Thomas Banks v. State of Illinois

OPINION

GAGLIARDO, J.

Factual Background

On March 22, 2016, Claimant Thomas Banks was sentenced in Cook County Circuit Court for aggravated battery of a child/bodily harm, which is a Class 3 Felony. The order of commitment (mittimus) specified that he was convicted of committing an offense under 720-5/12-4.3(a-5), that he was sentenced to ten years with one year of mandatory supervised release (MSR), and that he was to receive 2,259 days jail credit for time served.

The mittimus did not state what percentage of his sentence Claimant was required to serve, but in the sentencing transcript the sentencing judge stated that Claimant was to serve 50% of his 10-year sentence (five years). Given that his jail credit of 2,259 days amounted to a little over six years, Claimant should have been immediately released by IDOC because his five years would have been up on January 19, 2015.

However, the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) was not privy to the sentencing transcript and is not required to look for court transcripts in calculating a defendant’s sentence. IDOC is entitled to rely on the mittimus, which is what it did. Looking to the Truth in Sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3), IDOC interpreted it as requiring Claimant to serve 85% of his sentence because he was convicted of committing an offense under 720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a-5). As such, Claimant remained in Hill Correctional Institution, with IDOC calculating June 13, 2018, as the date on which he was to begin his MSR.

Because the sentencing court had intended for Claimant to serve 50% of his sentence, Claimant’s then counsel filed a motion with the sentencing court to correct the mittimus to reflect that Claimant was required to serve 50% of his sentence. On April 28, 2016, the sentencing court issued a corrected mittimus stating, “[i]t is further ordered that the one-year MSR term to be served at 50% rate.” On May 6, 2016, IDOC sent the sentencing court a letter requesting clarification on the corrected mittimus and within the letter indicated that they have now calculated Claimant’s sentence to be served at 50% with day for day credit. On May 12, 2016, IDOC released Claimant from custody.

Claimant subsequently filed the instant claim alleging that IDOC negligently interpreted the Truth in Sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3) as requiring Claimant to serve 85% of his [*143] sentence instead of 50%. Claimant argues that had IDOC properly applied the 50% requirement, he would have been released soon after being sentenced on March 22, 2016 and processed by IDOC instead of being released on May 12, 2016. Claimant seeks $100,000 in damages for his incarceration between March 22, 2016 and May 12, 2016.

Analysis

To establish a claim for negligent incarceration, Claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent, via IDOC, owed him a duty, that it breached that duty, and that he suffered damages that were a proximate cause of the Respondent’s breach of its duty. See Henderson v. State, 53 Ill. Ct. Cl. 193, 197 (2001).

Here, it is undisputed that Claimant suffered damages. He was incarcerated for 48 days beyond when he was supposed to be released. It is also undisputed that this is because IDOC interpreted the Truth in Sentencing statute as requiring Claimant to serve 85% of his sentence.

Further, with respect to negligent incarceration claims, this Court has previously held that IDOC has a duty to ascertain the correct legal release date of inmates committed to its custody. See Evans v. State, 55 Ill. Ct. Cl. 395 (2002).

The issue before this Court is whether IDOC breached its duty to Claimant. To determine whether Respondent breached its duty to Claimant, this Court must apply the appropriate standard of conduct, which in general negligence cases is the reasonable person standard.

McDaniel v. State, 69 Ill. Ct. Cl. 156, 158 (2017). This is an objective test, based on the “failure to do something that a reasonable, careful person would do, or to do something that a reasonable careful person would not do under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.”

Dealers Service & Supply Co. v. St. Louis Nat. Stockyards Co., 155 Ill.App.3d 1075, 1081 (5th Dist. 1987).

Here, Claimant alleges that IDOC improperly interpreted the Truth in Sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3) as mandating Claimant to serve 85% of his sentence and not 50%. Thus, we must determine whether a reasonably careful person in IDOC’s position would have interpreted the Truth in Sentencing statute to require Claimant to serve 85% of his sentence. The Truth in Sentencing statute details the percentage of a sentence that must be served with respect to different offenses. Before discussing the relevant portion of the statute, it is necessary to provide a brief background about the offense Claimant was convicted of committing, aggravated battery of a child with bodily harm (720-5/12-4.3(a-5)).

Under 12-4.3, which was in effect until being repealed in 2012, there were two types of aggravated battery of a child: with “great bodily harm” under 12-4.3(a), and with “bodily harm” under 12-4.3(a-5). 12-4.3 classified aggravated battery of a child with “great bodily harm” as a Class X felony and aggravated battery of a child with “bodily harm” as a Class 3 felony. Under the version of the Truth in Sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii)) that was in effect at this time, an inmate serving a sentence for 12-4.3 was required to serve 85% of his sentence regardless of whether he committed “great bodily” harm under 12-4.3(a) or “bodily harm” under 12-4.3(a-5).

[*144] In 2012, the criminal code was reorganized, and all the different types of aggravated battery were organized under one statute, 5/12-3.05. 12-4.3 was repealed, and aggravated battery of a child with "great bodily harm" was now under 12-3.05(b)1, and aggravated battery of a child with "bodily harm" was now under 12-3.05(b)2. The elements remained the same under the new statute, as did the respective Class X felony and Class 3 felony classifications.

When 12-4.3 was repealed in 2012, the Truth in Sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3) was updated to incorporate the new statutes as well as some substantive changes. This updated version is what IDOC applied when calculating Claimant's sentence in March 2016. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii), the applicable version of the updated statute, stated that at least 85% of the sentence must be served where the prisoner is "serving a sentence for aggravated battery of a child as described in Section 12-4.3, now repealed, or subdivision (b)(1) of Section 12-3.05" (West 2016) (emphasis supplied).

Notably, the 85% provision expressly limits its application to 12-3.05(b)1 (aggravated battery of a child with "great bodily harm"), but it still references 12-4.3 as a whole. IDOC interpreted this as meaning that, with respect to a sentence for 12-4.3, the 85% requirement applied to both aggravated battery of a child with "great bodily harm" (12-4.3(a)) and aggravated battery of a child with "bodily harm" (12-4.3(a-5)). Accordingly, it applied the 85% provision to Claimant's sentence for 12-4.3(a-5).

Claimant contends that IDOC should have instead applied the general 50% sentence requirement under the updated Truth in Sentencing statute. According to Claimant, the 85% requirement in the updated Truth in Sentencing statute references 12-4-3 simply to reflect that the 85% requirement applies to inmates sentenced before 12-4-3 was repealed, when the prior version of the Truth in Sentencing statute was in effect and applied the 85% requirement to both aggravated battery with "bodily harm" and "great bodily harm."

Claimant argues that the updated Truth in Sentencing statute has narrowed the 85% requirement to only apply when there was aggravated battery on a child with "great bodily harm" because it expressly limits the 85% requirement to only 12-3.05(b)1 (aggravated battery of a child with "great bodily harm").

Even though the 85% requirement provision contains no such express limitation with respect to 12-3.05(b)1's predecessor, 12-4-3(a), Claimant argues that it should be clear that the 85% requirement is limited to only 12-4-3(a) as well since 12-3.05 and 12-4.3 contain the same language and distinctions regarding aggravated battery of a child with "great bodily harm" and "bodily harm." It would make little sense, then, to interpret the updated Truth in Sentencing statute as applying the 85% requirement to 12-4.3(a-5) (aggravated battery on a child with "bodily harm") when the statute explicitly limits the 85% requirement to only 12-3-05(b)1 (aggravated battery on a child with "great bodily harm").

We agree with Claimant's reasoning. The entire language of 12-4.3 was reorganized into 12-3.05. Someone sentenced under 12-4.3(a-5) has committed the identical offense as someone who is sentenced under 12-3.05(b)2: aggravated battery on a child with "bodily harm." And [*145] someone sentenced under 12-4.3(a) has committed the identical offense as someone who was sentenced under 12-3.05(b)1: aggravated battery on a child with "great bodily harm."

Thus, the updated Truth in Sentencing statute could not reasonably be interpreted as requiring someone sentenced under it to serve 85% of his sentence if he was convicted of violating 12-4.3(a-5) (aggravated battery on a child with "bodily harm") but requiring him to serve 50% if he was convicted of the exact same offense numbered differently as 12-3.05(b)2. It should have been clear to IDOC in 2016 that the 85% provision in the updated Truth in Sentencing statute did not apply to aggravated battery of a child involving "bodily harm."

Accordingly, we find that when IDOC calculated Claimant's sentence on March 25, 2016, it was unreasonable in interpreting the updated Truth in Sentencing statute as requiring Claimant to serve 85% of his sentence for 12-4.3(a-5).

Having found Respondent negligent in applying the 85% requirement to Claimant's sentence, we now turn to the issue of damages. First, we address the number of days for which Claimant is entitled to compensation. Claimant argues that he is entitled to compensation for 52 days, the period between when he was sentenced on March 22, 2016, and released on May 12, 2016. However, even if IDOC had correctly calculated Claimant's sentence, he would not have been released that same day because IDOC did not receive Claimant from the Cook County Department of Corrections until March 25, 2016. Accordingly, we find that Claimant's wrongful incarceration attributable to IDOC's negligence did not begin until March 26, 2016 and that Respondent is responsible for 48 days of negligent incarceration.

That takes us to our next consideration: the amount of damages Claimant is entitled for each of the 48 days he was negligently incarcerated. In arguing that he is entitled to $100,000 in damages, Claimant cites federal cases where the prisoner was wrongfully convicted. We find the instant case distinguishable because Claimant's underlying conviction was not wrongful.

In Evans v. State, 55 Ill. Ct. Cl. 395 (2002), where the claimant's incarceration was negligently extended, we found it appropriate to award $100 per day each day that his incarceration was negligently extended. Id. at 397. However, in Evans, the $100 per day was awarded based on evidence submitted by the claimant that, had he been released on time, he would have been making that amount at the company he had worked for while he was on work release. Id. Here, there is no evidence that Claimant lost any income or even had any potential employment. Nor is there evidence that he incurred an extra expense because of the extra 48 days he spent in jail.

Further, in analyzing the damages Claimant suffered, it is useful to evaluate how the extended period of incarceration impacted his life. Claimant does not offer any evidence on this matter, via testimony or otherwise. However, we note from evidence submitted by Respondent that Claimant received prison sentences totaling 42 years for various convictions including murder, sexual assault, and aggravated battery of a child. We find that 48 additional days of incarceration is compensable but significantly different from incarceration of an individual wrongfully convicted. Therefore, we find it reasonable to award Claimant $100 per day of wrongful incarceration.

[*146] WHEREFORE, Claimant’s claim is hereby granted, and Respondent is hereby ordered to pay Claimant $4,800.