ERIK WILLIAM TAYLOR, Claimant, v. WESTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, Respondent.
Case summary
Claimant alleged breach of contract and misrepresentation after Western Illinois University did not apply all transfer credits to give him junior status. The court dismissed all counts, finding no contract existed in the acceptance letter, the Consumer Fraud Act did not apply to the state, and the tort claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Statutes cited: 705 ILCS 505/22(h); 705 ILCS 505/22(j); 74 Ill. Adm. Code §790.50
Cases cited: Jones v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univs., 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 691 (1983); Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. State, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 345 (1981); Conglis v. State, 14 Ill. Ct. Cl. 73; Weber v. State, 19 Ill. Ct. Cl. 33 (1945); Moore v. State, 11 Ill. Ct. Cl. 491 (1949)
AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.
Headnotes
- Contract-Elements-For a contract to exist there must be an offer, an acceptance of that offer, and consideration.
- Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Businesses Practices Act-A State entity is not a “person” as defined under the Act, and therefore is not subject to a lawsuit under its provisions.
- Limitations-Claimant filed tortuous misrepresentation actions beyond the two-year statute of limitations.
ORDER
STORINO, J.
This cause coming before this Court on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, the matter having been briefed by the parties, and this Court being fully advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Claimant’s complaint is dismissed in its entirety for the reasons stated as follows.
Factual Background
Claimant alleges that he applied to transfer to Western Illinois University (“WIU”) for the Spring 2000 semester.
On December 6, 1999, Claimant was issued an acceptance letter by WIU that stated that Claimant was accepted and his status was as a Junior.
The acceptance letter also indicated that an official notice of transfer credit would subsequently be sent to Claimant upon his registration. On January 13, 2000, Claimant was given his official notice of transfer credit which indicated that 51 hours out of the 71 hours of classes taken at previous institutions would be applied toward the Claimant’s degree requirements.
Having only 51 hours applied toward his degree resulted in Claimant’s classification as a sophomore based upon his semester hour earned.
On December 21, 2004, Claimant filed a three-count2 complaint before this Court against WIU alleging that upon his transfer, WIU failed to apply all previously earned credit hours to his degree requirements, which would classify him as a Junior as indicated in his acceptance letter, thereby resulting in a breach of contract.
Claimant’s complaint is actually five Counts due to the fact that Claimant has labeled Counts I and III in the alternative. The actual
Counts before this Court are: Count I, breach of contract; Alternative Count I, breach of contract; Count II, violation of Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act; Count III and Alternative Count III, tortuous misrepresentation.
[*215] Count I is a claim for breach of contract, alleging the letter of acceptance contractually obligated WIU to entitle Claimant Junior status with the University.
Alternative Count I is a claim for breach of contract between the United States Army and WIU.
Count II is a claim alleging WIU violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.
Count III and Alternative Count III are both claims alleging tortuous misrepresentation on behalf of WIU.
Opinion
Count I and Alternative Count I fail for Claimant has failed to identify a contract which would entitle him to relief if breached.
Claimant fails to attach the contracts identified in Count I and Alternative Count I, thereby mandating dismissal of his contract claims.
74 Ill. Adm Code §790.50.
In addition, with respect to Count I, Claimant relies on the acceptance letter as a contract entitling him to Junior status with the university.
First, this Court does not consider the acceptance letter a contract between the parties.
In order for a contract to exist, there must be an offer, acceptance of the offer, and consideration.
Jones v.Board of Governors of State Colleges and Univs., 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 691 (1983).
This letter of acceptance constitutes merely an offer, only one portion of the necessary elements to give rise to a contract, and does not suffice as a contract in and of itself.
In addition, even if this letter of acceptance was considered a contract on its own, Claimant has not and can not allege a breach of the letter of acceptance because said letter specifically provides that an official notice of transfer credit would be issued to Claimant at a later date.
As such, Claimant has no claim of entitlement to more credit hours than would be issued pursuant to the official notice of transfer credit.
Accordingly, Count I of Claimant’s complaint fails.
In Alternative Count I, Claimant argues that a contract exists between WIU and the United States Army to which Claimant is a third party beneficiary, however, as referenced above, Claimant attaches no such contract, therefore Alternative Count I is subject to dismissal.
74 Ill. Adm Code §790.50.
Claimant does attach an ROTC Nonscholarship Cadet Contract between Claimant and the United States Army obligating Claimant to enroll in the necessary courses at WIU to complete the ROTC program.
However, the attached contract does not suffice as a contract binding WIU to Claimant as asserted under Alternative Count I, for WIU is in no way a party to said contract.
As such, Alternative Count I of Claimant’s complaint fails.
Count II of Claimant’s complaint for violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“CFDBP Act”) fails for a State entity is not a “person” as defined in the Act, thus not subject to a lawsuit under its provisions.
See People v. E & E Hauling, 153 Ill. 2d 473 (1992); see also DuPage Aviation Corporation v. DuPage Airport Authority, 229 Ill. App. 3d 793 (1992).
The CFDBP Act specifically applies to persons defined, in pertinent part, as follows:
“ . . . any natural person or his legal representative, partnership, corporation (domestic and foreign), company, trust, business entity or association, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, member, stockholder, associate, trustee, or cestui que trust thereof.”
As specifically defined, the provisions of the CFDBP Act do not subject a political body, such as the State of Illinois, to liability under the Act, and accordingly, Claimant’s claim under Count II fails.
Claimant’s actions under Count III and Alternative Count III, for tortuous misrepresentation, are barred for having been filed beyond the applicable statutes of limitations.
(See 705 ILCS 505/22(h)).
Both of these [*216] counts sound in tort and are bound by the two-year statute of limitations.
Id.
Claimant’s cause of action accrued no later January 13, 2000, the date Claimant received the official transcript of hours, which put Claimant on notice of the alleged misrepresentation of his Junior status.
As such, Claimant was obligated to file his tort actions no later than January 13, 2002, as subject to the two-year statute of limitations.
Claimant
filed his complaint on December 21, 2004, well beyond the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations is jurisdictional on this Court, and failure to comply leaves the Court powerless to enter any award.
See 705 ILCS 505 22(j); Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. State, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 345 (1981); Conglis v. State, 14 Ill. Ct. Cl. 73; Weber v. State, 19 Ill. Ct. Cl. 33 (1945); Moore v. State, 11 Ill. Ct. Cl. 491 (1949).
Claimant failed to meet these statutory requirements and is accordingly barred from pursuing any remedy before this Court under Count III and Alternative Count III, for this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear these claims.
Accordingly, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted and the Claimant’s complaint is hereby dismissed in its entirety.