Gregory Bartlett v. State of Illinois

ORDER

Birnbaum, J.

This matter is before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

Claimant

filed a complaint on May 1, 2009, stating this is an action "in contract wherein the

Claimant, Gregory Bartlett seeks payment from the State of Illinois of a judgment

entered against its employee, Emmanuel Ford in the Circuit Court of Cook County,

Illinois in the case of Gregory Bartlett v. Emmanuel Ford, No. 06 L 009476.

On

March 1, 2007, a money judgment was entered in favor of Claimant against

Emmanuel Ford for his negligent operation of a motor vehicle owned by the State of

Illinois and assigned to him for his exclusive use."

In that case, Claimant alleged

that the vehicle that struck him was being driven by Tonnita Edwards, which had

been rear ended by the state vehicle which was being driven by Ford.

Respondent argues that this claim should be dismissed for failure to state a

claim, lack of standing, and failure to exhaust remedies.

Claimant filed a Motion for [*245]

Summary Judgment along with his Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss,

basing that motion on pages 1 through 5 of said Response.

On September 27, 2002, Emmanuel Ford, an employee of the Illinois Department of Transportation, was driving a state vehicle for personal use during non-work hours when his car collided with a car being driven by Tonnita Edwards which in turn collided with Claimant's car.

Respondent prepared a Departmental Report wherein Ford states that he was "extremely ill during the week of September 24-27" and "did not have access to his personal vehicle and used the remaining medication" he had in his possession.

At that time, Ford "misused" the state vehicle by driving it to obtain additional medication.

Ford was not acting within the scope of his employment the day of the accident; in fact, he did not even report to work that day.

Following that accident, Claimant filed suit against Ford in Circuit Court and against Respondent.

The latter case was ultimately dismissed on June 28, 2008, for Claimant's failure to file status reports in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008.

Meanwhile, Claimant's case in the circuit court against Ford resulted in an order entering default judgment against Ford on March 1, 2007, in the amount of $25,000 plus costs.

Claimant provides no information about what measures, if any, he has taken to recover this judgment from Ford.

Following Ford's failure to satisfy his judgment, Claimant brought the instant case, seeking payment of the judgment by Respondent pursuant to 20 ILCS 405/64.1, the State of Illinois Self-Insured Motor Vehicle Liability Plan ("Plan").

[*246] Claimant maintains that the Plan operates as an insurance contract between Respondent and Emmanuel Ford whereby Respondent is liable for any judgments entered against Mr. Ford stemming from his use of a state-issued motor vehicle.

Respondent argues that "the Plan is not a contract, but a statutory and administrative rule, pursuant to 20 ILCS 405/64 et seq., whereby the State is obligated to defend and indemnify drivers of state vehicles who meet certain qualifications - 'any employee of (the State and its agencies, departments, etc.)

while acting for or on behalf of the (State and its agencies, departments, etc.) while within the course of such employee's employment, while operating a motor vehicle.'

Plan, para. 5.2.2.

The alleged insurance contract upon which Claimant bases his claim is not a contract at all.

It is a statute creating certain rights for state employees, and corresponding responsibilities of the State to its employees."

Respondent's Reply to Claimant's Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at page 3.

Whether this Court characterizes the Plan as an insurance contract or "a statute" as the State urges, is irrelevant since, as set forth above, said Plan specifies that the employee must have been acting within the course of employment while operating a motor vehicle in order for Respondent to be liable for a judgment entered against said employee.

While, it is true that resolving motions under 735 ILCS 2-619 requires all well pleaded facts in the complaint to be taken as true as well as the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts, it is evident that Ford was not acting within the scope of his employment as required by the Plan.

If

there is a dispute to this fact, the proper party to bring this action before this Court [*247] would be the employee liable for the judgment entered against him individually, i.e., Ford, not Claimant.

Claimant maintains that "[i]f Respondent's argument were accepted, every person injured by a State owned vehicle would be barred from collecting his or her damages in a lump sum but rather relegated to endless wage deductions against the State employee.

Absent that person's bankruptcy, the claim or judgment would never be paid."

Claimant's Response at page 9.

Claimant has failed to provide the Court with any information as to the measures taken to recover directly from Ford, who specifically states in the Department Report that he is "liable for the damages" for both the "state's vehicle and the other vehicle involved in the accident" because he did not have additional insurance on the state vehicle.

Claimant is essentially asking this Court to consider him a third party beneficiary to the contract (Plan) and satisfy the judgment entered against Ford.

However, this Court has held that "[u]nder Illinois law there is a strong presumption against creating rights in a third-party beneficiary.

To overcome this presumption, the intent to benefit a third party must affirmatively appear from the language of the instrument and the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of its execution."

Sargent & Lundy v. State, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 336 (1996).

Claimant

has failed to establish that there is any such provision contained in the Plan.

Claimant also argues that Ford was authorized to drive the state vehicle to "places to obtain medical assistance, including drug stores" pursuant to the Vehicle Operator's Manual.

However, a closer examination of that provision reveals that said travel is only authorized "[w]hen on official travel status" as set forth in [*248] Chapter 2-1(b)(2).

Even in the light most favorable to Claimant, there is no indication that Ford was on "official travel status."

Accordingly, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Claimant's

Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

This matter is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.