Robert Bruno v. University of Illinois

Claimants Robert Bruno, Margaret A. Chaplin, John Buckmaster, James Hutchinson, Al Kagan, R. Grear Kimmel, William J. Maher, Joseph T. Miller, Jay Mittenthal, Walter A. Robinson, Todd Rusk and Mary Stuart have filed a Third Amended Complaint against the Respondent, Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

The Third Amended Complaint alleges breach of their employment contracts when Respondent failed to pay a portion of Claimants’ annual salary due to a pay date change implemented by Respondent.

In answer to Claimant’s Third Amended Complaint, Respondent filed a Combined Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment.

In its Motion to Dismiss, Respondent argues that Claimant’s Complaint fails to state a cause of action because it fails to set forth facts demonstrating existence of a contract, the terms of the contract, breach thereof and damages cause by breach.

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Respondent attaches an affidavit and numerous verified exhibits.

Respondent asserts that summary judgment should be granted in its favor because Claimants’ employment agreements expressly allow Respondent to prorate Claimants’ salaries and because Claimants were paid for every day worked for the pay periods encompassing their claim.

For the reasons set forth herein, Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Facts

Claimants are academic employees of the University of Illinois and entered into respective annual employment contracts in the form of a document titled, “Notice of Appointment,” (“NOA”).

Claimants were academic employees for the 2002/2003 academic year and were all continuing academic employees for the 2003/2004 academic year.

Pursuant to Claimants’ NOAs, for both academic years, Claimants were to receive 12 monthly payments of their annual salaries.

[*195] Beginning in September 2003, Respondent changed its pay date from the 21st to the 16th of each month for academic employees.

The pay date change resulted in a shortened contract year for all academic employees of Respondent, by a period of approximately one week, for the 2003/2004 academic year.

Specifically, the 2003/2004 academic year commenced on August 21, 2003 and ended August 15, 2004, whereas the previous 2002/2003 academic year commenced on August 21, 2002 and ended August 20, 2003.

All continuing 12- month academic employees, which included all of Claimants, were paid for every day worked for both contract years.

Due to the shortened contract year for 2003/2004, the first paycheck for that academic year was impacted by the shortened contract year and was prorated to reflect work for the period from August 21, 2003 to September 15, 2003.

Claimants were notified of the pay date change and the prorated paycheck pursuant to an email issued by Respondent’s Associate Provost and Director of Human Resources on April 14, 2003. In addition, on April 14, 2003, Respondent posted a document on its website notifying its academic employees of the pay date change, the shortened contract year for 2003/2004, and the prorated paycheck for continuing 12-month academic employees.

Claimants subsequently filed suit in this Court claiming that Respondent breached their employment contracts, namely their NOAs.

Claimants’ present Third Amended Complaint alleges, that although Claimants “will have earned full payment of their salary for the 2002/2003 academic year, pursuant to their annual employment contract, have not been paid ¼ of the 1/12 of their annual salary.”

Claimants seek reimbursement of this approximate one week deficiency and seek interest.

Respondent has responded to Claimants’ Third Amended Complaint with a Combined Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment.

Among other exhibits attached to Respondent’s Motion, Respondent has attached the 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 NOAs and an affidavit of Respondent’s Associate Provost and Director of Human Resources.

Respondent asks this Court to either dismiss Claimants’ Third Amended Complaint for failure to properly state a claim or, in the alternative, asks that this Court consider the exhibits attached to its motion and enter summary judgment in its favor.

In response to Respondent’s Motion, Claimant responded with a specific denial and responsive memorandum essentially standing on the allegations of their Third Amended Complaint.

However, in their response, Claimants did admit to the authenticity of the 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 NOAs.

Standard of Review

Section 2-1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides judgment “shall be rendered without delay if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 735 lLCS S/2-1005(c). In response to a motion for summary judgment, it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to show all facts in evidence that plaintiff believes will satisfy his/her burden of proof. Coleman v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 64 Ill.App.3d 974, 979, 382 N.E.2d 36, 40 (1st Dist. 1978). If the plaintiff fails to establish any element of the cause of action, summary judgment for the defendant is proper. Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 862 N.E.2d 985,991 (Ill. 2007) (citations omitted).

Summary judgment is encouraged under Illinois law to aid the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit.

Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 95 Ill. Dec. 305, 409 N.E.2d 867 (1986).

A motion for summary judgment should be [*196] granted only if no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Id.

Although it is a drastic means of disposing of litigation, summary judgment should be allowed when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Quality Lighting, Inc. v. Benjiman, 227 Ill. App. 3d 880, 883-884, 592 N.E.2d 377, 169 Ill. Dec. 890 (1992), Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 560 N.E.2d 586, 148 Ill. Dec. 188 (1990).

Legal Analysis

Illinois law is clear that in order to prevail on a claim for breach of contract, Claimants must show: (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by the Claimants; (3) a breach of the subject contract by the Respondent; and (4) that the Respondent’s breach resulted in damages. Unterschuetz v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. App. 3d 65 (1st Dist. 2004). Claimants’ action fails for the unrefuted affidavit and NOAs attached to Respondent’s Motion clearly indicate that Claimants are unable to establish a breach by Respondent or resultant damages.

Accordingly, there is no triable issue of fact, and summary judgment is appropriate.

Claimants’ NOAs specifically provide that employees are paid an “annual rate” representing the “gross annual compensation of the appointee for services required during a fully appointment year period (academic year, or 12 months, as the case may be), whether payable in the form of salary earnings, purchases of annuity contracts, or in any other manner authorized by law.”

The NOAs also allow for Respondent to adjust an employee’s salary and state specifically that “[a]djustments to salary and changes to other conditions of employment may be communicated electronically.”

Based upon the plain language of the contract at issue Respondent was granted the authority pursuant to the terms of the NOA to adjust Claimants’ salary via electronic notice.

The facts are unrefuted that such electronic notification was provided to Claimants pursuant to the Respondent’s website notification and email issued by Respondent’s Associate Provost and Director of Human Resources on April 14, 2003.

Accordingly, Claimant’s can not establish a breach of the NOA and there is no issue of fact for trial in that regard.

Although this Court need not look beyond Claimants’ inability to establish a breach of contract, this Court also notes that no issue of fact exists with respect to damages.

The affidavit of Respondent’s Associate Provost and Director of Human Resources attests that Claimants were paid for every day worked.

Claimants

have responded to Respondent’s attestation with nothing other than the reference to its Third Amended Complaint.

This alone is not enough to withstand Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.

With respect to motions for summary judgment, Illinois law is clear that when a defendant requests summary judgment, the plaintiff need not establish his case as he would at trial, but he must present some factual basis that would arguably entitle him to judgment.

Rotzoll v. Overhead Door Corp., 289 Ill. App. 3d 410, 418, 681 N.E.2d 156, 161, 224 Ill. Dec. 174 (4th Dist. 1997); citing Malone v. American Cyanamid Co., 271 Ill. App. 3d 843, 845- 46, 649 N.E.2d 493, 495 (4th Dist. 1995).

If a defendant supplies sworn facts that, if uncontradicted, warrant judgment in its favor as a matter of law, a plaintiff may not rest on his pleadings to create a genuine issue of material fact.

Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher and Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376, 380, 313 N.E.2d 457, 459 (1974). Where the moving party’s affidavits stand uncontradicted, the facts contained therein must be accepted as true and, therefore, the failure to oppose a summary judgment motion supported by affidavits by filing counter affidavits in response is frequently fatal.

Id. at 381;

Rotzoll, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 418.

Accordingly, Respondents

are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Claimants’ claim for breach of contract.

[*197] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Claimants’ Third Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot.