SELENA TOM-QUI, Claimant, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.
Case summary
Claimant sought compensation for personal injuries from tripping over a floor mat at an IEPA building. The court granted summary judgment for respondent because claimant's exclusive remedy was workers' compensation benefits she received from her temporary employer, Burke Staffing, and the IEPA was her borrowing employer.
Statutes cited: 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c); 820 ILCS 305/5(a)
Cases cited: Bickerman v. Wosik, 245 Ill.App.3d 436, 438, 614 N.E.2d 551, 552 (3rd Dist. 1993); Parsons v. Carbondale Township, 217 Ill.App.3d 637, 649, 577 N.E.2d 779, 787 (5th Dist. 1991); Fuller v. State of Illinois, 46 Ill.Ct.Cl. 432 (1994); Chavez v. Transload Services, L.L.C., 379 Ill.App.3d 858, 862, 884 N.E.2d 1258, 1262 (1st Dist. 2008)
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Headnotes
- Compensation for personal injuries- Claimant is barred from collecting damages for injuries sustained when tripping and falling over a floor mat of a building owned by the IEPA because she already received workers’ compensation for the injuries from her employer.
OPINION
Birnbaum, J.
This matter coming to be heard on the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. On April 11, 2011 we granted Claimant's Motion an Extension of Time to file a Response to this Motion. Claimant has not filed a Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
THE COURT FINDS:
Claimant seeks compensation for personal injuries she sustained when she tripped and fell over a floor mat while walking out of a building located at 9511 W. Harrison, Des Plaines, Illinois 60016 allegedly owned, operated, managed and/or controlled by the State of Illinois and specifically; the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) on April 23, 2003.
The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c). The plaintiff need not prove her case at the summary judgment stage; she must, however, present a factual basis to support the elements of [*246] her claim. Bickerman v. Wosik, 245 Ill.App.3d 436, 438, 614 N.E. 2d 551, 552 (3rd Dist. 1993).
Where the plaintiff cannot establish an element of her claim, summary judgment is proper.
Parsons v. Carbondale Township, 217 Ill.App.3d 637, 649, 577 N.E.2d 779, 787 (5th Dist. 1991).
The Workers' Compensation Act is an exclusive remedy to recover damages for personal injury from an employer. Fuller v. State of Illinois, 46 Ill.Ct.Cl. 432 (1994); 820 ILCS 305/5(a).
Additionally, a borrowing employer is entitled to the protections of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Chavez v. Transload Services, L.L.C., 379 Ill.App.3d 858, 862, 884 N.E.2d 1258, 1262 (1st Dist. 2008).
At Claimant's discovery deposition, Claimant testified that on the day of her injury she was an employee of Burke Staffing, a temporary employment agency. Claimant further testified that Claimant worked for the IEPA by virtue of her employment with Burke Staffing. Lastly, in compensation for her injuries, Claimant received worker's compensation benefits through Burke Staffing.
Claimant's exclusive remedy for the injuries that she sustained was the worker's compensation benefits that she received from Burke Staffing. Claimant is barred from maintaining the instant claim against her borrowing employer, the IEPA.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
The motion of the Respondent, State of Illinois, is GRANTED, and the claim herein is DISMISSED with prejudice.