Tracey Kiefel v. State of Illinois

ORDER

This matter appearing before the Illinois Court of Claims coming to be heard on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and Claimant’s Objection thereto, and this Court being fully advised in the premises: On June 27, 2014, Universal Protection Services, doing business as Allied Universal Security Services (“Allied”) and the State of Illinois (“State”) entered into an agreement whereby Allied was to provide qualified security personnel to the State for an initial term beginning July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2019 (“Contract”). The Adjunct Illinois Veterans Home - LaSalle, located at 1015 O’Connor Avenue in the City of LaSalle, LaSalle County, Illinois (“LaSalle Veterans Home”) was one of the facilities where Allied was to provide security services to the State pursuant to the Contract. The LaSalle Veterans Home was operated by the Illinois Department of Veterans Affairs (“IDVA”).

Claimant Tracey Kiefel was an employee of Allied assigned to work as a security guard at the LaSalle Veterans Home. On October 11, 2020, Claimant was working at the Illinois Veterans Home, when she allegedly tripped and fell over a wire near the security desk where she was posted and sustained personal injuries. On July 12, 2021, Claimant filed this claim against the State of Illinois and IDVA (collectively, “Respondent”), seeking monetary compensation for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the fall.

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Allied was Claimant’s loaning employer and Respondent was Claimant’s borrowing employer. 820 ILCS 305/1 (a)(4). Under the [*215] Act, liability for loaning and borrowing employers is joint and several. 820 ILCS 305/1 (a)(4). Section 1 (a)(4) of the Workers' Compensation Act provides that: An employer whose business or enterprise or a substantial part thereof consists of hiring, procuring or furnishing employees to or for other employers operating under and subject to the provisions of this Act for the performance of the work of such other employers and who pays such employees their salary or wages notwithstanding that they are doing the work of such other employers shall be deemed a loaning employer within the meaning and provisions of this Section. ILCS 305/1 (a)(4).

This Court has previously defined a company like Allied as a “loaning employer” because it is “[a]n employer whose business or enterprise *** consists of hiring, procuring or furnishing employees to or for other employers.” Bateman v. State, 43 Ill.Ct.C1. 329, 330 (1991) quoting 820 ILCS 305/1 (a)(4). In Bateman, this Court held that the claim was governed exclusively by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act because the temporary agency was a loaning employer, and the State was borrowing employer.

On October 11, 2020, the date of the alleged occurrence, the State was the borrowing employer of Tracey Kiefel. A borrowing employer is entitled to the protections of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Tom-Qui v. State, 64 Ill.Ct.C1. 245, 246 (2012), citing Chavez v. Transload Services, L.L.C, 379 Ill.App.3d 858, 862, 884 N.E.2d 1258, 1262, 319 Ill. Dec. 13 (1st Dist. 2008).

The workers’ compensation insurance that Allied was required to maintain pursuant to the Contract satisfied Respondent’s statutory obligation to maintain workers’ compensation coverage as outlined in Section 305(a)(4): Any one engaging in any business or enterprise referred to in subsections 1 and 2 of Section 3 of this Act who undertakes to do any work enumerated therein, is liable to pay compensation to his own immediate employees in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and in addition thereto if he directly or indirectly engages any contractor whether principal or subcontractor to do any such work, he is liable to pay compensation to the employees of any such contractor or sub-contractor unless such contractor or sub-contractor has insured, in any company or association authorized [*216] under the laws of this State to insure the liability to pay compensation under this Act, or guaranteed his liability to pay such compensation.

On March 29, 2021, Claimant filed a Workers' Compensation Case #21 WC007567. On September 9, 2024, Arbitrator Gerald Granada approved a Settlement Contract that awarded Claimant $315,000. After deductions for attorney’s fees and costs, Claimant received a total of $251,970.52 for the alleged injuries that occurred on October 11, 2020. Claimant now seeks additional recovery for her alleged injuries from the State of Illinois in this Court.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is outlined in Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS 505/8. Section 8 states that the Court of Claims “shall not have jurisdiction (i) to hear or determine claims arising under the Workers' Compensation Act.” 705 ILCS 505/8(a)(i). Section 2-6 19(a)(1) provides for the involuntary dismissal of an action if the court “does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1).

The Workers’ Compensation Act provides for an exclusive remedy to recover damages for personal injury from an employer. 820 ILCS 305/1 (a)(4), 820 ILCS 305/5(a); Tom-Qui v. State, 64 Ill.Ct.C1. 245, 246 (2012) citing Fuller v. Southern Illinois University, 46 Ill.Ct.C1. 432 (1994) and Chavez v. Transload Services, L.L.C., 379 Ill.App.3d 858,862,884 N.E.2d 1258, 1262, 319 Ill. Dec. 13 (1st Dist. 2008).

The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision states that an injured employee retains “no common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer * * * for injuries * * * sustained by an employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided* * *.” (Emphasis added) Bateman v. State, 43 Ill.Ct.C1. 329, 330 quoting 820 ILCS 305/1(a)(4).

This Court finds that Claimant has no common law or statutory right to recover damages from Respondent other than as provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act, Claimant’s exclusive remedy for the injuries that she sustained is the Workers’ Compensation Contract Settlement award that she received from Allied. Claimant is, therefore, barred from maintaining the instant claim against the State of Illinois, her borrowing employer in this Court. Claimant’s claim is precluded by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Further [*217] Respondent’s obligations under the Workers' Compensation Act were fulfilled by Allied pursuant to the Contract. As this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim, this Complaint must be dismissed.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.