In re Rhonda F. Johnson

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 12,1996. Rhonda F. Johnson, friend of the deceased victim, Lucille Henderson, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on May 9, 1996, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds: 1. That on March 12, 1996, Lucille Henderson, age 86, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: first degree murder. See section 9-1 of the Criminal Code, 720 ILCS $9-1. 2. That the crime occurred in Chicago, Illinois and all of the eligibility requirements of section 6.1 of the Act have been met. 3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral and burial expenses. 4. That pursuant to section lO.l(c) of the Act, a person related to the victim may be compensated for funeral expenses of the victim to the extent to which she has paid or become obligated to pay such expenses. 5. That section 2(f) of the Act defines “relative” as a spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, half brother, half sister, spouse’s parent, nephew, niece, uncle or aunt.

[*600] 600 51 111. Ct. C1. 6. That on her application for compensation, the Claimant indicated that she was a friend of the deceased victim. Because she is not one of the relatives as defined in section 2(f) of the Act, the Claimant is not eligible for compensation for funeral expenses, pursuant to section lO.l(c) of the Act. 7. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is’hereby, denied.

I OPINION

FREDERICK, J. This cause comes before the Court on Claimant, Rhonda F. Johnson’s, Crime Victims Compensation Act application, brought pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act (the Act). (740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.) Claimant seeks reimbursement for burial and funeral expenses arising out of the death of Lucille Henderson. The application, dated May 19, 1996, states that the victim was a family friend of the Claimant. The victim was struck in the head with a blunt object, stabbed repeatedly, then robbed.

According to the application, the victim did not have any family and Claimant paid the entire burial cost.

On August 21, 1996, the Court entered an order denying the claim. The order included a finding that the deceased victim, Lucille Henderson, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in paragraph 1 of section 2(c) of the Act.

However, section lO.l(c) of the Act specifies that a person related to the victim may be compensated for funeral expenses of the victim to the extent that person has paid or is obligated to pay such expenses. Section 2(f) defines ‘!relative.” The Court concluded that Claimant’s claim did not [*601] Zh re Johnson 601 meet a required condition precedent to compensation as Claimant was not a relative of the decedent.

Claimant submitted a written request for review and reconsideration of the denial. Claimant stated therein that she was the only ‘Ifarnily” the victim had. Claimant did the victim’s shopping, took her to the doctor, got her medication, took her on outings, and did her errands. Claimant testified that the victim was like a surrogate grandmother.

A hearing was scheduled for December 27, 1996, before our Commissioner; however, Claimant did not appear.

Another hearing was scheduled for June 27,1997, at which time Claimant appeared and testified.

Claimant testified that she paid $3,360 for the funeral and burial expenses of the decedent. The iictim’s death was very emotional for Claimant and Claimant’s son. The victim had kept Claimant’s son from age six months until he started to school. The decedent was like a grandmother to him. The Claimant used part of her son’s college tuition to pay for the funeral expenses. The victim had no family, but Claimant considered her family.

The victim did not live with Claimant. Claimant’s family did not provide any financial assistance to the victim.

Claimant did all of the victim’s errands.

This is a very sad case. Claimant should be coinmended for her help to the victim during her life. Claimant deserves to be lauded for her generosity and her decision to help in a time of need. However, the Act does not grant the power or authority for the Court to order compensation to a person not defined as a “relative” in section 2(0 of the Act. A relative is defined in the Act as a spouse, parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, half brother, half sister, spouse’s parent, nephew, niece, uncle or aunt: ‘Claimant is not a relative as [*602] 602 51 Ill. Ct. C1. defined by the Act. She was a true friend. Unfortunately, a surrogate grandmother is not a “relative” under the Act.

The Law

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The burden of proof in a Crime Victims Compensa- I tion Act case is on the Claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence all conditions precedent for an award under the Act. (In re Application of Mercado (1996), 48 Ill. Ct. C1. 650; In re Application ofBamett (1996), 48 Ill.

Ct. C1. 661.) The Crime Victims Compensation Act has been strictly construed by the Court as the Act is statutory. The Court has no lawful authority to expand the provisions of the Act. In re Application of Richardson (1996), 48 Ill. Ct. C1. 612.

Section lO.l(c) of the Act allows a person related to a victim of a violent crime to be eligible for funeral expenses of the victim to the extent to which the relative has paid or becomes obligated to pay such expenses. (In re Application of Cox (1994), 47 Ill. Ct. C1. 586.) This Court in separate cases has previously denied the claims for funeral expenses for a cousin and for the mother of a victim’s children where the mother and the victim were not married because in both cases the Claimants were not relatives as defined by the Act. (In re Application of Htusain (1993), 45 Ill. Ct. C1. 72; In re Application of Reynold (1992), 45 Ill. Ct. C1. 525.) The Court has also denied the claim of a live-in girlfriend of the victim decedent as she was not a relative as defined by the Act. In re Application of Curry (1992), 44 Ill. Ct. C1. 473.

The Court cannot expand the Act to include friends.

While we sympathize with Claimant, we must find that Claimant has failed to meet a condition precedent for an award under the Act for funeral expenses, as Claimant was not a relative of the decedent as defined by the Act.

[*1] 1 In re Hoyd 603 For the foregoing reasons, it is the order of the Court that Claimant’s claim be, and hereby is, denied.

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(No. 97-CV-O04PCl>m denied; &ition for rehearing denied.)

In re APPLICATION OF GLEN HOYD i

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Orderfiled August 21,1996.

I Opinion on rehearingfiled May 14, 1999. ~ I G REGORY A. HARRIS, for Claimant. ... . .

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JIM RYAN, Attorney General (D ONALD C. MCLAUGH

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LIN , J R .,. . Attorney General, of counsel), for ReI spondent.

C RIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION ACT-requirement for eligibility-oci currence of violent crime set forth in statute. In order for a Claimant to be eligible for compensation under the.Crime Victims Compensation Act, there must be -evidence that one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 2(c) of the Act occurred, and a .“crime of violence”,as defined by the Act does not include any other offense or accident involving a motor vehicle except reckless homicide and driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs.

SAME-hit-and-run accident-lack of spec$cally enumerated crimclaim denied. In a hit-and-run victim’s action seeking compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, the claim ‘was denied,, because a hitand-run accident is not one of the statute’s specifically enumerated crimes and, even assuming that the Claimant established that the motor vehicle which struck him was a “deadly weapon,” the perpetrator’s acts were not so reckless or wanton as to rise to the level of a constructively willful or intentional act that constituted a compensable violence crime.

ORDER

P ER C URIAM.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 7 , 1995. The Claimant, Glen Hoyd, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 4511 et seq. .

[*604] 604 51 Ill. Ct. (21.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 5, 1996, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds: 1. That on July 7, 1995, the Claimant was injured as a result of a traffic accident. The incident occurred at Roosevelt and 14th Avenue, Maywood, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the Claimant was attempting to cross the street when he was struck by an automobile.

The offending driver fled the scene and has not been apprehended. 2. That in order for a Claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence that one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 2(c) of the Act occurred. 3. That “crime of violence” as specified in section 2(c) of the Act does not include any other offense or accident involving a motor vehicle except reckless homicide and driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs. 4. That the issues presented to the Court are: (1) whether the Claimant’s injury that was caused by the offender’s operation of a motor vehicle is compensable under section 2(c) of the Act; (2) whether the fact that the offender fled the scene of the incident has an effect on the Claimant’s eligibility for compensation under the Act. 5. That as the Court stated in In re Nancy Hansen (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. C1. 401: “The Court has uniformly taken the position that the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act is not applicable to unintentional motor vehicle [*1] In re Hoyd 605 offenses, as not being a ‘crime of violence’ within $2(c) I thereof.” See also In re Jean Desir (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. C1.

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391; In re Stevens (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. C1. 710; In re Ceniceros (1995), No. 94-CV-2822. i 6. That the Court has also recognized that while a hit-and-run accident is a crime, it is not one of the crimes I specifically enumerated in the Act as being the basis of a

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claim under the Act. In re Alfonso Viscarrondo (1980), 34

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I Ill. Ct. C1.402; In re Ceniceros, supra.

i 7. That this claim does not meet a required condi

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tion precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby, denied.

OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING

EPSTEIN, J. Claimant has petitioned for a rehearing of the Court’s denial (order of May 11, 1998) of his application for compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (the “Act”) as a victim of a hit-and-run automobile incident.

In that opinion, on first rehearing from our initial adverse order, this Court rejected Claimant’s application for lack of a compensable “crime of violence” under the Act.

Although the Court found that reckless driving had been shown, our inability to find an intentional crime on this record required us to deny compensation under the Act.

Claimant’s petition for rehearing urges the point that extreme “reckless, wanton and willful” driving of a motor vehicle can constitute assault with a deadly weapon under section 12-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961-actually section 12-2(a)( 1) (720 ILCS 5/12-2(a)( 1))-and that, [*606] 606 51 Ill. Ct. C1. because section 12-2 is one of the compensable “crimes of violence” listed in section 2(c) of the Act (740 ILCS 45/2(c)), such “reckless, wanton and willful” driving is (or can be) compensable under the Act. Claimant argues that the section 12-2 caselaw has recognized such conduct with a motor vehicle as willful, rather than merely negligent, and that such constructively willful conduct can constitute a criminal act without a showing of specific intent to injure the victim, citing People v. Crockett (1957), 13 Ill. App. 2d 255, 141 N.E.2d 641; People v. Clink (1920), 216 Ill. App. 357; and State 0. Schune, 87 N.J.L. 15.

Because of the novelty of this argument, as well as the infrequency of section 12-2 crimes to be asserted as grounds for compensation under the Act, we set this case for oral argument. However, for reasons unknown, Claimant’s counsel did not appear.

The Court finds it is unnecessary to address the interesting and non-obvious issue of what is substantively added to the section 2(c) list of compensable “crimes of violence” by the inclusion of section 12-2 of the Criminal Code, “aggravated assault”, (720 ILCS 312-2) in addition to such compensable crimes as simple assault (section 12-1 of the Criminal Code). Presumably, if not conclusively, something was intended by the General Assembly by its inclusion of this crime among the other compensable crimes under the Act. But the facts of this case do not raise that issue.

This is because the “reckless” driving facts here, as we have previously found, do not rise to the level of an intentional or willful act, which remains the dispositive issue.

Even if we assume arguendo that the motor vehicle in this case’was a “deadly weapon” as this Claimant contends, our third rereview of this record leaves us unconvinced that [*607] In re Bello 607 I the perpetrator’s acts in this case were so reckless or wanton as to rise to the level of a constructively willful or in

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tentional act. For this analysis, we also assume arguendo that the cited caselaw (Crockett, Clink and Schutte, supra) would be good law under the Criminal Code of 1961, which was enacted after those decisions. I This Court agrees that a motor vehicle can sometimes be a “deadly weapon” and that s o m conduct can be so extremely reckless and wanton as to be deemed willful or intentional, for purposes of the Crime Victims Compensation Act. But we do not find such extraordinary wanton or reckless acts in this case, and therefore, we must reaffirm our previous conclusion, and deny this claim.

Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is denied, and this case is closed.