Brian Dugan v. State of Illinois

ORDER

Steffen, J.

The Claimant, Brian Dugan, filed suit seeking $140 for medical co-payment that he alleges have been improperly debited against his inmate trust fund account.

The Claimant asks the Court of Claims to compensate him for administrative decisions the Respondent made in deciding who are indigent inmates within the Illinois Department of Corrections (‘IDOC’), whether the Claimant is indigent, whether the Respondent can charge the Claimant a $2 co-payment for medical care, and when the $2 co-payment is deducted from the Claimant’s trust fund account.

Claimant seeks injunctive relief and additionally requests reimbursement for costs, postage, photocopying costs, filing fees, and his time in prosecuting this action at a rate of the minimum wage, totaling $559.28.

For the reasons stated below, Claimant’s claim is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

[*162] I.

BACKGROUND

A case, addressing the same issue raised by Claimant, was decided by the Illinois Supreme Court, during the pendency of Claimant’s claim.

See Hadley v. IDOC, 224 Ill. 2d 365; 864 N.E.2d 162 (2007).

The Illinois Supreme Court found fault with IDOC’s administrative policy, because IDOC failed to take action on the statutory exemption for indigents until an inmate was discharged, a day that the Court recognized would never arrive for those inmates serving life sentences or sentenced to death. Id.

The Court takes judicial notice that Claimant falls into the former of the two categories of inmates, serving multiple life sentences.

Even after a review of the legislative history, the Illinois Supreme Court in Hadley was unable to clarify how the indigence determination should be made.

One

thing was sure, though, that for a statute mandating exemption from a $2 copayments for indigence, there was no authorization for a system under which an inmate’s trust fund account is debited for the co-payment irrespective of whether the inmate is “financially able to afford the co-payment.” Id. citing 730 ILCS 5/3-6- 2(f) (West 2004).

The Court envisioned that the IDOC could implement a system, such as was done, for example, in Massachusetts, which left open the possibility that some inmates could, at some point, have a negative balance in their trust fund accounts after a debit was made for the $2 co-payments.

Ruling that the IDOC was under no compulsion to adopt a regulatory scheme similar to the one adopted by the Massachusetts Department of Correction, the Court merely provided an example of a “type of regulation that could allow for the creation of negative balances, yet still focus on an inmate’s current financial ability to afford the co-payment.” Id.

II. EVIDENCE PRESENTED

Claimant and Respondent agreed that pursuant to 20 Ill. Admin. Code §415.30(g), (f)(3), the Claimant is required to pay a $2 co-pay for non-emergency medical care, unless he is indigent.

What has classified an inmate as indigent by IDOC was introduced at the hearing.

A survey of the indigence classifications reflects the adoption of a regulatory scheme such as Massachusetts’ by IDOC in July of 2007, shortly after the Hadley decision.

From May 1, 1997, to July 1, 2007, an inmate was considered indigent by IDOC if during the entire term of his or her incarceration the offender is without funds to pay the $2 co-pay.

Starting July 1, 2007, an inmate was considered indigent if at the time of service, the inmate’s trust fund balance is under $2 and no time 60 days preceding the service has the inmate’s trust fund account contained more than $2, regardless of the source of funds.

Claimant testified that he has had a negative balance in his trust account since 2000.

Respondent impeached Claimant’s claim of indigence.

The Claimant

admitted to receiving payroll, i.e. state pay, from 2004 to the present and that said funds have been applied to his trust fund account.

From January 24, 2007, through November 6, 2009, Claimant received no payroll, because Claimant has not otherwise been indigent since he received state pay and his trust fund account reflected a positive balance.

Beginning March 16, 2010, Claimant’s medical co-pays, totaling $14, started being deducted.

The dates of each of the $2 invoices, corresponding to the $14 of [*163] medical co-pays are as follows: September 29, 2003, October 9, 2003, October 21, 2003, November 12, 2003, November 20, 2003, December 23, 2003, and January 8, 2004.

Claimant has additional restrictions listed that total $126 in medical co-pays, which have not been deducted from his trust fund account.

There is no guarantee of whether or when those $126 in medical co-pay restrictions will be debited.

Since the hearing date, Claimant notified the Court of Claims by letter that, “As it stands…Pontiac C.C, ceased making their questionable co-pay deductions from my trust account.”

III. COURT OF CLAIMS HAS THE AUTHORITY TO OVERRIDE THE

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS OF THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS THAT CONFLICT WITH THE STATUTE.

The Court of Claims routinely denies review of the disciplinary and administrative policies and decisions of the Illinois Department of Corrections.

White v. State, 49 Ill. Ct. Cl. 187, 189 (1996), citing, Holmes v. State, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 275 (1978), Brady v. State, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 240, 241 (1977), and Tedder v. State, 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 201, 203 (1988).

The Court of Claims grants deference to the Illinois Department of Corrections, as it is charged with the administration and enforcement of the statute, and is given great administrative discretion.

Id; Church v. State of Illinois, 164 Ill. 2d 153, 162, 646 N.E.2d 572, 207 Ill. Dec. 6 (1995), citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc, v. Natural resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).

Courts, however, are not bound by an agency’s interpretation that conflicts with the statute, is unreasonable, or is otherwise erroneous.

Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill. 2d 590, 595, 837 N.E.2d 876, 297 Ill. Dec. 425 (2005); Press v. Code Enforcement Board of Appeals, 149 Ill. 2d 281, 285, 595 N.E.2d 1068, 172 Ill. Dec. 298 (1992); Carson Pirie Scott &Co. v. State of Illinois Department of Employment Security, 131 Ill. 2d 23, 34, 544 N.E.2d 772, 136 Ill. Dec. 86 (1989).

Here, as was pointed out in Hadley, the IDOC’s approach, in an effort to remove any possibility of abuse by inmates, has the effect of swallowing up the $2 exemption.

Under DOC’s rules, the statutory co-payment requirement is imposed

on all inmates regardless of whether they are ‘financially able to afford the

co-payment.’ 730 ILCS 5/3-6-2(f) (West 2004).

DOC’s rules cannot be

reconciled with the statute.

Where an administrative rule conflicts with the

statute under which it was adopted, the rules is invalid.

See Carson Pirie

Scott, 131 Ill. 2d at 34 (recognizing that agency action that is inconsistent

with the statute must be overturned); Ruby Chevrolet, Inc. v. Department of

Revenue, 6 Ill. 2d 147, 151, 126 N.E.2d 617 (1955) (declining to uphold agency

rule that was ‘in clear contravention of the day specific wording of the

statute’ under which the rule was adopted); Greaney v. Industrial Comm’n,

358 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1026, 832 N.E.2d 331, 295 Ill. Dec. 180 (2005) (noting

that ‘[w]henever an administrative rule conflicts with a statute, the rule will

be held invalid’).

Hadley, 224 Ill. 2d at 384-85.

[*164] The actual deduction of $14 of medical co-pays, for payment by the Claimant to Respondent, beginning March 16, 2010, correspond to medical co-pay restrictions that were placed on Claimant’s account and were invoiced on the following dates:

September 29, 2003, October 9, 2003, November 12, 2003, November 20, 2003, December 23, 2003, and January 8, 2004.

Because the administrative rule conflicted in 2003 and 2004 with the statute under which it was adopted, the $2 medical co-pay restrictions for the seven instances outlined above must be overturned, and Claimant is to be awarded the $14 which was deducted from his account.

IV. CLAIMANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE DAMAGES

FOR HIS CLAIM FOR THE REMAINING $126

With respect to the remaining $126 in medical co-pays restrictions, Claimant failed to present any competent evidence of when, if ever, Claimant’s remaining $126 medical co-pays restriction will actually be debited from his account.

And

since the hearing date, Claimant has affirmatively notified the Court of Claims by letter that, “As it stands…Pontiac C.C, ceased making their questionable co-pay deductions from my trust account.”

Each claimant has the burden of proving his or her damages and in the absence of such proof, the claim will be denied.

Harris v. State, 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 184 (1989); Jackson v. State, 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 314 (1992).

Compensatory damages are damages that are awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for a wrong or injury sustained by him and are to make the injured party whole by restoring him to the position before the loss; not enable him to make a windfall or profit.

Harris v. Peters, 274 Ill.App.3d 206, 207, 653 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (1st Dist. 1995) citing Dial v. City of O’Fallon, 81 Ill.2d 548, 558, 44 Ill.Dec. 248, 411 N.E.2d 217 (1980), Rittenhouse v. Tabor Grain Co. 203 Ill.App.3d 639, 650, 148 Ill. Dec. 958, 561 N.E.2d 264 (4th Dist. 1990), Restatement (Second) of Torts §901, comment a, at 452 (1979), McLane v. Russell, 131 Ill.2d 509, 523, 137 Ill.Dec. 554, 546 N.E.2d 499 (1989).

Therefore, Claimant’s claim for the remaining $126 medical copay restrictions which have not actually debited from his account, because he has not suffered an injury and damage, is DENIED.

V. CLAIMANT’S INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS DENIED AND MOOT

Claimant sought injunctive relief in the form of having the Respondent being prohibited from charging him any medical co-pay until he has a positive balance in trust fund account.

This Court lacks equitable power to grant an injunction.

The

Illinois Municipal League v. State, 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 43, 47 (1994); Garimella v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 350, 353 (1996); Gass and Eckermann v. State, 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 186,, 196 (1992).

Since this Court cannot grant injunctive relief, the Claimant is not entitled to the same.

Furthermore, since the hearing, Claimant has notified the Court of Claims that, ‘As it stands…Pontiac C.C, ceased making their questionable co-pay deductions from my trust account,’ making, therefore Claimant’s prior request for injunctive relief, moot.

Therefore, the Claimant’s request for injunctive relief is DENIED.

VI. CLAIMANT REQUEST FOR COSTS REIMBURSEMENT, IN

THE AMOUNT OF $559.28, IS DENIED.

[*165] Claimant sought to be compensated $559.28 for his costs in this matter, to wit, $44.45 copying, $39.58 postage, $15 filing fees, and $475.25 for his time/labor.

The Claimant is not entitled to this compensation.

The Court held in Lucien v. State, 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 221, 225-226 (1994), that in order for a party’s costs to be paid, a statute must authorize payment of costs in order for a party to recover costs.

Costs include filing fees, witness fees, deposition fees and expenses.

Parker v. State, 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 378 (2000).

Postage and copying are not costs. Id.

The State of Illinois is liable for costs only if the statute awarding the costs specifically and clearly names the State of Illinois as liable for those costs.

I & D Pharmacy, Inc. v. State, 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 7, 42 (1984), Cayman Associates Ltd. v. State, 33 Ill. Ct. Cl. 301 (1980), Parker v. State, 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 378 (2000).

The general statute that allows the awarding of costs to plaintiffs who recover damages, 735 ILCS5/5-108 (West 2011), does not name the State of Illinois as being subject to the payment of costs under that statute.

Claimant failed to cite to any Illinois statute that allows for the recovery of his costs in this matter.

Since the Claimant has not alleged authority for an award of costs and since the general statute that allows the awarding of costs to plaintiffs who recover damages does not name the State of Illinois as being subject to the payment of costs, the Claimant’s request for costs is DENIED. IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED that Claimant is granted $14.00 as full satisfaction of this claim.