Thomas Hummel v. State of Illinois

OPINION

REID, J.

The Claimant, Thomas Hummel, brings this claim in tort for alleged injuries arising out of an attack by another patient that occurred on Feb. 27th, 2002, at Tinley Park Mental Health Center. Tinley Park Mental Health Center is owned and operated by the Department of Mental Health, State of Illinois. Claimant, who was a patient at the above mentioned facility, alleges that he was attacked and beaten without provocation by another patient while he was asleep. Claimant alleges that his injuries were the direct and proximate cause of Respondent’s negligence in failing to separate the violent patients from the nonviolent patients, as well as its failing to supervise the patients at all times. Claimant seeks $100,000 in damages for injuries sustained due to the Respondent’s alleged negligence.

[*244] FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 20, 2002, Claimant Thomas Hummel was admitted to Respondent’s facility, Tinley Park Mental Health Center (hereinafter called Tinley). He was admitted to Tinley to receive treatment for various psychiatric disorders that had afflicted him most of his adult life, including major depression with obsessive compulsive tendencies, agoraphobia, and schizoaffective disorder. At trial, Hummel admitted that all he could really remember about the events on February 26 and February 27 was that he went to sleep, and that when he woke up, he was at Ingalls Memorial Hospital in great pain. The State of llinois Department of Human Services Incident Report, admitted into evidence at trial as part of Claimant’s Exhibit A, contained the following facts:

1. Around 8:30 P.M. on February 26, 2002, Hummel allegedly

touched another unidentified patient while that patient was

sleeping. When that unidentified patient awakened, he allegedly

pushed Hummel to the floor, causing a laceration on Hummel’s

chin.

2. Around 9:15 A.M., on February 27, 2002, while Hummel was

asleep in bed, a fellow patient, Hans Hightower, flipped Hummel’s

bed over, and while Hummel was on the floor, proceeded to attack

him with the bed.

3. Hummel was taken to the Emergency Room at Ingalls Memorial

Hospital and treated for a supracondylar fracture of the left elbow.

Claimant seeks an award for the damages and injuries related to the fracture of his left elbow. A hearing was held on May 9, 2007 before Commissioner Joseph Cavanaugh.

ANALYSIS

Procedural Issues:

The Court will first address the procedural issue raised in this case. In its post-trial brief, filed on June 29, 2007, Respondent asserts that this Court improperly admitted Claimant’s Exhibits A and G at trial.1 Respondent makes

Claimant’s Exhibit A consists of 1. Office of the Attorney General fax transmittal sheet; 2. Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS) progress notes; 3. examination report dated February 27, 2002; 4. DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) Incident Report Form; and 5. Tinley Park Mental Health Center (TPMHC) Unusual Occurrence Report. Claimant’s Exhibit G consists of 1. TPMHC Discharge/Transfer Summary ; 2. TPMHC Comprehensive Psychiatric Evaluation; and 3. TPMH progress notes.

[*245] this assertion based on its interpretation of 74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.140 which provides that certain State records, files, and departmental reports can be offered as prima facie evidence of the facts contained in those documents.2 Respondent correctly asserts that Rule 790.140 is a “one-way transaction” giving only the Attorney General or the legal counsel for the appropriate State agency the right to file departmental reports. However, Rule 790.140 does not provide that once a departmental report or records and files maintained in the regular course of business by any department, commission, board, agency or authority of the State of Illinois has been filed with the court and served on the claimant, that only the Attorney General or legal counsel for a State agency can admit or introduce these documents into evidence at trial. While counsel for the Claimant in this case could have sought a stipulation from the Attorney General that the exhibits were part of the State’s departmental report or records and files maintained in the regular course of business by a State agency or called witnesses to establish facts to support their admission under Rule 790.140, the Court is satisfied that the documents contained in exhibits A and G were provided to the Claimant from the Attorney General pursuant to Claimant’s discovery requests and are State records and files kept in the regular course of business by a State agency and for the purpose of the hearing allowed the exhibits into evidence pursuant to the provisions set forth in Rule 790.140.

Substantive Issues:

Claimant asserts that as a result of Respondent’s negligence, he was attacked by Mr. Hightower, who resided in the same ward at the facility. In order for the Claimant to state a cause of action sounding in negligence, he must set forth facts establishing the existence of a duty owed to him by the Respondent; that the duty was breached; and that, as a proximate cause, Claimant suffered damages. Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hosp, 119 Ill.2d 496, 503, 520 N.E.2d 37, 117 Ill. Dec. 47 (1988). The threshold inquiry, then, is to determine what duty the Respondent owed the Claimant. Generally, the duty that is owed, if there is one at all, is the duty to use reasonable care to protect an individual from a foreseeable risk of harm. With respect to State-run mental health institutions, such as Respondent’s, this Court has long held that this duty includes that the State exercise reasonable care in restraining and controlling dangerous insane persons committed to its custody so that they will not have the opportunity to inflict a foreseeable injury upon others. Clifton v. State, 24 Ill. Ct. Cl. 404, 412 (1963).

The parties are not limited to the prima facie evidence contained in the departmental reports and are entitled to produce any additional evidence to support or contradict the prima facie evidence contained in said reports.

[*246] Having established the duty that Respondent owed Claimant, this Court must next determine if Respondent breached this duty. In Marasovic v. State, 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 154 (1993), a case that Claimant relies on in his post-trial brief, the claimant was an advocate for the Legal Services Foundation and was interviewing a resident at a State institution for the mentally retarded. While conducting her interview at the facility, claimant was attacked by another patient - one who had a history of violent outbreaks. This Court found that “[t]he State breached its duty to prevent a patient in its control from attacking the claimant when that attack was entirely foreseeable given the previous history and nature of the attacker.” Id. at 157 (citations omitted).

In Doe v. State, 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 190 (1991), the claimant/patient was admitted to the respondent mental health center for a psychotic condition that caused her to continually disrobe and act out sexually. She was eventually raped by a fellow patient. This Court found that respondent was negligent and this duty was breached in light of the following facts: the respondent was aware that the claimant’s condition required close supervision; there were only three or four faculty members to supervise 39 patients in the ward that the claimant was in; and the patient who attacked the claimant had a long criminal history, including a record of violent sexual activities. Id. at 192-93.

In Dever v. State, 29 Ill. Ct. Cl. 374 (1974), a mentally ill patient escaped the respondent hospital and inflicted severe property damage on a neighboring property owner’s home. This Court found that the respondent hospital breached its duty of care to the third-party home owner by leaving the patient in an improperly assigned, unlocked ward because an attack by the patient was foreseeable: her well-documented medical record clearly evidenced her violent propensities. Id. at 376.

In all the above-referenced cases, it was foreseeable that the patient would attack the claimant. Since these attacks were foreseeable, this Court held the respondents liable for failing to protect the claimants from these attacks. In the case at bar, both during trial, and throughout his post-trial brief, Claimant asserts that Hightower’s attack was foreseeable because Respondent knew or should have known of Hightower’s “violent and mean disposition.” Surprisingly, however, the Claimant offers no evidence, other than the attack in question, that establishes Hightower had a history indicating violent propensity, and more importantly, that the Respondent had knowledge or should have had knowledge of this propensity, thereby rendering Hightower’s attack foreseeable.

Unlike in Doe, Dever, and Marasovic, there are no medical or criminal records in the Record indicating that Hightower had a “violent and mean disposition.” Also, there is no evidence that Respondent was aware of any such records. Further, unlike in Doe, Claimant’s own condition was not such that it [*247] was foreseeable that he was in danger if he was not closely supervised or isolated from the other patients. Even if Claimant’s condition did warrant close supervision, the Record, unlike the record in Dever and Doe, contains no evidence suggesting that the quality or the quantity of Respondent’s supervision of Claimant was unreasonable.

While it is true that Hummel did get into an altercation at the Respondent’s institution on February 26, 2002, about twelve hours before the incident in question, there is no evidence in the record that supports that the altercation put the Respondent on notice as to Hightower’s violent propensities - namely because the Record does not indicate that it was Hightower that Hummel had the altercation with. Most importantly, while Hummel’s testimony at trial was inconsistent regarding whether he had even met Hightower prior to February 27, his testimony was emphatic and consistent regarding the more relevant issue: he had not had any prior altercations with Hightower.

To the extent that Claimant, in his post-trial brief, asserts that the State had notice of Hightower’s violent propensities because he has been in State mental institutions for the past 15-20 years, such evidence alone does not establish that Hightower had a “violent and mean disposition.” There are many mental conditions that a person might need extended treatment for that are not accompanied by violent or mean behavior. Absent relevant medical or criminal history, this Court cannot infer that Respondent had notice of Hightower’s “violent and mean disposition” simply because he has been institutionalized for many years.

The Respondent clearly owed the Claimant a duty to use reasonable care to protect him from a foreseeable risk of harm, including a duty to restrain and control dangerous insane persons committed to its custody from inflicting a foreseeable injury upon Claimant. However, Claimant has not established that the Respondent breached this duty - namely because Claimant offers no evidence that Hightower’s attack was foreseeable. Accordingly, this Court does not find the Respondent negligent.Therefore,

It is hereby ordered that the relief requested in the Claimant’s Complaint is DENIED.