GARY MICHAELIS, Claimant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPEMENTAL DISABILITIES, Respondent
Case summary
Claimant alleged harassment, physical assault, forced detention, defamation, and deprivation of civil rights during a psychiatric detention, seeking $10,000,000. The court dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction over non-state respondents and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Statutes cited: 42 U.S.C. §12188(a); 29 U.S.C. 794; 705 ILCS 505/1; 705 ILCS 505/25; 74 Ill. Admin. Code 790.60; 74 Ill. Admin. Code 790.90
Cases cited: Sherry v. State, 55 Ill. Ct. Cl. 437 (2002); Alencastro v. State, 54 Ill. Ct. Cl. 457 (2001); Washington v. State; Washlow v. State, 54 Ill. Ct. Cl. 317 (2001); Lyons v. State, 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 268 (1981)
AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.
Headnotes
- Jurisdiction-The State cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of non-state actors. The only proper Respondent in the Court of Claims is the State of Illinois and its divisions.
- Jurisdiction-Federal and state constitutional issues, as well as claims based on federal statute, are outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.
- Exhaustion of remedies-Claimant must exhaust all other remedies against all other sources of recovery for injury or damages prior to seeking final determination of his claim in the Court of Claims.
ORDER
Birnbaum, J.
This matter coming before the Court to be heard on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court being fully advised in the premises finds that,
On November 2, 2006, Claimant filed a complaint in the Court of Claims alleging he suffered from “harassment, physical assault, forced detention, defamation and deprivation of [ ] civil rights. Claimant is seeking $10,000,000.00 in damages.
Claimant alleges the following in his complaint: On October 28, 2005, Claimant’s then wife obtained an Order for Detention and Examination against Claimant. The South Elgin Police Department picked Claimant up on October 30, 2005 and took him to the Elgin Mental Health Center. Claimant states he was detained there against his will until November 5, 2005. During this time, Claimant asserts the staff of the Elgin Mental Health Center humiliated and harassed Claimant, and used unnecessary force.
Claimant alleges that the Elgin Mental Health Center violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, failed to provide him with reasonable accommodations and equal access to services. He further alleges that [*271] the Elgin Mental Health Center discriminated against him because he is disabled by “requiring disrobing” in order to be admitted into psychiatric care.
ANALYSIS
I. Lack of Jurisdiction Over Certain Respondents
Claimant has named the following parties as Respondents in this case the State of Illinois, South Elgin Police Department, Elgin Mental Health Center, Kane County Sheriff’s Department, and Agents, Officer Rick Wessel, South Elgin Police Chief Merritt, and Kane County Sheriff Ken Ramsey. This Court lacks jurisdiction over the Kane County Sheriff’s Department and South Elgin Police Department and their respective agents.
This Court has previously ruled on the issue of whether the State can be held liable for negligent acts of county public officials Sherry v. State, 55 Ill.Ct. Cl. 437 (2002) (involving Sheriff’s Department of Kane County, County of Kane, and State’s Attorney of Kane County), Alencastro v. State, 54 Ill. Ct. Cl. 457 (2001) (involving Sheriff Cook County), Washington v. State (involving State’s Attorney of Cook County) and Washlow v. State (involving Clerk of the Circuit Court of Livingston County), 54 Ill. Ct. Cl. 317 (2001). The above-cited cases, provide a review of the issue of jurisdiction over these offices and liability of the State in these circumstances.
Throughout this line of cases this Court has held that under the current statutory and constitutional structures governing the Court, the State cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of a Sheriff, County Clerk or State’s Attorney, nor does it have jurisdiction over those officials.
This Court has exclusive and limited jurisdiction over claims against the State of Illinois, and only the State, as set forth in the Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS 505/1 et seq. The only proper Respondent before the Court of Claims is the State of Illinois, and the divisions thereof, namely, Elgin Mental Health Center. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the South Elgin Police Department, Kane County Sheriff’s Department, and Agents, Officer Rick Wessel, South Elgin Police Chief Merritt, and Kane County Sheriff Ken Ramsey.
[*272] II. Lack of Jurisdiction Over Claimant’s Alleged Claim
Claimant alleges that this Court has jurisdiction in the instant case under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. §12188(a), and 29 U.S.C. 794(a) as questions of federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. He also alleges this Court has supplemental jurisdictional pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367 under the Court of Claims Regulations, 74 Ill. Admin. Code 790.
Claimant alleges his constitutional right to vote was denied on November 2, 2004. Claimant then cites to the Illinois Constitution, Article III, §§1-2. He further alleges that his constitutional right to privacy “was violated with the [cassette tape] recordings on my tape recorder were heard by others without my consent and/or when possession of it was given to other without legal authority and/or my consent .” Then, Claimant cites the Illinois Constitution Article I, §6. Claimant further alleges that the Elgin Mental Health Center failed to provide public accommodations, discriminated against him and provided unequal access to services while he was in their care, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
The Court of Claims, being a Court of limited jurisdiction pursuant to statute, does not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain claims based on federal statute, Farrell v. State, 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 275 (2000). Furthermore, federal and state constitutional issues are outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Smart v. State, 48 Ill. Ct.
Cl. 38 (1996) (citing Reyes v. State, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 498 (1979), Winzeler Trucking Co. v. State, Ill. Ct. Cl. 191 (1978) (holding the Court of Claims does not have statutory authority to hear alleged violations of equal protection and due process under federal and state constitutions).
In Ziegler v. State, 55 Ill. Ct. Cl. 405 (2002), the Court further explained:
This Court is a creature of Illinois statute, and our limited jurisdiction is solely what the General
Assembly has granted by law. If a subject matter is not enumerated or encompassed by the
jurisdictional grant in our enabling Act ([Section] 8, Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS 505/8), and if
the jurisdiction over that subject is not granted by another Illinois statute, that subject does not lie
within our adjudicatory jurisdiction to hear and determine claims against the State. Federal
statutory and constitutional claims are among the subjects that are not mentioned in [section] 8 of [*273]
the Court of Claims Act, our primary jurisdictional statute and thus this Court has long held that it
lacks jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law.
In sum, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Claimant’s alleged federal and constitutional claims.
III. Failure to Exhaust All Other Remedies
Claimant has failed to exhaust all other remedies available to him. Both section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations and Section 505/25 of the Court of Claims Act require the Claimant to exhaust all other remedies against all other sources of recovery for injury or damages prior to seeking final determination of his claim in the Court of Claims. 705 ILCS 505/25, 74 Ill. Admin. Code 790.60. This Court has previously held that it does not “seem to recognize any discretion on the part of claimants to pick and choose whom they wish to sue.”
Boe v. State, 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 72 (1984).
In Boe, the Court quoted the holding from Lyons v. State, 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 268, 271-72 (1981) stating:
The requirement that Claimant exhaust all available remedies prior to seeking a determination in this Court is clear and definite in its terms. It is apparent to the Court that Claimant has sufficient time to both become aware of his other remedies and to pursue them accordingly. The fact that Claimant can no longer pursue those remedies cannot be a defense to the exhaustion requirement. If the Court were to waive the exhaustion of remedies requirement merely because Claimant waited until it was too late to avail himself of the other remedies, the requirement would be transformed into an option, to be accepted or ignored according to the whim of all claimants. We believe that the language of section 25 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch 37, par. 439 24-5) and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Claims quite clearly makes the exhaustion of remedies mandatory rather than optional.
Section 790.90 of the Court of Claims Regulations demands dismissal if there is not compliance with the provisions in section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations requiring exhaustion of remedies 74 Ill. Admin, Code 790.90. Claimant has not complied with section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations and section 505/25 of the Court of Claims Act 705 ILCS 505/25, 74 Ill. Admin. Code 790.60. It does not appear that Claimant has complied with the Court of Claims Act and exhausted all other sources of possible recovery. There is no indication in the Complaint that Claimant has sued any of the non-state ‘Respondents’ in other venues.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondent’s Motion be, and the same is, hereby granted, and the claim herein is Dismissed, With Prejudice.