Victoria Coda v. State of Illinois

OPINION

SPRAGUE, J.

Claimant, Victoria Coda, widow of Robert S. Coda, brings this claim pursuant to the Line of Duty Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 315/1 et seq. In its Report filed on May 12, 2006, the Attorney General (AG) concluded it was unable to recommend whether Robert S. Coda, a Senior Special Agent in the Criminal Investigation Bureau of the Illinois Department of Revenue, was “killed in the line of duty” as contemplated by the Act. The AG recommended that a hearing be held in this matter. The Court then referred this matter to a Commissioner who conducted a hearing on October 9, 2007. At the Commissioner’s request, Claimant supplemented the Record by obtaining Decedent’s medical records for January 23, 2006, to February 1, 2006.

[*288] FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 24, 2006, Claimant Victoria Coda filed the instant claim pursuant to the death of her husband, Senior Special Agent Robert S. Coda, who died on February 1, 2006. On January 23, 2006, while Senior Special Agent Coda was in his State-issued vehicle during his normal employment hours, two pedestrian witnesses observed him going through a red light at a slow speed. When the witnesses realized Coda was unconscious, one of them reached into the vehicle and put it in park. Police and Paramedics arrived shortly thereafter and transported Coda to Palos Community Hospital. Coda’s ER report indicates he suffered cardiac arrest and was unresponsive upon arrival, but doctors successfully resuscitated him by administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation, defibrillation, and medication. The ER report also indicates that Coda suffered an acute inferior myocardial infarction, received stenting to the right coronary artery, and was subsequently put on ventilator support with a Diprivan drip. Despite various other medicines administered and procedures performed, on January 30, 2006, doctors informed Claimant that Mr. Coda had severe cerebral anoxia and was not expected to have any meaningful cerebral recovery. Accordingly, Claimant requested that Mr. Coda be taken off life support. Mr. Coda remained in the hospital until his death on February 1, 2006, his cause of death listed as “acute myocardial infarction”. Some of Coda’s previous medical records admitted into evidence reflect that he had minor issues with back, leg, and shoulder pain and that he was on the cholesterol medication Lipitor. Further, the ER/Consultant report Dr. Craig Adams made on January 23, 2006, reflects that previous stenting had been performed on Mr. Coda within the last ten years.

At trial Jeffrey A. Gaida testified that, at the time Coda’s death, he was the Acting Special Agent Supervisor in the Illinois Department of Revenue, Criminal Investigations Bureau. He was responsible for supervising fifteen agents, Coda being one of them. Gaida’s duties included assigning cases, evaluating cases for prosecution, and conducting employee evaluations. He testified that Coda had been a Senior Special Agent for the last seven or eight years and that he knew Coda since 1994, when they both started their training at the State of Illinois Police Academy.

According to Gaida, Senior Special Agents are sworn State peace officers with full Police duties. Coda’s general duties included interviewing witnesses, analyzing records and police-type duties like executing search warrants. Additionally, Coda was involved with the Bureau’s “Revocation Project” for two to three days a week. Coda wore a Kevlar vest and carried a weapon while working on this project. Gaida described the project as one of the Bureau’s more proactive law enforcement activities, because it involves contacting businesses with revoked certificates of registration. Thus, revocation cases were more stressful because agents had to confront people who were non[*289]compliant with the law. Gaida added that some of the people the agents dealt with at the time were aggressive and were often located in dangerous areas.

Although Gaida was not aware whether Coda was working on the revocation project on January 23, 2006, he was told by another agent that earlier that morning Coda stopped by the Des Plaines office, the office at which both Coda and Gaida worked. The last time Gaida saw Coda was either on Wednesday or Thursday of the previous week - Coda’s demeanor did not appear stressful. With respect to Coda’s performance, Gaida stated that he believed Coda had brought in over one million dollars in tax-revenue based on his activity. However, Coda was having a hard time getting credit for the revenue he brought in, this issue remained unresolved at the time of his death.

Claimant, Victoria Coda, testified that the issue of getting the appropriate credit for his generated revenues caused Coda stress. She stated that he was trying to go above his regular supervisor to get the situation rectified but made no progress in his pursuit. The majority of claimant’s testimony focused on how the revocation project really upset Coda. She described Coda as very easygoing and recalled how it was hard for him to go to people’s businesses and threaten them with closure - often, when he would return home from revocation work, he would be upset. Sometimes, he would tell her about threats made against him as well. Claimant noted that the revocation project required agents to “not be nice” and that no one in the department would ever volunteer for it.

Although Claimant and Gaida both described certain stressful components of Coda’s job during the months preceding his death, neither indicated that Coda looked stressed or was suffering from health problems stemming from job related stress Claimant stated that Coda did not complain about feeling ill on January 23, 2006, and that he did not appear more stressed than usual in the months prior to his death. Gaida testified that he was not aware whether Coda had any preexisting medical conditions and did not remember Coda complaining to him about any job related stress.

In the past, this Court has opined that “cases involving heart attacks are among the most difficult presented.” See In re Application of Smith (1990), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 183. The case at bar is no exception. Presented only with lay witness testimony regarding the stressful nature of Coda’s job from his wife and his former IDOR supervisor, this Court must decide the issue that is determinative in all Line of Duty heart attack cases the existence of a causal connection between job related stress and the ultimately fatal heart attack. Although a medical opinion would be probative of this issue and would assist the Court, unfortunately, such evidence is seldom presented in these cases.

This may be due to the claimants’ inability to obtain legal representation. The Line of Duty Compensation act provides that, “[n]o part of such compensation may be paid to any other person for any efforts in securing [*290] such compensation” 820 ILCS 315/3. Therefore, if financial resources are available, a claimant must either pay for an attorney in these cases up-front and out-of-pocket, find an attorney to take the case probono, or proceed pro se without benefit of professional legal assistance. The provision’s practical effect is that most claimants do not have legal representation or expert testimony at proceedings under this Act.

Under provision 705 ILCS 505/19 of the Court of Claim Act, “[t]he Attorney General, or his assistants under his direction, shall appear for the defense and protection of the interests of the State of Illinois in all cases filed in the court, and may make claim for recoupment by the State”. Under the Line of Duty Compensation Act, the AG has an additional statutory duty: “[w]hen a claim is filed, the Attorney General shall make an investigation for substantiation of matters set forth in such an application” 820 ILCS 315/4.

Although the AG routinely complies with its duty to defend Illinois in other cases, the AG takes no position, for or against, the merits of an award in Line of Duty heart attack cases presented to the Court for decision1. Also, the AG does not usually provide the Court with any independent expert medical testimony. Without such information provided to it at or before trial, this Court is placed in the untenable and conflicting position of both investigator and decision maker.

In the case at bar, the AG takes no position in support of or in opposition to this claim. As part of its investigatory duty, the AG would have greatly assisted the Court by providing it with expert evidence supporting or opposing the primary issue presented “Whether Coda’s heart attack and subsequent death were caused by job related stress”. The AG did not include Coda’s ER reports from January 23 to February 1. These reports are probative of Coda’s medical condition from the date of his heart attack to the date of his death. The AG did not seek an independent medical expert opinion. Expert medical testimony would have greatly aided the Court in determining whether Coda’s heart attack resulted from job-related stress. It also would have helped the Court determine whether any preexisting medical conditions contributed to Coda’s heart attack.2

Line of Duty compensation awards are approximately $250,000, while awards in Court of Claims tort claims are capped at $100,000, excepting tort claims involving a State owned or operated vehicle driven by a State employee. It does not make sense that the AG chooses not to take a position only in Line of Duty cases but investigates and protects State interests in all other claims against the State.

Medical records Claimant submitted indicate that Coda had been on Lipitor, a cholesterol medication. Also, the ER reports Claimant obtained indicate that Coda had received stenting within the last ten years. However, while stenting is a medical procedure often associated with different types of cardiac procedures, the ER report does not indicate that Coda’s prior stenting was heart related. Despite the common association [*291]

ANALYSIS

What Kind of Employee was Special Agent Coda?

The decedent having been “killed in the line of duty” is a precondition to granting claimant compensation. Under 820 ILCS 315/2(e) a decedent is “killed in the line of duty” if he died within one year of an injury he suffered while in the active performance of his job duties. However, the requisite circumstances constituting an injury depend on the type of employee the decedent was See 820 ILCS 315/2(e). For a claimant to recover for the death of a law enforcement officer, civil defense worker, civil air patrol member, paramedic, fireman, or chaplain, the claimant must show that the injury arose from violence or other accidental cause. 820 ILCS 315/2(e). However, for a claimant to recover for the death of a State employee, the claimant instead must show that the injury arose from a willful act of violence by another State employee committed during such other employee’s course of employment and that it occurred after January 1, 1988. 820 ILCS 315/2(e).

The threshold inquiry in determining Claimant’s eligibility to receive compensation under the Act is to determine what type of employee Special Agent Coda was. Obviously, Coda was a State Employee. However, more specifically, Coda was a law enforcement officer. “Law enforcement officer” or “Officer” is defined in 820 ILCS 315/2(a) as

Any person employed by the State or a local governmental entity as a

policeman, peace officer, auxiliary policeman or in some like position

involving the enforcement of the law and protection of the public

interest at the risk of that person’s life.

Because Coda had been sworn in as peace officer in the State of Illinois, and because his job duties involved the enforcement of the law and protection of the public interest at the risk of his own life, he was a law enforcement officer under 820 ILCS 315/2(a).

Elements Claimant Must Establish to Successfully Assert her Claim Since Coda was a law enforcement officer, the following portion of 820 ILCS 315/2(e) applies in defining “killed in the line of duty”

Losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active

performance of duties as a law enforcement officer, civil defense that stenting and high cholesterol have with heart problems this Court was unable to find that Coda had a preexisting condition absent expert medical testimony.

[*292] worker, civil air patrol member, paramedic, fireman, or chaplain if

the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received

and if that injury arose from violence or accidental cause [emphasis

supplied].

Thus, Claimant must show the following to sustain her claim under the Act.

1. Special Agent Coda suffered an injury in the active performance of

his duties;

2. His death occurred within one year from the date of the injury; and

3. His injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.

Since Coda suffered the acute myocardial infarction (heart attack) while on duty driving his State issued vehicle, his injuries occurred while he was in the active performance of his duties. Further, his death occurred within one year from the date of his injury because he died within ten days of his heart attack. The Record does not reflect that Coda’s injuries were the result of violence. Thus, in order to prevail, Claimant must establish that Special Agent Coda’s heart attack was caused by some “other accidental cause” See In re Application of Kolowski (1995), 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 443,447.

Did Special Agent Coda’s fatal heart attack while driving his State Issued Vehicle during normal employment hours, arise from an “other accidental cause?”

This Court has found that a heart attack constitutes an injury arising from an accidental cause where the decedent’s heart attack was due to the job activities that he was performing. Smith, 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 184. In cases where the decedent performed physically strenuous tasks during the time of the heart attack, it has been relatively easy for this Court to conclude that the decedent was killed in the line of duty. Kolowski, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 447.

However, cases where the decedent was not performing strenuous physical tasks when the heart attack occurred often require a more thorough examination of the circumstances surrounding the decedent’s performance of duties and a determination whether these circumstances precipitated the fatal heart attack. Smith, 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 186-87. The circumstances evaluated should be as far back as is practical but not overly remote. See id. In Kolowski, during the few days prior to decedent’s death, he worked extra hours, engaged in physically strenuous tasks, and worked in very cold weather conditions. Kolowski, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 447-48. The Court concluded that the decedent’s heart attack constituted an injury arising from “other accidental cause” See id.

[*293] In In re Application of Feehan (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 293, the Court found that a police officer died in the line of duty when he suffered a fatal heart attack after testifying in a burglary case. The court found that in addition to the stress from testifying, the officer had suffered a lot of job-related stress namely the extraordinary amount of overtime he put in and the drug surveillance and stakeouts he had been engaged in.

Additionally, this Court has found that a police fingerprint technician who died of a heart attack died in the line of duty because his heart attack was related to the high-pressure nature of his work. See In re Application of Nicholson (1979), 33 Ill. Ct. Cl. 319. This Court has also held that when a police officer was walking alone on a new beat in high crime area for the first time that such a situation was stressful enough to be considered the accidental cause precipitating his heart attack and death. See In re Application of Ford (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 306.

In the case at bar, Coda suffered his heart attack while on duty driving his State issued vehicle. Gaida, Coda’s former supervisor attested to the confrontational and dangerous nature of the revocation work Coda was involved in. He also mentioned the high revenues Coda had generated but not received credit for. Further, Claimant’s testimony provided insight on how these two aspects of Coda’s job caused him stress. The threats he did not want to make but had to, and the threats made against him, are similar to the stressful job related circumstances in the cases cited supra.

The Court finds that Claimant produced some support for all three elements required to succeed in her claim under the Act. Coda’s heart attack constitutes an “injury” that “arose” from some “other accidental cause,” because his heart attack was due to the job related activities he had been performing. Coda’s “injury” occurred while he was in the active performance of his duties, because his heart attack occurred while he was on duty driving his State issued vehicle. His death occurred within one year from the date of his injury, because he died within ten days of his heart attack. The Attorney General offered no contradictory evidence or argument. Accordingly, this Court finds that Special Agent Coda was killed in the line of duty as contemplated by the Act.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Claimant is awarded $283,129.89 (TWO HUNDERED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY NINE DOLLARS AND EIGHTY NINE CENTS), pursuant to the Line of Duty Compensation Act. 820 ILCS 315/1 et seq.