and rugs could have been placed on the floor in trafficked areas.

The accumulation of water and snow was the proximate cause of the Claimant’s fall and injury, and the State’s employees clearly had knowledge of the situation. This Court finds negligence on the part of the Respondent.

[*112] The Claimant saw a physician the next day who told her that she had a fractured kneecap (patella). This diagnosis was considered probable by her surgeon and a later examining physician. Mrs. Owens underwent whirlpool treatment, wore a knee brace for three months, and in May of 1984 had a pain killer injected into the knee. The Claimant finally underwent surgery on her left knee on August 11, 1984, and wore a knee brace for some time thereafter.

Entered into evidence were the reports of her surgeon, the hospital and the orthopedic physician who examined her in Arkansas where she presently resides.

The hospital reports indicate that the surgery repaired a torn meniscus (cartilage) in the left knee. At that time it was reported that there was “significant degeneration of the undersurface of the patella.” The surgeon in December of 1985 refers to this as “posttraumatic chondromalacia of patella.” Chondromalacia of the patella is a deterioration of the cartilage on the underside of the patella. Other than occurring naturally, it can be caused by a fracture of the patella, a hard knock or a torn meniscus. An injured party feels sharp pain and stiffness and the knee gives way on occasion.

Mrs. Owens reports these symptoms.

In May of 1985, ‘the surgeon reported a good recovery with no swelling and close to full range of motion of the left knee. The Claimant still indicated some discomfort. In December of 1985, the surgeon noted that her symptoms may increase as the patella fracture and chondromalacia may lead to “degenerative arthritic damages.” The Arkansas physician in October of 1986 reported “degenerative arthritis” in both knees with pain and swelling more pronounced in the left knee, with the possibility of further surgery.

[*113] In April of 1987, the surgeon reported that chondromalacia of the patella was present in the left knee, and that the condition was partially traumatic in origin. The question in cases such as this is to what extent the trauma caused or accelerated the chrondromalacia, as naturally arising arthritic changes. also contributed to the condition. We have no report from the Respondent’s examining physician, if any, indicating the extent of arthritis in other parts of the Claimant’s body, or the probably extent of pretraumatic arthritis.

The preponderance of the evidence shows and this Court finds that the Claimant suffered a probable fractured patella and a torn meniscus of the left knee.

The left knee was treated surgically to repair the torn meniscus. A chondromalacia of the patella has since set in which may require surgery, in various degrees of seriousness, if it does not respond to conservative treatment. There is no evidence of the disability due to the fall that the Claimant will suffer in the future, though she is suffering disability at the present time.

This Court is asked to make a fine judgment in the matter of its award for’disability and its duration. The Claimant’s condition is not solely due to the posttraumatic chondromalacia and the prognosis after treatment or surgery is‘not in evidence. Therefore, the Court awards Dessie Mae Owens $12,000 for her disability .

The matter of lost income is speculative in this claim. Mrs. Owens stopped working three years prior to the injury. No evidence was introduced concerning her past wages or her desire to return to work. There is no evidence of Mrs. Owens’ ability to perform work she had previously done or could do after her pending treatment or surgery. Therefore, we make no award for lost income.

[*114] Medical bills in the amount of $4,363.68have been stipulated, and we award such an amount to Mrs. Owens and the vendors.

The Claimant asked for $5,000 for pain and suffering to date in her amended bill of particulars, and we award that amount to Mrs. Owens, and we award $5,000 for future pain and suffering.

The Claimant's surgeon stated that the potential operation would range from $3,000to $5,000 in cost. We award $5,000 to Dessie Mae Owens for treatment or the operation, and $3,000 for therapy.

It is therefore ordered that Dessie Mae Owens be awarded a total of $34,363.68 and that the award be made payable to Dessie Mae Owens and her attorneys, Schirger, Begar and Ferguson, Ltd.

Official volume 41 (Containing cases in which opinions were filed and orders of dismissal entered, without opinion for: Fiscal Year 1989 – July 1, 1988–June 30, 1989)  ·  All opinions in this volume  ·  Also on CourtListener

This text is OCR/derived from the official volume and may contain errors. The PDF is authoritative. Boundary pages shared with the adjacent opinion are reproduced whole, so the page image may show a neighbor's opening or closing lines; the transcript text itself is opinion-scoped. See About & sources.