Illinois Court of Claims Opinions
Crime Victim Compensation
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In re Eugene Mines

48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 666 Illinois Court of Claims Filed 1996-05-17 No. 95-CV-2522
Disposition: (No. 95-CV-2522-Claim denied.)
Cite as: In re Eugene Mines, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 666 (1996)
Crime Victim Compensation 48 denied 1990s In re Eugene Mines 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 666 1996-05-17 (No. 95-CV-2522-Claim denied.) /opinions/v48-p0550-1/

In re APPLICATION OF EUGENE MINES, III

Case summary

Claimant sought compensation for medical expenses and lost wages after being injured in an assault. The court denied the claim because he notified law enforcement 23 days after the crime, failing to meet the 72-hour notification requirement under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, and did not establish that the delay was timely under the circumstances.

Claim type: Crime Victim Compensation

Statutes cited: 740 ILCS 45/6.1(b)

Cases cited: Schenk v. State (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 437; In re Application of Seber (1987), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 387

AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.

Headnotes

  1. CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION ACT-notification requirement. Section 6.1(b) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act requires that a person requesting compensation under the Act notify law enforcement officials within 72 hours of the perpetration of the crime allegedly causing death or injury to the victim, but if the notification is made more than 72 hours after the crime is perpetrated, the applicant must establish that such notice was timely under the circumstances.
  2. SAME-limitations-failure of police to advise Claimant of Act. The failure of police to advise the Claimant of the Crime Victims Compensation Act is not an exception to the limitations period under the Act.
  3. SAME-injuries sustained in breaking up fight-notification to law enforcement officials was not timely-claim denied. Where the Claimant did not notify law enforcement officials of injuries he sustained in breaking up a fight until 23 days after the incident occurred, he was precluded from recovering under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, since the Claimant did not prove that such notice was timely under the circumstances, and neither his lack of knowledge of the Act or the failure of police to advise him of its existence were exceptions to the statutory limitations period.

OPINION

FREDERICK, J. The Claimant, Eugene Mines, III, was kicked in the face by unknown offenders when he tried to break up a fight between two men on December 30, 1994, at the American Legion Hall, 705 South Larkin, in Joliet, Illinois.

[*667] Claimant suffered a ruptured orbit of the left eye, retinal detachment, and lost a lens and iris. On March 9, 1995, Mines filed a claim pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act for doctor and hospital expenses totaling $30,656.62, plus lost wages. Claimant had no insurance available to pay the medical bills. The Court denied the claim on July 3, 1995. The Court found that section 6.1(b) of the Act (740 ILCS 45/6.1(b)) requires that a person requesting compensation under the Act notify law enforcement officials within 72 hours of the perpetration of the crime allegedly causing the death or injury to the victim.

If the notification is made more than 72 hours after the perpetration of the crime, the applicant must establish that such notice was timely under the circumstances. The Claimant notified law enforcement officials 23 days after the perpetration of the crime and had not established that such notification was timely under the circumstances. The Claimant requested a review of the decision. A hearing was held before Commissioner Michael E. Fryzel on February 16, 1996.

The Claimant testified that he did not report the crime to law enforcement officials for two reasons. The first reason is that he was not informed about the Crime Victims Compensation Act until his aunt, a police officer, told him ten days after the crime. The second reason is that the offenders were unknown to him and he thought the police wouldn’t do anything because of this. The Claimant’s mother testified that when he went into the hospital, someone told her to file a police report but they didn’t know which police department would handle the case. The Joliet police said it was a county police problem. After talking to Officer Williams ten days later, Mrs.

Mines called the county police and asked if they could send an officer to Claimant’s house since her son was not able to go into the police station as he had a high fever.

[*668] They replied that there was a snowstorm and told her to wait until the victim felt better and then have him come in. When she called again on January 23, 1995, 23 days after the incident, Officer Stott of the Will County Sheriff’s Police Department, who came out, said the police should have sent somebody out the night she first called.

Claimant and his mother were not aware of the Act until they talked to Officer Williams, ten days after the crime, at which time they contacted the county police.

Even if the police had sent someone out that night, the report would have been made a substantial time after the 72-hour deadline required by the Act. This Court has held that failure of the police to advise a Claimant of the Act is not an exception to the limitations periods under the Act. (Schenk v. State (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 437.) Claimant has failed to show that the notification he made 23 days after the occurrence was timely under the circumstances of this case. (In re Application of Seber (1987), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 387.) Claimant has failed to meet all conditions precedent for compensation under the Act. Based on the foregoing reasons, it is the order of the Court that this claim be and hereby is denied.

Official volume 48 (Containing cases in which opinions were filed and orders of dismissal entered, without opinion for: Fiscal Year 1996 – July 1, 1995–June 30, 1996)  ·  All opinions in this volume  ·  Also on CourtListener

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