Charles M. Bingaman v. Illinois Department of Human Services

ORDER

Kaplan, J. This comes before the Court on State of Illinois’ Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter also “Respondent”). Claimant filed his “Objections” and “Suggestions in Support of Objections”, and Respondent filed its Reply.

Charles M. Bingaman, (hereafter also “Claimant”) filed a “Petition for Payment of Claims and for Specific Performance for Breach of Contract” alleging jurisdiction under 705 ILCS 505/8(b) (“All claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois”). Claimant alleges that he had been working for the Office of the Inspector General for the Illinois Department of Human Services when in December 1999 he was asked to assume the post of Network Team Leader. He was promised that he would receive a 3% raise immediately and a 10% raise after he cleared a six month probationary period. Claimant assumed the post of Network Team Leader on January 1, 2000 and performed those duties until June 1, 2001.

Claimant did not receive the 3% or 10% raise and was removed from Network Team Leader position.

Claimant filed a grievance and determination was reached on March 1, 2002. As a result, the Director of Central Management Services (“CMS”) determined that the Claimant should be granted a 3% pay increase from January 1, [*239] 2000 to June 30, 2001, but without raising Claimant’s base salary and without addressing the promised 10% raise.

Respondent has never paid Claimant in accordance with this decision. Claimant alleges Respondent is in breach of the oral employment agreement. Claimant requests specific performance of the contract including a promotion to the position of Network Team Leader per the employment agreement and compensatory damages in the amount of $19,089.76 for back pay and:

1. $55.52 per bi-weekly pay period for from June 30, 2001 to the date of resolution of this matter, being the value of the promised 3% raise increase, calculated on the basis of Claimant’s January 1, 2000 gross annual salary of $48,119, and omitting the anticipated payment for the period January 1, 2000 through June 30, 2001; 2. $200.16 per bi-weekly pay period for each such period between June 30, 2000 and February 1, 2001, being the value of the promised 10% raise increase, calculated on the adjusted gross wage of $52,040.37 (accounting for the promised 3% raise that should have been in effect at the time, but for the breach, plus a 5% annual raise effective February 1, 2000); 3. $206.16 per bi-weekly pay period for each such period between February 1, 2001 and February 1, 2002 being the value of the promised 10% raise increase, calculated on the adjusted gross base wage of $52,040.37 (accounting for the promised 3% raise that should have been in effect at that time, but for the breach, plus a 5% annual raise effective February 1, 2000 and an additional 3% raise effective February 1, 2001); 4. $212.34 per bi-weekly pay period for each such period between February 1, 2002 and the date of resolution of this matter, being the value of the promised 10% raise increase, calculated on the adjusted gross base wage of $52,040.37 (accounting for the promised 3% raise that should have been in effect at that time, but for the breach, plus a 5% annual raise effective February 1, 2000 and an additional 3% raise effective February 1, 2001, and a further 3% raise effective February 1, 2002; 5. $1,850 in unpaid overtime from January 1, 2000 to the present; 6. Statutory interest at 5% pursuant to 815 ILCS 205/2; 7. $1,282.68 in unpaid retirement fund contributions; [*240] 8. Loss of concomitant contributions to the social security system, and loss of additional life insurance benefits; 9. Loss of three week’s sick leave time for stress proximately caused by Respondent’s breach; 10. Costs of suit and any additional compensatory damages.

Respondent filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment. Respondent contends that Claimant’s cause of action is barred by the Statute of Frauds (740 ILCS 80/1) as Claimant is attempting to enforce an oral employment contract for continued employment that exceeds one year. In addition, since the resolution of the Claimant’s grievance was to pay the Claimant a 3% pay increase from January 1, 2000 to June 20, 2001, the Claimant has been fully compensated for his services as a Network Team Leader. Respondent also states that this court does not have jurisdiction over implied or quasi contracts or to rule on administrative decisions, and injunctive relief.

Claimant responds that the Statute of Frauds does not apply here as the agreement could have been performed in less than one year, Claimant is not asserting claims based on an implied or quasi contract theory, only on a promotion with commensurate increases in pay, and claimant is not seeking review of an administrative decision. Claimant does not dispute that this Court does not have jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief.

Within the filed materials is the “Rules Committee Recommendation” that states, in full:

The panel recommends that the grievance be granted to the extent a 3% pay increase be given from January 1, 2000 to June 20, 2001. The grievant was performing the duties and responsibilities of the Investigative Team Leader position and should be compensated for these duties.

Also included in the file is the “Findings and Decision of the Director of Central Management Services”.

In the “Findings”, the Director concurred with the Rules Committee Recommendation and further stated that “the agency did not properly abide by the provision regarding temporary appointments defined in Section 302.150 of the personnel rules”. The Director stated that Claimant “shall be awarded a 3% salary adjustment for the period of January 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001” and that the decision was final and “binding on all parties.”

[*241] Respondent replies that Claimant’s “new assertion” that he never received his award and that Claimant has not exhausted all of his administrative remedies as Claimant could have filed a back wage claim, a mandamus, or a claim with the Civil Service Commission to enforce the award.

The issue to address in this matter is whether this Court has jurisdiction to address this claim. In his Petition, Claimant seeks damages based on a “breach of an employment agreement against the Illinois Department of Human Services and its Inspector General.” Claimant clarifies this in his Response by stating he is alleging a breach of a promise of promotion.

It is axiomatic, and requires no citation of authority-which is endemic in the reports of this Court as well as those of the Illinois reviewing Courts- that for this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, such jurisdiction must be granted to us by statute. Arthur Wulf v. State, 51 Ill.Ct.Cl. 383 (1999). In Michigan Central v.

State, 7 Ill.Ct.Cl. 133 (1933), this court stated that:

Disagreements and disputes may arise between the State and the other parties thereto necessitating the determination of questions of both law and fact. To provide a forum for the determination of such questions the Legislature created the Court of Claims. But it is clear the Legislature did not intend the Court of Claims should take jurisdiction of matters the determination of which had been developed upon other agencies. It was only created to hear claims and demands against the State for which no other forum had been provided. Any other construction of the powers developed upon the Court of Claims would give it jurisdiction to review the decisions of all agencies of the State in all matters involving the moneys due to or from the State. Certainly the Legislature never intended to confer such powers upon this court.

The only statutory delegation of authority to this Court is set forth in Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/8). Therefore, the jurisdictional analysis is whether the claim falls within the scope of any of the jurisdictional grants in Section 8. This Court has long held that our contract jurisdiction is limited to express contracts with the State and does not encompass implied in law contracts (quasi-contracts). Arthur Wulf v. State, 51 Ill.Ct.Cl. 383 (1999).

This Court has rejected implied contract claims because our “contract claim” jurisdiction under Section 8(b) of the Court of Claims Act is limited to actual, express contracts “entered into” by the State. Thomas Rubidoux et. al. v. Northeastern Illinois University et. al., 51 Ill.Ct.Cl. 275, (1998) (count dismissed for want of [*242] jurisdiction). See also, OJA Enterprises, Inc. et. al. v. State, 54 Ill.Ct.Cl. 477 (2001) (wherein the respondent argued that the claimant’s theories of recovery based upon implied contract and unjust enrichment must fail as an express written contract governs the equitable claims implied; it is well settled that implied contracts with State entities are looked upon with disfavor, and this court has consistently held that one dealing with an agent of the State must ascertain at his peril the authority of the agent). See also, Dilbeck (Susan Rhea) v. State, 42 Ill.Ct.Cl.

222 (1990) (even if there was an oral contract, it would not have been enforceable under the Statute of Frauds due to the fact that it was for continuous employment and exceeded one year).

In addition, this court has held that it is well settled that oral or implied contracts are only enforced when provided in an emergency. Aldo M. Sbigoli, D.D.S. v. State, 53 Ill.Ct.Cl. 215 (2000).

Based on the above, this Court has no jurisdiction to address Claimant’s claim for a breach of a contract to promote him. There is no evidence of a written contract, nor evidence of an emergency.

If Claimant’s Petition can be interpreted as an attempt to review the administrative decision of the Director of CMS’ final decision, this cannot be reviewed by this court.

Section 5/3-104 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/3-104) states that Jurisdiction to review final administrative decisions is vested in the circuit court. For example, in Baca v. State, 45 Ill.Ct.Cl. 243 (1992), the court stated that the fact that the review of the decision of the Division of Benefit Payment Control is provided through administrative review in the circuit court prevented the Court of Claims from assuming jurisdiction over the claim. In Baca v. State, 45 Ill.Ct.Cl. 243 (1992), the claimant sought to recover the amount of an unemployment insurance warrant issued by the Illinois Department of Employment Security and the Division of Benefit Payment Control of the Department of Employment Security held administrative hearings to determine whether a warrant should be reissued; the claims adjudicator denied reissuance of the warrant. See also, Rivera v.

State (1981), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 375; Moore v. State (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 108; Anaya v. State (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl.

161.

This is in keeping with the provisions of the Administrative Review Act, ILCS Ch. 735, ACT 5, Art. Ill.

Section 5/3-102 of the Act defines its scope. It provides that the Act shall apply to and govern every action to [*243] review judicially a final decision of any administrative agency where the Act creating or conferring power on such agency, by express reference, adopts the provisions of the Act. Section 5/3-101 of the Act defines what is contemplated by the terms “decision” and “administrative agency” as follows:

“Administrative decision” or “decision” means any decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency. In all cases in which a statute or a rule of the administrative agency requires or permits an application for a rehearing or other method of administrative review to be filed within a specified time (as distinguished from a statute which permits the application for rehearing or administrative review to be filed at any time before judgment by the administrative agency against the applicant or within a specified time after the entry of such judgment), and an application for such rehearing or review is made, no administrative decision of such agency shall be final as to the party applying therefor until such rehearing or review is had or denied. However, if the particular statue permits an application for rehearing or other method of administrative review to be filed with the administrative agency for an indefinite period of time after the administrative decision has been rendered (such as permitting such application to be filed at any time before judgment by the administrative agency against the applicant or within a specified time after the entry of such judgment), then the authorization for the filing of such application for rehearing or review shall not postpone the time when the administrative decision as to which such application shall be filed would otherwise become final, but the filing of the application for rehearing or review with the administrative agency in this type of case shall constitute the commencement of a new proceeding before such agency, and the decision rendered in order to dispose of such rehearing or other review proceeding shall constitute a new and independent administrative decision. If such new and independent decision consists merely of the denial of the application for rehearing or other method of administrative review, the record upon judicial review of such decision shall be limited to the application for rehearing or other review and the order or decision denying such application and shall not include the record of proceedings had before the rendering of the administrative decision as to which the application for rehearing or other administrative review shall have been filed unless the suit for judicial review is commenced within the time in which it would be authorized by this Act to have been commenced if no application for rehearing or other method of administrative review had been filed. On the other hand, if the rehearing or other administrative review is granted by the administrative agency, then the record on judicial review of the resulting administrative decision rendered pursuant to the rehearing or other administrative review may consist not only of the record of proceedings had before the administrative agency in such rehearing or other administrative review proceeding, but also of the record of proceedings had before such administrative agency prior to its rendering of the administrative decision as to which the rehearing or other administrative review shall have been granted. The term “administrative decision” or “decision” does not mean or include rules, regulations, standards, or statements of policy of general application issued by an administrative agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the legislation enforced or administered by it unless such a rule, regulation, standard or statement of policy is involved in a proceeding before the agency and its applicability or validity is in issue in such proceeding, nor does it mean or include regulations concerning the internal management of the agency not affecting rights or interests.

The Central Management Services’ decision involved in the case at bar falls within the above definitions.

There is no evidence that the Act creating the agency at issue did not adopt the provisions of the Administrative Review Act. As such, under Section 505/8(a) of the Court of Claims Act, jurisdiction to review final [*244] administrative decisions is vested in the Circuit Courts. Rockford Memorial Hospital Association v. State, 26 Ill.

Ct. Cl. 215 (wherein the claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the claimant had an adequate remedy in a court of general jurisdiction).

Finally, the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Garimella v. University of Illinois 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 350 (1997).

Considering all of the above, this Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to consider Claimant’s claim for a breach of contract against the Illinois Department of Human Services and its Inspector General Odell Thompson.

Furthermore, if it is Claimant’s position that he is alleging a review of the final decision of the Director of Central Management Services as to Claimant’s grievance, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Finally, even if Claimant’s Petition can be constructed as a Petition to enforce the Director’s final decision, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Also, Claimant’s request for damages indicates that he is seeking damages based on a position that would last over a year, bringing into issue the Statute of Frauds. Claimant’s Petition further requests specific performance of the oral agreement such that Respondent be made to promote Claimant per the oral agreement. This Court also lacks jurisdiction to order this remedy.

For these reasons, Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.