Saeed O. Singletary v. Southern Illinois University (carbondale)

ORDER

BIRNBAUM, J.

This matter is before the Court on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Claimant

filed a petition seeking damages for breach of contract and consumer fraud, pursuant to the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. (“Act”).

Claimant enrolled in the MEDPREP program in the fall of 1999.

MEDPREP is a program offered by Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

Claimant was enrolled in the MEDPREP program for two academic years, leaving the program following the spring 2001 semester.

Claimant alleges that Respondent breached its “oral” contract with Claimant by advertising the MEDPREP Program as a service to assist students in the preparation for careers in medicine or dentistry, and then deceptively encouraged Claimant to continue in the MEDPREP Program in the hopes that she would perform in a manner that would increase her chances of being accepted into a medical school.

Claimant also alleges that her denial of admission to SIU School of Medicine, on the basis that she was an out-of-state resident, was an additional breach of Respondent’s contract with her.

Respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Claimant cannot establish the elements of a breach of contract claim and that Claimant cannot establish the essential elements of a cause of action under the Act.

Claimant has responded that there remain factual issues that preclude summary judgment.

First addressing the breach of contract claim, Respondent contends that Claimant cannot establish that she met all required conditions of any alleged contract with the university.

Specifically, Respondent argues that Claimant “cannot establish that she met all conditions required of her,” and [*199] claims that it has presented “uncontroverted evidence” regarding a list of a variety of factual accounts about Claimant’s academic performance, meetings relating thereto, and the residency requirement for acceptance into medical school.

Claimant responds that the reasons behind her academic evaluations are that “Respondent itself undermined Claimant’s ability to boost her academic performance in the sciences by virtue of the conduct of professors Evelyn Jackson and Shirley McGlinn, … contrary to the express purposes of the MEDPREP program and its promise of providing a ‘supportive’ environment’ for disadvantaged students. … Thus, the alleged failure of Claimant to fulfill the requirements of her contract was itself a consequence of a prior breach by Respondent.”

In the absence of evidence of bias, conflict of interest or arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of a teaching institution or its academics, courts have little business substituting their judgment for that of the educational and academic professionals. Tanner v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 43 Ill.Ct.Cl.12 (1989).

This Court discussed the nature of the student/educational institution contractual relationship in Bulloch v. State, 54 Ill.Ct.Cl. 292, 294 (2002), stating:

“That our evaluation of an academic decision arises as a legal determination of whether or not

a breach of contract was committed does not alter this deference. Quite the contrary. The

educational contract between the student and the educational institution inherently and

implicitly adopts the academic standards of the institution - including subjective or

judgmental standards.”

That, indeed, is a critical element of the student’s contractual bargain with the institution: he or she agrees to be judged academically according to the prevailing (or duly established) standards of academic performance. Among other things, the application and enforcement of those academic standards are one of the underlying premises of higher education programs that maintain the value of the degree or certificate that the student agrees to earn. Thus the court enforces the parties’ educational bargain by upholding the academic standards set by the academic professionals.

In this case, Claimant alleges that Respondent somehow failed to hold up its end of the bargain when the Student Progress Committee (SPC) gave her a rating of “Recommended with Reservations” on the basis that she had “not shown sustained academic performance over a period of time.”

As set forth above, such determinations are subjective by nature and this Court is reluctant to substitute an institution’s judgment with its own.

Claimant provides deposition testimony of Claimant and Dr. Harold Bardo, MEDPREP Director, regarding alleged conversations that took place between them.

These conversations are the basis of Claimant’s breach of oral contract allegations.

It is evident that Claimant has a different recollection than Dr. Bardo regarding these alleged conversations.

Even viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Claimant, she cannot establish that there was a meeting of the minds.

Claimant has the burden of showing that there was a meeting of the minds in order to establish that a contract existed.

In

Weidmann v. State, 57 Ill.Ct.Cl. 209 (2005), this Court considered whether an alleged oral contract to reinstate a medical student to the University of Illinois College of Medicine was enforceable noting, “[e]ven if claimant was able to establish that some kind of offer was indeed made, she also had the burden of proving a meeting of the minds regarding the terms of the offer. What is required to establish a meeting of the minds is proof of the intent of two parties to agree on the terms of the contract,” citing Vandevier v. Mulay Plastics, Inc., 135 Ill. App. 3d 787, 482 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1985). “Where it appears [*200] that the language used of the terms proposed is understood differently by the parties, there is no meeting of the minds and no contract exists between the parties.” Id.

This absence of a meeting of the minds bears particularly on any alleged promises made by Dr. Bardo regarding residency requirements.

Specifically, Claimant alleges that she had a conversation with Dr. Bardo during which he told her that being enrolled in the MEDPREP program for the spring session automatically fulfilled residency requirements for SIU School of Medicine eligibility and acceptance.

Dr. Bardo denies making any such representations to Claimant.

Claimant’s testimony to the contrary is the only evidence that such a promise was made.

This is insufficient to establish a breach of contract, given the policies set forth by Respondent and deposition testimony of Dr. Bardo and other university officials.

Summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, if any, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c); Jensen v. Bayer AG 372 Ill. App. 3d 682, 862 N.E.2d 1091 (1st Dist., 2007).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Claimant, she cannot produce evidence that there was any express or implied contract with Respondent that guaranteed a more favorable recommendation from the SPC or that she would necessarily be eligible for the School of Medicine’s Alliance Program.

Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the breach of contract claim is GRANTED.

Respondent next argues that Claimant cannot establish the elements for the cause of action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act.

In order to establish a violation under the Act, Claimant must establish that (1) Respondent committed a deceptive act, such as the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, (2) Respondent intended to induce Claimant’s reliance on the deception, and (3) the deception occurred in a course of conduct involving trade or commerce.

Brody v. Finch University of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 298 Ill. App. 3d 146, 698 N.E.2d 257 (2nd Dist., 1998).

Claimant alleges that she was induced to participate in a program that ultimately failed her because she did not gain admission to medical school.

However, at no time does Respondent guarantee that Claimant will be accepted to medical school.

The evidence provided by Claimant shows that Respondent indicated certain steps could be taken by Claimant to increase her chances of admission.

Again, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Claimant, she cannot establish the first two prongs required to show violation of the Act.

Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.