Angel Herrera v. State of Illinois

ORDER

BURNS, J. This matter comes before the Court on the Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Claimant did not file a response. The Court, having read the pleadings and being fully advised, finds as follows:

BACKGROUND

This case involves allegations of medical malpractice against the State of Illinois arising out of the treatment of Maria Gregoria Herrera, who died of heart failure at age 76 on December 31, 2009, two days after being transferred from the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical Center (UIC Medical Center) to a private nursing home.

On December 28, 2010, Claimant filed a 10-count complaint in the Circuit of Cook County against multiple defendants, including UIC Medical Center and the nursing home, Alden Town Manor, as well as several doctors and nurses. On the same day, Claimant filed this claim in the Court of Claims alleging malpractice on the part of named Respondents. This case was put on hold pursuant to Court of Claims Rules while the Claimant pursued her action in the Circuit Court.

On September 14, 2011, the Circuit Court entered an order granting UIC Medical Center’s motion to dismiss on the basis that exclusive jurisdiction against UIC Medical Center lies with the Court of Claims. On November 19, 2012, the Claimant voluntarily dismissed Oliver Graf, MD, a resident physician at UIC Medical Center. Over the next two years, Claimant eventually dismissed voluntarily each of the defendants, without payment before settling with Alden Town Manor for $20,000.

Claimant then reinstated her case in this court, on July12, 2016, Claimant filed an Amended Complaint, alleging one count of negligence on the part of UIC Medical Center, through its agents or employees, in providing proper care instructions to the nursing home at the time of Ms. Herrera’s transfer, leading to her death just two days later. On February 6, 2020, we dismissed the Amended Complaint sua sponte based on certain pleading defects but allowed Claimant 30 days to file an amended complaint.

[*159] On March 5, 2020, Claimant filed her Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended Complaint states that Respondent’s: a) negligently and carelessly transferred Maria Gregoria Herrera to a nursing home in an unstable condition; b) negligently and carelessly failed to adequately communicate the necessary healthcare needs of Maria Gregoria Herrera to the accepting facility Alden Town Manor, which was to provide postoperative acute care to the patient; and c) failed to communicate the need of Maria Gregoria Herrera to be maintained on anticoagulant therapy within therapeutic range due to her risk for post-surgical thrombolic complications.

On December 15, 2021, the Respondents filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. The Respondents’ Motion argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining in this case and that the summary judgment is warranted because a) the Claimant’s single disclosed expert witness lacks the necessary qualifications and foundation to offer standard of care opinions; b) the evidence demonstrates that Ms.

Herrera was discharged for comfort care, which the Claimant’s own expert conceded would have involved no deviation from the standard of care; and c) the subsequent treating physician at the nursing home was aware of all the necessary information and would not have changed his course of treatment.

Analysis

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when views in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c); see also Johnson v.

Ingalls Memorial Hosp., 402 Ill. App, 3d 830, 847 (1st Dist. 2010). Although the nonmoving party is not required to prove her case at the summary judgment stage, Id. If the claimant fails to establish any element of her case of action, summary judgment is proper. Id.

In order to sustain a claim for medical negligence in Illinois, a claimant must show: (1) the standard of care in the medical community by which the physician’s treatment is measured; (2) deviation from that standard of care by the defendant; and (3) injury proximately caused by the deviation from the standard of care. Id.

Here, Claimant alleges that UIC Medical Center acted negligently in transferring Ms. Herrera to Alden Manor in an unstable condition and without adequate instructions as to her post-operative care. In support, Claimant offers the expert testimony of Dr. Richard Sweet, M.D., 76, a nephrologist and clinical professor of medicine at San Francisco General Hospital. Dr. Sweet testified generally in his deposition that the lead UIC physician deviated from standard of care by transferring Ms. Herrera to the nursing home “when she wasn’t really ready for a nursing home” and without clear and adequate advance directives as to her care. Had the UIC doctor and/or staff properly informed the nursing home of Ms. Herrera’s condition and future needs, he opined. “I don’t think they would have accepted her.”

However, the testimony and records in evidence show that Ms. Herrera was being transferred to Alden Home for “comfort care” as opposed to trying to treat her heart [*160] condition, and that both the lead UIC physician and staff conveyed this fact and discussed it with Ms. Herrera’s family prior to the discharge. At least one medical record created at the time of the patient care states that the discharge was being made for comfort care. When asked at his deposition, Dr. Sweet agreed that if Ms. Herrera was transferred for comfort care, then no negligence occurred.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Ms. Herrera had not been transferred for purposes of comfort care only, Claimant’s claim would still fail for lack of proximate cause.

In Illinois, a medical professional cannot be liable for failing to tell a treating physician something the treating physician already knows. Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 311 (1993); Snelson v Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 45-45 (2003).

In Gill, the plaintiff underwent surgery to correct his acid reflux problem. Id at 309. A week later, he reported chest pains to his doctor, who considered them normal after that type of surgery. Id. Two days later, on the morning of his discharge, the patient again complained of chest pains to his doctor, who chose not to examine him more thoroughly. Id. A few hours later, the patient told the discharge nurse about the pain, who advised him to see his family doctor. Id. The patient was discharged, and later had to have emergency surgery to fix a herniated stomach in his chest caused by the initial surgery. Id. At 307-308. The patient sued the hospital on the theory that the discharge nurse had failed to notify the treating doctor about the plaintiff’s chest pain.

Id. At 309. The trial court found the evidence undisputed that the doctor had already known about the chest pain and misdiagnosed the plaintiff anyway. Id. At 310. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital since the nurse’s omission could not have been the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Id.

At 311. Since the proximate cause was an element of the plaintiff’s case, summary judgment was appropriate irrespective of issues of material fact regarding a breach of the standard of care. Id.

When proximate cause is contingent on the actions of an intervening third party, summary judgment is appropriate if there is no evidence the third party would have done anything differently. Johnson v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., 402 Ill. App. 3d 830, 847 (1st Dist. 2010). In Johnson, the plaintiff’s baby was born with brain damage and subsequently died. Id. At 834. The plaintiff sued her doctors for failing to tell her that she was a high-risk patient and for failing to refer her to a delivery doctor. Id. The plaintiff evidently needed a caesarian section, but her own expert conceded it would have been within the standard of care not to perform the procedure based on the evidence available at the time. Id. At 844. Without evidence that informing or referring the plaintiff would have changed the outcome, there was no issue of material fact, and the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Id. At 846.

Here, the record is uncontroverted that Dr. Strnad, the medical director at Alden Town, was fully aware the Ms. Herrera had undergone mitral valve surgery, was on continuous oxygen flow through a nasal cannula, and was being transferred for care to Alden Town. He testified that after the transfer, he examined Ms. Herrera on December 30, 2009, and she was in stable condition. He saw no evidence that she was not properly anti-coagulated. Her noted in his admission history that Ms. Herrera had a history of pulmonary embolism, hypertension, severe mitral stenosis, mild aortic [*161] stenosis, atrial fibrillation, gastroesophageal reflex disease, and history of gastric resection. He was also aware that Ms. Herrera had undergone numerous thoracentesis procedures, including one the prior day. He testified that “the orders that came from (UIC) were very complete and thorough and appropriate for this patient.” As in Johnson, there is no evidence that Dr. Strnad would have done anything differently and thus, summary of judgment is appropriate.

Similarly, there is no evidence in the record that the alleged failure of the UIC Medical Center team to include anti-coagulation medicine on the list of medications in the transfer instructions to the nursing home caused Ms. Herrera’s death. Dr. Sweet testified generally as to his opinion the Ms. Herrera should not have been discharged to the nursing home given her condition at the time, but not to the specifics of anticoagulation medication. As the court noted in Johnson, “the mere possibility of a casual connection is not sufficient to sustain the burden of proof of proximate causation.” Id.

At 846.

Because there is no issue of material fact about whether any conduct on the part of UIC was a proximate cause of the Claimant’s damages, the Claimant cannot prove a necessary element of his cause against UIC and Respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

For the forgoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent’s motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and this claim is hereby denied.