James Larry v. State of Illinois

OPINION

JANN, J. The present case involved a claim for injuries sustained when Claimant’s vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by a State employee.

Claimant testified that on October 26, 2001, at approximately 9:45 p.m., he was driving westbound on 55th Street. He was stopped in a bus lane because there were two buses in front of his vehicle. He had been stopped for approximately 20 seconds when he was struck by Mr. Jordan’s vehicle. He did not hear a siren or see any lights or Mr. Jordan’s vehicle before the accident.

Claimant was taken to Northwestern Memorial Hospital by paramedics. He kept blacking in and out and became belligerent when the paramedics attempted to take him away because he was uncomfortable on the board.

Claimant was treated at the hospital where he received x-rays.

[*212] The parties stipulated to and entered into evidence all of Claimant’s medical records. The records include a Pathology Laboratory Report which indicates that Claimant’s blood was drawn when he was taken to the hospital on October 26, 2001, and that his blood alcohol concentration was .196.

Claimant denies being intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. He was not charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Claimant testified that he did not have anything to drink for 12 hours before the accident. He stated that he had consumed one beer about 16 hours before the accident, at about 11:00 a.m., with lunch. He also testified that the opened can of beer in his car had been punctured during the accident.

Claimant was released from the hospital after three days and returned home. He testified that on the day after his discharge, he rolled off the couch and was taken back to the hospital. He contends that these injuries should also be attributed to the State because he fell off the couch due to the medication that was prescribed to him for injuries sustained in the accident.

As a result of the accident, Claimant sustained contusions to his head, chest, shoulder and back and a broken bone in his back. Claimant testified that he has constant back pain, has chest pain when he coughs, has headaches and had to obtain glasses as a result of the accident.

Johnnie Jordan testified for the State. On October 26, 2001, he was employed by the Illinois Department of Corrections as a Fugitive Apprehension Specialist. On that date, when he was at approximately 52nd and Morgan in Chicago, he received a call to retrieve a fugitive on the west side of Chicago. Mr. Jordan was driving an unmarked squad car. He turned on the siren and the white emergency lights on the front of the car and the red-andblue light on the dashboard. The accident took place approximately six to eight blocks away from his starting point at 52nd and Morgan. He was traveling eastbound on 55th Street approaching the intersection of 55th and Wentworth. 55th Street traffic had the green light, but had stopped. As he entered the intersection, he was looking north. He was completing a left-hand turn onto Wentworth when Claimant came through the light and the driver’s side of his vehicle struck the Claimant’s vehicle. Claimant’s vehicle was moved from the street to the sidewalk as a result of the collision. He did not see Claimant’s vehicle prior to the accident. Mr. Jordan was taken from the scene by ambulance.

David Brutny was a paramedic employed by the Chicago Fire Department. On October 26, 2001, he responded to an accident a little after 10 p.m. Claimant was the driver of a car that had been hit by another car. He was awake, alert, a little belligerent and smelled of alcohol. Claimant told him that he had consumed one twelve-ounce beer. Because Claimant appeared to be intoxicated he did not have the right of refusal of transport or treatment and his consent was implied.

Claimant contends that the State was negligent in causing the accident and his injuries. He seeks $22,019.96 in compensatory damages, $36,000 for loss of normal life, and $36,000 for pain and suffering, for a total [*213] of $94,019.96. Claimant further argues that evidence of intoxication should not have been admitted at trial because it is irrelevant and extremely prejudicial and there was no evidence that Claimant’s mental or physical abilities were impaired as a result of his intoxication.

The State argues that the claim should be denied because Claimant was negligent in his driving and in failing to yield to an emergency vehicle.

The State contends that Claimant was the sole proximate cause of the accident or that the fault of the Claimant was more than 50% of the proximate cause of injury (735 ILCS 5/2-1116(c)) because, at the time of the accident, Claimant was driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of more than 0.08.

We find evidence of Claimant’s intoxication was properly admitted into evidence. Blood alcohol testing is recognized as a proper means of proving intoxication in personal injury actions. Hambrick v. State, 48 Ill. Ct.

Cl. 57,67 (1995). Pursuant to Section 11-501.2(b)(3) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more creates a presumption that “the person was under the influence of alcohol.” 625 ILCS 5/11.2(b)(3).

Here, the accident took place at approximately 9:45 p.m. and Claimant was taken to the hospital from the scene by ambulance. It is uncontroverted that Claimant’s blood alcohol level was 0.196 shortly before midnight. Thus, there is a statutory presumption that Claimant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. This statutory presumption has not been rebutted by Claimant.

The State contends that Claimant’s intoxication contributed to the accident and his failure to yield to an emergency vehicle. Mr. Jordan’s unrebutted testimony establishes that he had his emergency lights and siren on at the time of the accident. Yet, Claimant testified that he did not hear a siren or see any lights or Mr. Jordan’s vehicle before the accident. A reasonable inference can be drawn that his failure to notice the siren or the lights, and his failure to yield to the emergency vehicle, was the result of his intoxication. See Lance v. State (1999), 52 Ill.Ct.Cl. 142; Paul v. State (1999), 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 164 and Stoeckel v. State (1999), 52 Ill.Ct.Cl. 224.

The Court further finds that Claimant’s version of events is simply not credible. Mr. Jordan testified that he was traveling eastbound on 55th Street approaching the intersection of 55th and Wentworth on a green light; the rest of the traffic had stopped. As he entered the intersection, he was looking north. As he completed a left-hand turn onto Wentworth, Claimant came through the light and the driver’s side of his vehicle struck the Claimant’s vehicle. Claimant, on the other hand, testified that he was stopped in a bus lane behind two buses at the time of the accident. Had he been stopped behind two buses, however, the buses would have gone through the intersection before Claimant did and the accident could not have occurred in the manner described by Claimant. It appears more likely that Claimant drove around the buses stopped on a green signal and proceeded into the intersection. This scenario is consistent with Claimant’s failure to see Jordan’s vehicle and Jordan’s failure to see Claimant until he had begun to execute his left turn. The Court must consider the credibility of the witnesses in [*214] rendering a decision. Duerst v. State, 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 186,192 (1998). Here, Claimant’s version of the accident simply is not plausible or credible.

Claimant has not presented evidence that Jordan breached his duty of care owed to other motorists by the driver of an emergency vehicle. See Koepp et al. v. State (1993) 46 Il. Ct. Cl. 344. The preponderance of the evidence indicates that other drivers had heard the siren and seen the flashing lights and allowed Jordan to pass and make his way into the intersection.

Claimant apparently entered the intersection after the signal had turned read and his vehicle was struck by Jordan as he completed his turn onto Wentworth.

We find, based on the evidence, that Claimant was intoxicated at the time of the accident, that he failed to yield to an emergency vehicle, and that the comparative fault of the Claimant was more than 50% of the proximate cause of the injury. For the foregoing reasons, Claimant’s claim is hereby denied and dismissed with prejudice.