Germaine Elcock v. State of Illinois

ORDER

BURNS, J.

This case comes before the Court on the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.

The Claimant filed a Response, and the Respondent filed a Reply to the Claimant’s Response.

The Claimant then filed an Amended Complaint.

The Court having read the pleadings and being fully advised in the premises finds:

The Claimant, an inmate under the care of the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed this pro se Claim against the Respondent, the State of Illinois (via the Lake County State’s Attorney), alleging various tort claims under Section 8(d) of the Illinois Court of Claims Act.

Specifically, the Claimant alleges that Lake County State’s Attorney Michael J. Waller and two assistant State’s Attorneys under his supervision conspired to bring false charges of witness harassment against the Claimant as part of a scheme to bolster the State’s case against the Claimant in an underlying criminal matter.

The Claimant’s amended complaint charges the Respondent with malicious prosecution, conspiracy, wrongful indictment and intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 The Claimant claims that as a result of the Respondent’s alleged conduct, the Claimant suffered irreparable harm in the form of a prison sentence longer than the Claimant would have received but for the alleged conduct of the Respondent.

The Claimant seeks $100,000 in damages.

The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Section 2-619, arguing that the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over the Lake County State’s Attorney, and that the Claimant’s cause of action is barred by prosecutorial discretion and immunity.

The issue of this Court’s jurisdiction to hear claims against a county State’s Attorney thus far has eluded clear resolution.

Illinois courts have held that Claims

The Claimant’s original Complaint contained only a single claim for malicious prosecution. In her Response to the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, the Claimant stated that she intended to add a related constitutional claim in her amended complaint. The Claimant’s Amended Complaint, however, included no such constitutional clam but rather the three additional claims of conspiracy, wrongful indictment and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

[*224] against a State’s Attorney acting in the scope of his or her employment must be brought in the Court of Claims.

Price v. State of Illinois and the State’s Attorney of Cook County, 354 Ill.App.3d 90, 93 (2004); see also Biggerstaff v. Moran, 284 Ill.App. 3d 196 (1996); Sneed v. Howell, 306 Ill.App.3d 1149 (1999); Stokes v. City of Chicago, 660 F.Supp. 1459 (1987).

However, this Court has held that a State’s Attorney, as an elected State officer, does not trigger respondeat superior liability of the State, as a matter of law.

Sherry v. State, 55 Ill.Ct.Cl. 437 (2002).

The Court need not address the issue here, because the Claimant’s cause of action is barred by prosecutorial discretion and immunity in any event.

Under

Illinois law, the initiation and prosecution of criminal charges is an important prosecutorial function for which the prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity.

Van

Guilder v. Will County State’s Attorney James W. Glasgow, 588 F.Supp.2d 876 (2008), citing White v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill.App.3d 765 (2006).

This immunity applies, however, only for those activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.

White v. City of Chicago, 3769 Ill.App.3d 765 (2006).

In the instant case, the Claimant seeks damages due to the State’s Attorney’s decision to bring four charges of witness harassment against the Claimant.

The

conduct in question, relating to the imposition of criminal charges, clearly falls within the judicial phase of the criminal process.

The State’s Attorney, therefore, has immunity against the Claimant’s claims stated herein.

Since the Claimant cannot prevail in her claims against the State’s Attorney, the Claimant’s claims against the State of Illinois, via the doctrine of respondeat superior, must fail as well.

For the foregoing reasons, the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the Claimant’s claim is dismissed with prejudice.

All other pending motions in the matter are hereby declared moot.