Seville Staffing v. State of Illinois

OPINION

BIRNBAUM, CJ.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615.

Nature of the Claim

The Claimant entered into a Master Staffing Contract with the Illinois Department of Central Management Services from September 29, 2011 through September 28, 2015. Multiple state agencies utilized the staffing contract, including the Illinois Department of Public Health, the Illinois Mathematics and Science Academy, the Illinois State Police, the Historic Preservation Agency, the Illinois Department of Human Services, the Department of Revenue, and the Emergency Management Agency.

The claimant alleges that multiple invoices have been submitted to the Respondent agencies and that the invoices have not been paid. The claimant has filed, or intends to file, lapsed appropriation claims in this Court for the amount of the unpaid invoices. Claimant is seeking penalties, fees and costs for violations of the Day and Temporary Labor Services Act (“Day Labor Act” or “Act”), 820 ILCS 175/1 et seq., pursuant to these lapsed appropriation claims.

Relevant Statutory Provisions of the Day and Temporary Labor Services Act

The Day Labor Act provides for various penalties against service agencies who employ temporary and day laborers and who do not properly compensate them, as well as imposes penalties on third party clients who contract with the service agency. The Act provides day laborers the ability to bring claims against service agencies, and allows service agencies to bring claims against third party clients. The following provisions from the Act are relevant to this claim.

The Day Labor Act defines a day and temporary labor service agency as:

“Day and temporary labor service agency” means any person or entity engaged in

the business of employing day or temporary laborers to provide services, for a fee, [*208] to or for any third party client pursuant to a contract with the day and temporary labor services agency and the third party client.

820 ILCS 175/5

The Day Labor Act defines a third party client as:

“Third party client” means any person that contracts with a day and temporary labor service agency for obtaining day or temporary laborers.

820 ILCS 175/5

The Day Labor Act defines a person as:

“Person” means every natural person, firm, partnership, co-partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, business trust, or other legal entity, or its legal representatives, agents, or assigns.

820 ILCS 175/5

Section 70 of the Day Labor Act states that:

(a)…Following a First Audit, a day and temporary labor service agency or third party client shall be subject to a civil penalty to not exceed $2,500 for each repeat violation found by the Department within 3 years…the amount of the penalty, when finally determined may be: (1) Recovered in a civil action brought by the Director of Labor in any circuit court. In this litigation, the Director of Labor shall be represented by the Attorney General. (2) Ordered by the Court, in an action brought by any party for a violation under this Act, to be paid to the Director of Labor.

820 ILCS 175/70

Section 95 of the Day Labor Act states that:

(a)…A day or temporary laborer whose rights have been violated under this Act by a day or temporary labor service agency or a third party client is entitled to collect: (1) in the case of a wage and hour violation, the amount of any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to the day or temporary laborer or day and temporary labor service agency by reason of the violation, plus an equal amount in liquidated damages. 820 ILCS 175/95(a)(1).

Section 96 of the Day Labor Act states that:

A day and temporary service agency may recover attorney’s fees and costs in a civil action brought by the day and temporary labor service agency against a third-party client for breach of contract by the third-party client in relation to services provided by the agency to the third-party client if the plaintiff prevails in the lawsuit. 820 ILCS 175/96.

[*209] ANALYSIS

When interpreting the meaning of the provisions of the Act, we are bound to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. See People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Booth, 215 Ill.2d 416, 423, 294 Ill.Dec. 157, 830 N.E.2d 569 (2005). While the Claimant offers various theories as to why the legislature intended to include the State of Illinois in its definition of “Person” when it enacted section 5 of the Act, it is well established that the best evidence of legislative intent is the language in the statute itself. See Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Worker’s Compensation Commission, 30 N.E.3d 288, 295 (2015). That language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. If the statutory language is clear, Courts must not read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill.2d 76, 83, 196 Ill.Dec. 655, 630 N.E.2d 820 (1994).

We agree with Respondent that the legislative intent of 820 ILCS 175/1 et seq. is very clear by the language. If the legislature intended to include the State in its definition of “Person,” it would have done so. For this Court to hold that the State is included in the definition of “Person” because it is a “legal entity” would create ambiguity in the statute where none exists. “Legal entity” is specifically listed in 820 ILCS 175/5; the State is not.

There is no dispute that Claimant provided Respondent’s agencies with temporary and day labor services, that Claimant is pursuing payment of unpaid invoices through various lapsed appropriation cases, or that the Day Labor Act provides for penalties against service agencies or third party clients who employ day and temporary laborers who have not been properly compensated. While the Act goes on to enumerate various entities that may be liable for improper compensation, and for penalties, costs and fees associated with that violation, that list includes only natural persons, firms, partnerships, co-partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, associations, business trusts, or other legal entities. The State of Illinois is not mentioned.

We agree with the Respondent that the penalties, fees and costs provisions of the Day Labor Act do not apply to the State of Illinois. To decide otherwise would require us to ignore the plain and unambiguous language of the statute and read into it an exception or limitation which the legislature did not express.

For all of these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.