JAME SBYRD, Claimant, v. THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.
Case summary
Claimant sought $100.63 for property allegedly stolen from his prison cell due to State negligence. The court dismissed the claim because the State did not take exclusive control of the property, and claimant failed to present specific evidence that his cell was locked or that the State was responsible for the theft.
Cases cited: Doubling v. State (1976), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl.; Owens v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 150; Blount v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 790; Walker v. State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 286; Dunglemun v. State (1979), 33 Ill. Ct. Cl. 154; Edwards v. State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 206; Bargas v. State (1976), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 99
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Headnotes
- NEIL F. HARTIGAN, Attorney General (KIMBERLY L. DAHLEN, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
- P R l SONERS AND INMATES-sfUte has no duty to SafegUUrd inmate’s property from theft. The State of Illinois has no general duty to safeguard an inmate’s personal property from theft by other inmates when the property is in the inmate’s cell. NEGLIGENCE-~OSS of property from inmate’s cell-what necessarq to rccouer on negligence theory. An inmate of a State correctional facility may recover under a negligence theory for the loss of personal property from his or her cell if specific evidence is presented that the inmate had no cellmate, that the lost property was outside the reach of passersby, that the cell door was locked when the inmate left his cell, that there was a lot of traffic in the g a l l t ~ yand that the State was in complete control of the cell doors. PRisoNEns AN D INMATES-~OSSof property from cell-insufficient evidence-claim dismissed. An inmate’s claim for the loss of various items of personal property from his cell based on the theory that the State negligently left the cell door unlocked was dismissed, since the inmate failed to present evidence as to specifically where the property was located in the cell, there was no evidence as to the amount of traffic in the gallery, and the inmate did not present evidence that he requested that his cell door be deadlocked by a guard when he left.
Claimant seeks $100.63 in lost property which he claims was stolen from his prison cell on August 17,1985, through the negligence of the State. The cause was tried before the Commissioner on November 5, 1987. The evidence consists of the transcript of testimony, the departmental report, and Claimant’s Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.
Both parties have filed briefs.
On August 17, 1985, Claimant, James Byrd, was a prisoner at Pontiac Correctional Center serving a total sentence of 18 years for robbery. About 8:OO a.m., Claimant left his cell to go to breakfast and then out to the yard. At about 11:OO a.m., he returned to his cell and found it open. He never leaves his cell door open; he always leaves it locked, and he had no cellmate. He made an immediate complaint to an officer on the [*160] gallery and gave a statement to the sergeant as to the property missing from his cell.
Claimant was missing an am/fm tape player he purchased on October 10, 1984, for $59.26, a TV converter he purchased on January ‘16, 1985, for $26.37, $15 worth of coupons, and some jeans. Claimant exhibited proof of his ownership and cost of the tape player, converter and coupons through his Exhibits 2 and 3. I After the theft, Claimant spoke to Officer Jennings.
Officer Jennings wrote “It is a possibility I opened Byrd’s cell 431 WCH because I don’t work that gallery but once every so often,” on Claimant’s Exhibit 1.
Claimant admitted his cell was not deadlocked when he left and he had not asked the officer to deadlock the cell. He did not see his cell door opened but believed that officers were opening cell doors to allow inmates to shower. This had happened in the past when inmates weren’t in the cells. He further believes his property was taken by other inmates and he was not accusing the officers of taking his property.
This is not a bailment or constructive bailment case.
This is not a case where the Respondent took exclusive control and possession of Claimant’s property. (Doubling v . State (1976),32 111. Ct. (3.1.) There was no duty on the State to exercise reasonable care in returning Claimant’s property since the State did not take actual physical possession of the property. (Owens v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. C1. 150.) If Claimant is to recover, it must be based on a theory of negligence by the State in failing to relock the cell if, in fact, the State failed to lock the cell and not that Claimant just failed to lock his own cell. Claimant’s reliance is in the theories espoused by the Court of Claims in Blount v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct.
[*161] C1. 790, and Walker v . State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. C1. 286.
These two cases and particularly Walker indicate that an inmate can recover for lost property where very specific evidence is presented by the Claimant that he had no cellmate, that the stolen property was outside the reach of passersby, that the cell door was locked when Claimant left the cell, that there was a lot >of traffic in the gallery, and that Respondent was in complete control of the cell doors. Under these circumstances, the Respondent can clearly anticipate that property can be stolen from an inmate’s cell in the absence of an inmate if an officer would unlock the cell and let it remain unlocked.
The Claimant in the present case did not testify with such particularity. The sparse evidence in this case is more like the evidence in Dunglemun v . State (1979),33 111. Ct. C1. 154, where the claims were denied. Also Claimant indicated the property was stolen by other inmates and not by the guards. There is no general duty on the part of the State of Illinois to safeguard an inmate’s property from theft by other inmates when the property is in the inmate’s cell. Edwards v . State (1986), 38 111. Ct. C1.206; Bargas v . State (1976),32 111. Ct. C1.99.
Based on the foregoing and because Claimant did not request the cell be deadlocked, and did not present with specificity the location of the property in the cell and the amount of traffic in the gallery, the claim must be denied.
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that this claim is dismissed, with prejudice.