David R. & Marcia Bentley v. State of Illinois

OPINION

GAGLIARDO, J.

A hearing was held before Commissioner Reid on August 4, 2022. The evidence consisted of the pleadings, the testimony of Claimants, Illinois Department of Transportation employee Steven Beran, Exhibits 1A through 4D, 5-8, and Respondent’s Exhibit 1. These Exhibits included pictures of the flooding, damaged home furniture, bank statements, medical records, and the Respondent’s Departmental Report.

FACTS

The facts are clear. A neighbor of the Claimants, Scott Mundhenke, signed a Permit in 2013 which allowed him to “locate, construct and maintain a field entrance on Frazee Road North of IL 104 at the Auburn/Pawnee exit.” This work eventually caused the flooding of the Claimant’s real property. The work under the Permit also included “installing 80 lineal feet of 36-inch diameter pipe culvert… in the ditch line with its flow line placed in the flow line of the ditch.” This work was completed in 2013. There was no problems or complaints about flooding from any residents, officials, etc.. until September 1, 2019. At that time, there was a heavy rain and flooding occurred on the Claimant’s property. The Claimants sought relief from their insurance provider, but the claim was denied. The Claimant’s subsequently filed their complaint on May 21, 2020, with the Court of Claims for damages in the amount of $10,000. No other parties were included in the case.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Claimants bear the burden of proving the elements of the cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. State, 44 Ill.Ct.Cl. 265, 268 (1992). “The mere happening of an accident does not of itself raise any presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant. This is not a strict liability action.” Lind v. State, 31 Ill.Ct.Cl. 332, 324-25 (1977)(citations omitted). A claimant seeking recovery based upon the respondent’s alleged negligence must plead and prove the existence of duty owed by the Respondent, a breach of that duty and injury proximately caused by that breach. Bogenberger v. Pi Kappa Alpha Corp.. 2018 Il 120951; Griffin v. State, 36 Ill.Ct.Cl. 206, 208 (1983).

ANALYSIS

[*263] The Claimants presented no evidence that Respondent had “actual notice” of a dangerous condition, or that the culvert pipe was too small and would cause flooding. This fact was confirmed by the testimony of IDOT Operating Engineer Steve Beran. Accordingly, the Claimants have not met their burden of proof for the existence of a duty owed by Respondent or any breach of that duty resulting in the alleged injury. Moreover, the Claimants have not shown any “constructive notice” of a dangerous condition due to the small pipe and resulting flood. See Tolbert v. State, 57 Ill.Ct.Cl. 199 (2004). In fact, there was no testimony or evidence of constructive notice to the State before the September 1, 2019, flooding. Further, the Claimants wholly failed to exhaust all other remedies and sources of recovery prior to filing a suit in this Court. The exhaustion of remedies is a specific and mandatory requirement of all claimants in the Court of Claims. 705 ILCS 505/25; 74 Ill.Admin.Code 790.60; Gipson v. State, 51 Ill.Ct.Cl. 54, 59 (1999). Specifically, Scott Mundhenke completed the Application for the Permit which allowed the installation of the incorrect size pipe and caused subsequent flooding. The submitted Permit placed responsibility and liability on Mr. Mundhenke, and Claimants have not exhausted their remedies against Mr. Mundhenke. (Respondent’s Departmental Report Exhibit 1). The failure of a person before the Court of Claims to exhaust all administrative, legal, or equitable remedies is grounds for immediate dismissal. Lucius v. State, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 307 (1996). Furthermore, based on the facts presented, even if the mandatory exhaustion requirement was satisfied, Claimant have failed to prove any negligence by the Respondent in that there has not been any evidence to suggest the existence of a duty owed by the Respondent, a breach of that duty, and injury proximately caused by that breach. Accordingly, Claimants’ failure to exhaust all available remedies and Claimants’ reliance on the subsequent remedial measures taken after the flooding incident do not satisfy the elements required to establish the liability of Respondent in a cause of action arising out of the legal theory of tortious negligence.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claimant’s claim is DENIED.