Dorene E. Campbell v. Illinois Department of Corrections

ORDER

Birnbaum, J.

This case is before the Court on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed on May 30, 2008.

Claimant was given until July 1, 2008, to file a response and failed to do so.

By way of background, Claimant filed a complaint on May 7, 2004, for an alleged breach of contract, seeking $19,125 in damages and an unspecified amount of interest and costs as well as $100 in attorney’s fees.

According to Respondent’s Motion, Claimant took advantage of an incentive to retire early from the Illinois Department of Public Health in December 2002. As a condition of the early retirement incentive, a restriction was placed on Claimant’s future employment that limited her to working 75 days each calendar year for the State of Illinois. If she worked any part of a day after already having worked 75 days in a calendar year for the State of Illinois, Claimant would lose her retirement benefits.

[*265] In 2003, Claimant had a contract with the Illinois Department of Public Health to work 75 days. During that contract, Claimant met with Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) Addiction Recovery Management Services Coordinator Dona Howell over lunch. Claimant alleges that during that May lunch meeting, she entered into an oral agreement to work for IDOC on a 75 day contract to develop an evaluation of the Sheridan Correctional Center drug project. No emergency circumstances existed at the time pertinent to the subject of the contract. Because of her 75 day Public Health contract in 2003, Claimant understood that she could not accept employment prior to January 2004 under the rules of the early retirement incentive.

In November 2003, Claimant received a letter from Steven Karr, the Acting Manager of the Planning and Research Unit of IDOC, which Claimant understood to be the beginning of the process of employment and preliminary in the negotiation of the alleged employment contract. In December 2003, Claimant alleges that the New Mexico Department of Public Health offered her a $20,000 employment contract. Feeling that she could not accept the additional work due to the commitment required by IDOC, Claimant turned down the New Mexico contract.

Claimant was given the option to start work for IDOC on December 16, 2003, or January 1, 2004. Karr indicated to Claimant that some preliminaries meetings would take place in December. Claimant and Karr exchanged a series of emails regarding these meetings and preliminary paperwork. Other administrators expressed concern about Claimant not participating in the December meetings, characterizing her as “uncooperative” and “not enthusiastic” about the proposed position. A decision was made to find someone else for the position, though IDOC did not tell Claimant of this decision until she arrived at IDOC’s Planning and Research Unit on January 5, 2004. Claimant arrived at approximately 10 a.m. that day for preliminary paperwork and processing and was informed that she was not getting the contract. Thus, no processing took place and no contract was signed.

In January 2004, Claimant obtained a $20,000, three-month employment contract to begin March 1, 2004, with the New Mexico Department of Public Health. In May 2004, Claimant obtained a 75 day employment contract in the amount of $19,125 with the Illinois Department on Aging to begin work on June 14, 2004.

[*266] A moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c). Since Claimant failed to respond to Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the facts alleged in that Motion are considered undisputed.

To prevail on an employment contract theory, Claimant must first prove the existence of such a contract.

Sennstrom v. State, 46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 304 (1993). In a breach of contract case, Claimant also bears the burden of pleading and proving the contract, the breach, and the damages. James Cape & Sons Co. v. State, 52 Ill. Ct. Cl.

322 (2000). Claimant also bears the burden of proving an enforceable oral contract of employment. Sennstrom, supra.

This Court generally does not enforce oral contracts against the State, although an exception exists for oral contracts to provide services in an emergency. Sbigoli v. State, 53 Ill. Ct. Cl. 215 (2000). There is no evidence that an emergency existed in this case, thus a written contract is necessary to be enforceable. If any contract existed, it was, at best, oral. Claimant acknowledges this in the complaint.

However, even if this Court found that an enforceable contract existed, Claimant mitigated any damages sought. Specifically, Claimant obtained a $20,000 contract with the New Mexico Department of Health and a $19,125 contract with the Illinois Department on Aging for 2004. In contract actions in the Court of Claims, Claimant has the burden of proof, and the obligation to prove his damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

Winters v. State, 54 Ill. Ct. Cl. 337 (2001). Claimant fails to provide this Court a basis to establish any damages suffered given the alternative employment sought and obtained by Claimant. Further, since Claimant failed to file a response to Respondent’s Motion, this Court is left with nothing except the facts contained therein as a basis to establish the element of damages, which as set forth above, appear to have been sufficiently mitigated. There is no evidence that Claimant lost any retirement benefits, so it is unclear what damages Claimant actually suffered.

Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and this matter is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.