IVORY FLUCAS, Claimant v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.
Case summary
Claimant, a DCFS employee, sought indemnification for costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending federal and state lawsuits. The court denied Respondent's motion to dismiss, finding it had jurisdiction to determine whether the Indemnification Act applied, and remanded for further proceedings.
Statutes cited: 5 ILCS 350/2(e)(i); 5 ILCS 350 et seq.; 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9)
Cases cited: Lawless v. State, 09CC2064; Loman v. Freeman, 229 Ill. 2d 104 (2008)
AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.
Headnotes
- Indemnification Act- The rationale surrounding the Indemnification Act, as recognized by Illinois Courts, is creating a "duty" to reimburse state employees for their "court costs and litigation expenses and other costs of providing a defense."
ORDER
BIRNBAUM, J. THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Respondent's Motion to Dismiss filed on March 9, 2012, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9).
FACTS
Claimant is an employee of the Department of Children and Family Services, ("DCFS"). Claimant alleges Respondent must indemnify him and pay him $93,458.48 for costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending civil rights and tort claims filed against him, as an employee with DCFS for alleged events occurring between July and August of 2001.
Specifically, on December 27, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a federal suit against Claimant in the United States Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Lipscomb v. State of Illinois, No. 02 C 9445 (N.D. Ill). Claimant requested representation by the Illinois Attorney General to defend the suit pursuant to the State Employees Indemnification Act, 5 ILCS 350 et seq. ("Indemnification Act"). Under the Indemnification Act, a State officer or employee is entitled to representation by the Attorney General and indemnification for damages awarded, court costs, and attorney fees when sued in a civil proceeding in which the plaintiff alleges deprivation of a civil or constitutional right arising out of an act or omission occurring within the scope of his employment. Id. The Attorney General's Office represented Claimant in the federal matter pursuant to the Indemnification Act and on March 21, 2003, the federal court dismissed all of the federal claims with prejudice and all of the state law claims without prejudice.
Subsequently, on July 15, 2003, the same plaintiffs in the federal matter filed a complaint against Claimant in the circuit court, based on the same alleged 2001 events. As before, the Attorney General's Office filed an appearance on behalf of Claimant pursuant to the Indemnification Act. On July 15, 2003, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in the circuit [*118] court, alleging Claimant committed a sexual assault. At this time, the Attorney General's Office withdrew its representation of Claimant and declined to further represent Claimant in the continuing proceedings in circuit court. Thus, Claimant obtained private counsel.
Prior to trial, plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew the sexual assault allegations against Claimant.
On January 10, 2010, the circuit court entered an order dismissing plaintiffs complaint which was upheld in the appellate court on October 29, 2010. After the dismissal, Claimant repeated his request that Respondent provide reimbursement pursuant to the Indemnification Act and was denied.
ANALYSIS
This Court agrees with Claimant that Respondent incorrectly asserts that this Court is an improper venue for Claimants to seek indemnification for costs and fees associated with providing a defense pursuant to the Indemnification Act. Respondent cites Lawless v.
State, 09CC2064, a recently decided opinion in this Court denying Claimant's request for indemnification under the Act. However, the language Respondent cites from Lawless is inapposite as it addresses the mechanism of payment, from the State Treasury through the Comptroller, and not the general right to recover under the Indemnification Act. In this case, Claimant is a State employee who was named in a lawsuit that was subsequently dismissed.
The rationale surrounding the Indemnification Act, as recognized by Illinois Courts, is creating a "duty" to reimburse State employees for their "court costs and litigation expenses and other costs of providing a defense.” 5 ILCS 350/2(e)(i); Loman v. Freeman, 229 Ill. 2d 104 (2008). Public policy considerations dictate that this Court stands as a check against the decisions of the Office of the Attorney General, who otherwise would be the sole authority on all matters of indemnification. In this case, the question of whether Claimant's conduct and subsequent proceedings are indeed outside the scope of the Indemnification Act is a question of fact, ultimately falling within the jurisdiction of this Court. As such, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction must be denied.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that for the above reasons, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. This matter is remanded to the appropriate commissioner for further proceedings.