Joseph McFarlane v. State of Illinois

OPINION

The claim is before the Court by way of evidentiary hearing conducted October 3, 2023 before Commissioner Jacksack utilizing teleconferencing. Claimant, Joseph McFarlane, was an inmate with the Illinois Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and resided at Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”) at the time relevant to this claim. Claimant alleges Respondent’s agents failed to provide adequate safety measures at Claimant’s assigned inmate work location, resulting in the amputation of Claimant’s fingertip. Claimant filed his Complaint, dated June 17, 2020, seeking $2,500,000 in damages.

Claimant’s Testimony

At hearing, Claimant testified that on August 4, 2019, he was working at Dixon in Housing Unit 44 at his job as a porter. Duties of a porter include cleaning showers, sweeping and mopping floors, and packing other inmate’s possessions if an inmate is sent to segregation. He had been working as a porter for a few weeks.

At approximately 9:30 p.m., Claimant was cleaning the north and south dayrooms, as part of his porter duties. He was working alone, as no other inmate wanted to work as a porter that evening. Having finished cleaning the south dayroom, Claimant exited the south dayroom, entering the narrow sally port area that connects the south dayroom to the [*204] north dayroom. Separate secure doors from each dayroom connected into the sally port into the sally port. Carrying the cleaning equipment in one hand, Claimant attempted to exit the sally port into the north dayroom. As he did so, the door to the north dayroom slammed shut, catching Claimant’s fingertip and amputating his middle fingertip on his right hand. The door was missing the springs that caused these doors to close properly. Two correctional officers were nearby. Claimant notes the response to his grievance confirms the door was broken and that it was repaired some weeks after Claimant’s injury.

Jeffery Daniels’ Testimony

Jeffery Daniels has worked at Dixon for almost twenty-five years, and has served as the tool control officer for the past nine years. He is familiar with Housing Unit 44. He testified as to the layout of the sally port area that connects the north and south dayrooms. The doors from each dayroom swing inward into the sally port area. When both dayroom doors are closed, the vestibule corridor is eight feet ten inches long. If both doors are open, the distance between the doors is two feet ten inches. The doors have steel frames and glass panels in the top two-thirds of the doors. Such doors are very heavy, weighing between 250 and 400 pounds depending on the thickness of the glass and the weight of the steel. They have hydraulic door closing mechanisms at the top, similar to most commercial doors, that control the closing of the doors. At Dixon, these doors self-latch, which means they automatically lock once closed. There are no door knobs. Rather, they are remotely unlocked from the control center, and the authorized user then must push or pull the door (via a handle on the door) to open it. Once through, the hydraulic closing mechanism re-latches the door, maintaining security. Mr. Daniels could not understand how Claimant, carrying the cleaning equipment as he was, could have gotten his right hand caught in the door as it closed.

Additional Evidence

Respondent filed a Combined Rule 55 Discovery Disclosure/Departmental Report. Claimant’s complaint and all exhibits, and all supplemental filings, are also added to the record.

[*205] Argument

Claimant argues that Respondent failed to provide adequate safety in Claimant’s work environment, requiring Claimant to move through the sally port from one dayroom to the other, where one door’s broken closing mechanism resulted in the amputation of Claimant’s fingertip.

Respondent contests liability.

Legal Analysis

The State is not an insurer of inmates in its custody. However, the State has a duty to provide reasonably safe conditions in its corrections facilities. Dortch v. State of Illinois, 65 Ill. Ct. C1. 135, 136 (2012)(add’l cite omitted). In order to prevail on a claim for negligence, Claimant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the existence of a duty owed to him by the Respondent; (2) a breach of that duty by the Respondent; and (3) that the breach proximately caused the Claimant’s damages. Rivera v. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, 63 Ill. Ct. C1. 218, 224 (2011). Here, the alleged dangerous condition existed at the inmate’s assigned work location. This court recognizes that an inmate at a DOC institution does not usually have the freedom to refuse to perform assigned work even if he or she believes the working conditions to be unsafe. Zernel v. State of Illinois, 58 Ill. Ct. C1. 214, 222 (2006)(add’l cites omitted).

Respondent had a duty to provide reasonably safe conditions at Claimant’s work location. Claimant alleges Respondent breached this duty by requiring Claimant to move through the sally port from the south dayroom to the north dayroom, and by failing to warn of the broken closing mechanism on one of the doors.

To establish Respondent’s breach, Claimant first must establish that Respondent had actual or constructive notice of the broken door mechanism. See Dortch at 136. Claimant alleged in his complaint that the door’s safety mechanism had been broken for a substantial amount of time. However, at the hearing, the only evidence Claimant offered in support of actual notice is the response to his grievance that reflects a work order to repair the door on August 13, 2019 and its ultimate repair on August 21, 2019. As these dates are both after Claimant’s injury, they do not establish that Respondent had actual notice of the door’s broken safety mechanism prior to Claimant’s injury.

[*206] Constructive notice may be imported to Respondent where the condition is substantial enough and has existed for a sufficiently long time that it should have been discovered, that reasonable persons would conclude immediate repairs should be made or warning signs posted. Collins v. State of Illinois, 66 Ill. Ct. C1. 145, 150 (2014)(add’l cite omitted). A broken door mechanism on a door that weighs between two hundred fifty to four hundred pounds is substantial enough that - if the mechanism had been broken for a substantial amount of time - Dixon’s command center should have observed the hazard and posted a warning or taken other precautions. However, Claimant offered no evidence at hearing as to the length of time the safety mechanism had been broken and therefore has not met his burden of establishing constructive notice.

Under certain facts, an exception to the notice requirement applies through the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Where the instrumentality was under the exclusive care and control of Respondent and the injury is such as ordinarily would not have occurred if Respondent had taken proper care, a presumption of negligence arises, and the burden shifts to Respondent to show it had taken proper care. Wiegers v. State of Illinois, 40 Ill. Ct. C1. 88, 91 (1988)(add’l cite omitted). Additionally, Claimant must not be contributorily negligent. Bell v. State of Illinois, 66 Ill. Ct. C1. 178, 179 (2014)(add’l cite omitted). Here, the dangerous condition - the door with the broken mechanism - was under the exclusive care and control of Respondent. Testimony from Mr. Daniels established that the door could be unlocked only by Respondent, from the remote command center. Dixon officers would watch remotely each time someone approached the door to determine if the person was authorized to pass through. If authorized, they would remotely unlock the door, as they did for Claimant. If the door had been properly inspected and maintained, a broken safety mechanism should have been discovered and repaired or replaced. As we noted in Wiegers, it is possible for a mechanical failure to occur spontaneously, even when proper care is exercised. Wiegers at 92. However, also in Wiegers, the Respondent here offered no evidence of proper care, inspection, or maintenance of the door’s safety mechanism. See id. Respondent also does not allege that Claimant was contributorily negligent. Under these facts, the Court finds res ipsa loquitur applies.

[*207] Claimant still has the burden of proving proximate cause. Proximate cause is any cause that in “natural or probable sequence, produced the injury complained of.” Osborn v. State of Illinois, 70 Ill. Ct. C1. 157, 160 (2017)(add’l cite omitted). Proximate cause has two separate and distinct elements: cause-in-fact and legal cause. Collins v. State of Illinois, 66 Ill. Ct. C1. 145, 149 (2014)(add’l cites omitted). Cause-in-fact exists when the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct. Id. Legal cause relates to foreseeability of the injury. Lopez v. State of Illinois, 65 Ill. Ct. C1. 138, 144 (2013).

As to cause-in-fact, Claimant must specifically prove “the nature and extent of his injury attributable to the claimed negligence” and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. Enyart v. State of Illinois, 57 Ill. Ct. C1. 202, 208 (2004). Claimant’s testimony at hearing, as well as his medical records and incident reports included in the Departmental Report consistently detail Claimant’s hand getting caught in the sally port door, resulting in fingertip amputation. The Departmental Report is prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 74 Ill. Admin. Code § 790.140; Zernel v. State of Illinois, 58 Ill. Ct. C1. 214, 219 (2006). While Mr. Daniels expressed skepticism as to how Claimant’s finger would be caught in the door based on which hand Claimant used to open the door, which hand he was carrying cleaning supplies in, and his overall path of travel, the overwhelming evidence shows that Claimant did get his hand caught in the sally port door, resulting in injury. Unlike in Bell, Respondent does not allege that Claimant tried to slip through the broken door, or was contributorily negligent in any way. See Bell v. State of Illinois, 66 Ill. Ct. C1. 178 (2014). As to legal cause, it is foreseeable that a person - including Claimant - who walked through the sally port door without knowledge that the closing safety mechanism was broken would get a hand caught in the door when it closed overly quickly, resulting in injury.

Lastly, Claimant has the burden of proving damages. Claimant claims $2,500,000 in damages, itemized as $1,250,000 for permanent injury that will prevent Claimant from pursuing his career as a construction worker and from engaging in certain work-out exercises to maintain health, and $1,250,00 for pain and suffering.

Claimant has not offered any evidence to the Court regarding any past work as a construction worker, any specific requirements for such work, any limitations that his injury might place on such work, or life expectancy tables, on which the Court could base [*208] an award for future lost wages. Claimant also has not offered evidence as to either present or future limitations on exercising ability based on his injury. The Court does not award damages for future lost earnings or for exercise limitations.

Claimant’s hospital and Dixon medical records establish his immediate pain and suffering following the injury. Medical records also establish the ongoing treatment Claimant received for dressing changes, prescription medication, food accommodations to avoid needing to use silverware, and extended lower bunk permits, as well as permanent disfigurement of the middle finger of his right hand. The Court awards $20,000 for permanent disfigurement and for pain and suffering.

IT HIS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent compensate Claimant $20,000 for his disfigurement and pain and suffering.